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INTRODUCTION 
“Where force is necessary, we have a moral and strategic interest in  
binding ourselves to certain rules of conduct” – President Barack Obama,  
“A Just and Lasting Peace,” Nobel Peace Prize Acceptance Speech,  
Oslo, Norway, December 10, 2009 
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Opening Remarks 
The introduction of this thesis will be written in the style of a memoir. I wish to 
explain my reasons for choosing such a touchy and controversial topic and the process of 
personal growth that I have experienced in researching it. It has become an identity-
exploration project, an attempt to reconcile my self-definition as a human rights activist 
and a student of Political Science. Perhaps it is not typical to bring in a personal take to an 
academic paper, but I feel that it will serve the reader well to understand from where I 
came and to where I have gone. After all, the purpose of the thesis is to shed light on a 
much misunderstood topic and better comprehend what really did happen and why, 
though I will admit right from the start that this paper will not solve the Abu Ghraib 
mystery nor provide a clear-cut definition of torture. The larger purpose of the paper is, as 
said above, to understand what happened and why. A discussion of what constitutes 
torture is vital to answering those questions, but what is most important is being able to 
understand all of the factors that contributed to the policy decisions and realities on the 
ground and of course, what we can learn from it. The research design, background, and 
literature review will be addressed as part of this personal introduction under the general 
heading of “Research Design”; any additional details I feel I have left out will be included 
in the subsequent “Background” section.  
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Research Design 
Spring semester of 2009, I began planning my thesis topic and my interests in 
human rights, social services, food, nutrition, and politics coalesced into the idea of 
researching the history of hunger in the US and presenting policy prescriptions to tackle 
it. This all changed when I, as president of Boston College’s Amnesty International 
Chapter, hosted an event in February based on Amnesty International’s “Fight Terror 
with Justice” campaign. Father Hollenbach (theology professor and director of Boston 
College’s Center for Human Rights and International Justice) served as the event 
speaker, and we followed his presentation with a screening of the Amnesty International 
documentary “Taxi to the Dark Side.”  
After the viewing, I felt so outraged that I was convinced that I had found my 
thesis topic. I did not like the Bush Administration anyway for a number of other policy 
matters quite removed from the war on terror and this just seemed to be unquestionable 
proof that the government was up to no good and was haphazardly disregarding our 
values, morals, and traditions in the name of fighting terrorism. As the description on the 
back of the documentary’s jacket reads, “…[T]he torture and killing of an innocent 
Afghan taxi driver…symbolize the erosion of our civil rights and how what it means to be 
an American has changed forever.”   
I had seen the photographs. I had seen the hooding and noise-canceling 
headphones, nudity, chaining to walls and ceilings, mimicking of sexual acts, the placing of 
women’s underwear over a detainee’s head, prisoners put on leashes, un-muzzled dogs 
allowed to scare prisoners, the shackling and/or stacking of naked prisoners together, 
beatings, deaths, etc. I wanted to know why on earth someone thought that this was okay 
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to do. From the little I knew about military culture, I knew that soldiers followed orders; 
improvisation and freelancing are not tolerated. Thus I felt that, even if I could not find 
one explicit memo directly linking President Bush to the abuses that happened at Abu 
Ghraib, Bagram, Guantanamo Bay, and elsewhere, there had to be a better reason for 
these abuses than just a “few bad apples” who went crazy on the night shift. 
So I began my research. In March, I attended Amnesty International’s Annual 
General Meeting at the Park Plaza Hotel in downtown Boston. One of the panels I 
attended was “Closing the Door on Guantanamo, Opening the Door to Justice.” The 
panelists included Matthew Alexander, former US military interrogator in Iraq and author 
of How to Break a Terrorist: The US Interrogators who Used Brains, Not Brutality, to Take Down the 
Deadliest Man in Iraq. His testimony was relevant not only because of his job, but also 
because he began his service in Iraq in March of 2006, at a time in which the enhanced 
interrogation techniques (EITs) approved for high-level al-Qaeda detainees had been 
(temporarily) revoked. Thus his stories of success accomplished without the use of EITs 
seemed to suggest their excessive and unnecessary nature.  
The other speakers were Scott Horton, human rights attorney and visiting 
professor at Hofstra Law School, and Stephen H. Oleskey, attorney at WilmerHale and 
co-lead counsel in the case of Boumediene vs. Bush, who spoke less to interrogation 
techniques and more to (what they saw as) the denial of detainee due process of law rights 
and the importance of holding officials accountable for egregious breaches of the law.   
By the end of the semester I had watched the documentary Torturing Democracy, 
whose bias is amply revealed by the title. A litany of new terminology and personnel was 
brought into my vocabulary: Office of Legal Counsel (OLC), KUBARK, SERE, Steven 
Bradbury, Major General Geoffrey Miller, stress positions, etc. were concepts and people 
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I had to begin to digest and comprehend. The vast and complicated nature of the topic I 
had chosen was beginning to hit me.  
Over the summer, I read several works, ranging from Monstering: Inside America’s 
Policy of Secret Interrogations and Torture in the Terror War by the senior editor of the liberal 
political magazine The American Prospect Tara McKelvey to War by Other Means: An Insider’s 
Account of the War on Terror by former Deputy Assistant Attorney General for the Office of 
Legal Counsel (Department of Justice) John Yoo. I was convinced by Yoo’s arguments 
about the necessity of the wiretapping program and the dangerous stupidity of insisting on 
a warrant to spy on every email, text message, and phone call sent between terrorists. I 
agreed that terrorists did not deserve POW status and consequently, would not be 
afforded the same level of treatment or legal protections.  
Yet I still felt a great level of unease, having seen indisputable proof that American 
soldiers had abused and tortured detainees. McKelvey’s book is largely a psychological 
profile of the miscreants who were the main perpetrators of the Abu Ghraib scandal, but 
she also seeks to prove that Abu Ghraib was not an isolated incident, but rather that it was 
part of a deliberate system of abuse designed by top officials.  
At this point, I felt I had my argument and just needed to find the additional data 
to back it up. I proposed to argue that programs and rules designed for a handful of high-
profile al-Qaeda members – for reasons I had yet to fully comprehend – became standard 
practice for all detainees. Techniques and procedures originally limited to use by trained 
professionals were okayed for lower-ranking, untrained soldiers who, working within a 
permissive environment and under enormous pressure to provide “actionable intelligence,” 
let loose and went beyond formal guidelines. Because I knew that abuses were not limited 
to Abu Ghraib and that the abuses that happened at various prisons in Afghanistan, Iraq, 
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and Guantanamo resembled each other, I was convinced that there was simply no way 
that these instances of torture were solely the responsibility or product of the imagination 
of a handful of soldiers. Everything I read seemed to point to a lenient system that, in 
providing maximum flexibility to interrogators, was creating a permissive environment 
that turned into systemic abuse. 
In November, I attended Amnesty International’s annual Northeast Regional 
Conference at Boston University. One of the talks addressed the “Counter Terror with 
Justice” campaign and the panelists once again included Mr. Oleskey. The other speaker 
was Shayna Kadidal of the Center for Constitutional Rights. During his presentation, Mr. 
Oleskey referred to Guantanamo as a “legal black hole.” The narrative put forth by Mr. 
Kadidal, one highly favored by the Left, is that Major General Geoffrey Miller, who was 
in charge of Guantanamo from November 2002 through March 2004, brought his abusive 
system of interrogation and detention from Guantanamo to Iraq, which led to Abu Ghraib.  
For the fall semester of 2009, I also took a course on the American Presidency and 
was required to read The Terror Presidency by Jack Goldsmith, former Assistant Attorney 
General for OLC. Taken as a whole, Goldsmith’s book is a defense of Bush 
Administration policies achieved by a detailed analysis of the US legal culture, with 
pointed criticisms of certain aspects of the administration’s tactics, such as its go-it-alone 
approach that he argues has weakened the executive branch.  
I recall one day in class when the professor mentioned that he had read the memo 
detailing the tactics used on high-level detainees and that he did not think they were that 
bad at all, that there were strict guidelines as to how the hand and fingers had to be placed 
if you were to slap a detainee and how detainees were thrown against a bouncy wall that 
made a lot of noise, but caused no real damage. I remember being thoroughly confused 
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and commenting in class that what had happened went far beyond that. I did not know 
what memorandum he was referring to, and in a lapse in my research, I did not investigate 
the matter. Only later did I realize that we were both right.  
Over Christmas break, in an effort to compensate for what was a less-than-ideal 
commitment to my thesis during the first semester due to personal issues, I tackled my 
thesis as a whole, determining section headings and the flow of the paper, did more 
research, lots of editing, and by the end of the break, I felt much more reassured in my 
ability to produce a solid piece of scholarly work. I had done greater exploration on legal 
definitions of torture; I had determined what were the myriad factors I wanted to discuss 
to make my case for why torture happened and why it could continue to happen if policies 
were not changed; I did research on legislation that I had overlooked.  
I came back from Christmas break prepared to spend the semester mainly refining 
my paper, without having to do much additional research. At the end of January, I was 
fortunate enough to meet Jack Goldsmith at Harvard University where he currently 
teaches and discuss my topic with him. The conversation made me realize that I had 
overlooked many, many aspects of the topic. Those techniques my professor had 
mentioned in class that I was so confused about, for example, were part of an officially 
sanctioned list that had been made public by the Obama Administration that same fall. 
There was more information out there now and I had not picked up on it.  
He suggested I read Marc Thiessen’s Courting Disaster: How the CIA Kept America 
Safe and How Barack Obama is Inviting the Next Attack, which had been published just weeks 
before. This is the type of book that, in most other circumstances, I would likely have 
written off as right-wing propaganda (which, granted, it may be, but the book has been 
enormously important to the writing of this thesis). My take would have been: How could 
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anyone possibly defend what happened at Abu Ghraib, Bagram, Camp Nama, and 
Guantanamo as morally and legally sound? Especially considering that many of the people 
who were subjected to abuse and torture were not valuable in terms of intelligence but had 
unfortunately been at the wrong place at the wrong time, I felt that there just could not be 
a justification for treating people in such a manner. I feel proud to be an American, but I 
could not reconcile these images and the fear-mongering rhetoric of the administration 
with the liberal, democratic ideals that this country so much stands for. I felt that in some 
bizarre twist of logic, the administration was trying to justify the discarding of our 
principles and values so as to save them in the long run. 
The point is, I read the book and had to reconsider many parts of my thesis. Here 
was someone who lambasted both the Center for Constitutional Rights and WilmerHale 
for playing “lawfare” and undermining national security. Yet I had recently heard 
representatives from both speak at the Amnesty International events highlighted above. 
Who was right?  
Before exploring further the impact of Courting Disaster on my research, I would 
like to clarify what this thesis is not about. It will not address questions regarding habeas 
corpus, military commissions, access to lawyers, and all of the other due process questions 
of that nature. This paper focuses only on detention and interrogation techniques, with an 
emphasis on the latter. 
It would be a poor show of scholarship to let one book dominate my thesis and be 
convinced of one argument and set everything else aside. But that is not what I did; 
Thiessen did not provoke within me a complete reversal of my original perspective. His 
adamant defense of the CIA detention and interrogation program and other Bush 
Administration policies, however, did expose me to some powerful revelations.  
12 
First, I realized that no one (no one, obviously, except a few extremists) defends 
the use of torture, regardless of his or her political persuasion. The problem arises when it 
comes to defining torture and even more messily, defining “cruel, unusual, and inhumane” 
treatment which, depending on what laws you cite, is legal or illegal. Bush supporters 
(largely those on the right side of the political litmus test) believe that what the Bush 
Administration legalized and implemented was not torture and that cases like Abu Ghraib 
are instances of unauthorized and illegal abuse and torture; they are cases that strayed 
from sanctioned behavior. Bush naysayers (largely those on the Left) think that there 
must be a link between the top and bottom and are more wary of approving tactics that 
stray, for example, from the US Army Field Manual on Interrogation, for fear that 
flexibility can lead to abuse.  
Whatever the interpretation, no one was or is trying to legalize torture. Take for 
example the May 10, 2005 memorandum issued by Steven Bradbury, then head of OLC, 
which, while simultaneously defending the CIA interrogation program, states on the first 
page: “Torture is abhorrent both to America law and values and to international norms.” It 
made me see that the Bush Administration was sincere in its public statements about the 
US’ commitment not to torture.  
What is so important about realizing that no one is trying to authorize torture is 
that it neutralizes the arguments that critics (including myself) make about how torture is 
useless for intelligence purposes. Confessions made under torture are notoriously 
unreliable and, to use a classic line, a person will say anything to stop the torture. The 
point is, confessions that may have been extracted from those prisoners at places like Abu 
Ghraib who were paraded around naked, beaten, shackled together, etc. were probably 
full of holes and not useful in the slightest to intelligence officials. But what was 
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authorized was taken to not be torture and therefore whatever intelligence was gained 
from detainees who underwent EITs was considered reliable (although, of course, subject 
to verification).  
Thiessen lists example after example of crucial intelligence we collected from 
detainees who underwent EITs. Those in the Bush Administration were not under the 
impression that it had to torture in order to get the information it needed; it did not try to 
make the case that torture can produce good intelligence. Using torture to extract 
confessions, after all, is illegal under US law. The argument it did make was that EITs 
made for good intelligence and it implemented strict guidelines for their use so as to 
adhere to US law. 
That sincerity and thoroughness, however, does not take away from the reality of 
abuse and torture that has happened to those in US custody during the war on terror. 
Thiessen goes to great lengths to explain how the techniques employed by the US, and 
even the extent of the abuse where it did occur, are so minor in comparison to all of the 
unfair parallels critics draw to the Nazis, the Khmer Rouge, the Japanese during World 
War II, and various other cases of blatant state-sanctioning of torture. I never believed 
that the Bush Administration came anywhere near these dictatorial, hideous regimes.  
Yet it is important for the US to maintain very high standards, particularly during 
crisis situations, for that is what distinguishes us from dictatorial regimes that use crises as 
excuses to impose martial law and subjugate the people. It is healthy that the American 
public is concerned with cases of abuse, even if they may be statistically insignificant when 
compared to the entire historical record. We are a democracy and that requires civic 
engagement and participation; it demands questioning of government policies and a 
constant striving for a commitment to the ideals and values that make us who we are.  
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The second major revelation from reading Courting Disaster is more of a question 
rather than a clarification of doubts I had. Thiessen chides Bush Administration critics as 
not understanding the stakes at hand, as not being realistic, as undermining national 
security by insisting on a level of detainee treatment that is better than those that criminals 
in US prisons receive. He lambasts President Obama for wanting to close Guantanamo 
and for eliminating the CIA’s special detention and interrogation program for high-level 
al-Qaeda operatives. Critics, he argues, are hurting the US by throwing around the word 
“torture” and calling the Bush Administration evil, without knowing what really 
happened.  
He quotes former Vice President Dick Cheney as describing critics’ logic as 
follows: “‘Well, I think it was a dark period in American history, and I have these ideals, 
and in order to uphold my ideals I’m going to cancel these programs’” (Thiessen 237). As I 
read that, I thought, is that me? Do I write off the Bush Administration as simply a black 
spot on the American record and that what needs to happen now is a thorough reversal to 
get us back on track? Thiessen’s argument is that the US did not stray from that track at 
all; the Bush Administration simply had to make tough choices that any wartime president 
would have to make. He stayed within the law and did what he thought was best to save 
American lives and prevent another terrorist attack. We have remained true to our ideals 
and the soldiers who did commit abuses strayed from those ideals and were promptly 
punished.  
But that analysis is not sufficient. The part that he does not adequately address is 
why those on the Left feel that certain measures taken by the Bush Administration were 
not necessary and why replacement measures had to be implemented in an attempt to 
correct what were perceived as grave mistakes. Most on the Left are not crazy and are not 
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using present circumstances for personal and political gain; at heart here are members of 
the Left like myself. There is a reason that I felt compelled to research the topic of torture 
and its relation to the Bush Administration. There is a reason why President Obama felt 
compelled to end the CIA program. Enough happened to make a significant segment of 
the population sufficiently suspicious to begin and sustain an anti-Bush campaign. I 
believe that it is a failure of the Bush Administration to adequately address people’s 
criticisms that has led to the terrible backlash that Thiessen argues is jeopardizing national 
security.  
This thesis will hopefully help illuminate some of the reasons why the Left feels so 
moved to criticize and question and wishes to limit our flexibility in fighting terrorism. 
Goldsmith argues that one of the primary reasons is the secrecy surrounding the 
Administration’s work; it avoided collaboration with Congress and other relevant 
departments like the Department of State, thus arousing suspicion in others.  
I argue further that much has to do with the tone and rhetoric of the 
administration; the constant fear-mongering, unaccompanied by public declarations of 
exactly how what we were doing was saving lives, made it seem as if the administration 
was intentionally trying to keep the American public in the dark as it went on a rampage 
around the Middle East to squash any and all signs of terrorist activity against the US. In 
addition, the Bush Administration talked frequently about how its efforts were creating a 
new, democratic, and peaceful Middle East. Yet it seemed that we were not capturing 
“hearts and minds” at all but were rather provoking more people to turn against us, thus 
making the US less safe rather than more.  
Thiessen argues that a key reason why the Bush Administration did not reveal 
more information was for national security purposes. But that excuse, for as genuine as it 
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may be (and after reading his work, I believe the argument), is difficult to sustain for very 
long in a liberal democratic society and as Thiessen himself points out, silence allows the 
opposition to frame the story to its liking, which is what the Left did as time went on and 
the Bush Administration continued to keep all information under wraps. Too much 
secrecy for too long causes the public to begin to lose conviction in the efficacy of the 
government’s efforts, and thus in their necessity as well. In addition, threats to national 
security do not give the president a “do-whatever-it-takes” mandate as long as he can 
retroactively defend it based on the keeping of the American people safe. Our ideals as 
well as our safety need defending. 
So, in a sense, I finish where I began. The question is: is there a link between what 
the CIA was allowed to do to high-level detainees and what happened at places like Abu 
Ghraib? It seems doubtful (though not impossible) that, given military culture and history, 
soldiers at various locations would dream up the same sick things to do and have at it. 
There had to be a basis for it somewhere, though I knew I was not going to find some 
golden memo that showed a direct link between the two. Yet I hesitate to excuse top 
leadership of all responsibility for abuses that happened on the ground. Something went 
terribly wrong and low-level soldiers cannot alone be to blame. Please read further to see 
my argument as to what extent that link exists. 
 However, this thesis is designed to push further than that and to serve as a 
clarification piece for people who, like me, come into this topic with a mindset that grave 
abuses and torture must have been the product of executive policy. It is written for those 
who are angry that so many Afghan goat herders and Iraqi taxi drivers ended up in the 
mix when they had nothing to do with terrorist actions against the US. It is for those who 
still have lingering doubts about certain techniques and how close they come to being 
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torture. It is for those that question the sincerity and practicality of the administration’s 
efforts to spread democracy across the Middle East. It is about asking one’s self what 
defines patriotism. The Bush Administration was adamant in its rhetoric that the public – 
and the world – could either be supportive of its policies and be patriotic, or criticize it and 
thus be “un-American.” I argue that this is an unnecessary and dangerous dichotomy. The 
US can defend itself and preserve its values and principles concurrently. We do not have 
to surrender liberty in order to preserve it, nor ignore democratic norms so as to save 
them. This thesis, by analyzing the arguments of both the Bush Administration and its 
critics, is about that balancing act, so that both sides of the debate will be in a better 
position to produce future policy decisions that honor the American commitment to law, 
liberty, and security.  
It is also to remind the reader of the unfortunate reality that terrorism is alive and 
well; there are people out there who have made it their life objective to kill Americans. 
There simply is no getting around that fact. The threat is real and for better or worse, the 
Bush Administration took the steps that it believed were necessary to keep Americans 
safe. I am scared, but I know that our country is capable of striking a balance between 
safety and ideals and I have realized that the Bush Administration struck a better balance 
than I had originally assumed.  
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Background 
October 7, 2001, the US began military action in Afghanistan (Operation 
Enduring Freedom). On January 11, 2002, the first detainees (coming from Afghanistan 
and Pakistan) arrived at Guantanamo Bay. On March 20, 2003, the US invaded Iraq 
(Operation Iraqi Freedom). On April 28, 2004, CBS television network was the first to 
make public evidence of the Abu Ghraib abuses on its program 60 Minutes II. A few days 
later, The New Yorker published the photos.  
The government responded with several investigations and reports. The major ones 
come from the military, such as the Taguba, Fay-Jones, and Schlesinger reports, and 
understandably so, given that the people charged with crimes were largely military 
(specifically Army) personnel. However, the Red Cross also produced a report and several 
other internal reviews were conducted by the CIA and the FBI. Most of these reports, too, 
are now part of the public domain. Several of them, in fact, are quoted and reproduced in 
many of the major works of Bush Administration opponents. Two of the most well known 
are The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib by Karen J. Greenberg and Joshua L. Dratel 
and Mark Danner’s Torture and Truth: America, Abu Ghraib, and the War on Terror.  
In terms of Supreme Court cases, there have also been several, such as Hamdi vs. 
Rumsfeld (2004), Hamdan vs. Rumsfeld (2006), and Boumediene vs. Bush (2008), which have 
attacked various aspects of war on terror policy. These cases will be addressed only 
nominally, for they tend to focus on other aspects of the war on terror, such as military 
commissions and habeas corpus.  
Legislation surrounding the question of torture is also an important source of 
information, particularly in its ability to act as a political barometer of the general 
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sentiment of not only members of Congress, but also the public. The Patriot Act of 2001, 
the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, and the Military Commissions Act of 2006 are just 
three examples of post-9/11 legislation that have shaped the US’ handling of the terrorism 
threat. 
In addition to the sources already mentioned, the body of literature addressing the 
topic at hand continues to grow daily, in part because of lobbying from groups like the 
American Civil Liberties Union that, through the Freedom of Information Act, are 
pushing for release of more and more previously confidential government documents. 
Several were released during the fall of 2009, including the second August 1, 2002 memo 
which listed the ten techniques approved for use by the CIA for high-level al-Qaeda 
operatives.  
Furthermore, several people involved with the Bush Administration have since 
written memoirs and have done interviews detailing their experience (the examples 
already mentioned include John Yoo, Jack Goldsmith, Marc Thiessen, and Matthew 
Alexander). Particularly now that many Bush officials are no longer working for the 
White House (such as Vice President Dick Cheney), the slew of personal accounts about 
the Bush years are filling bookstore shelves.  
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CHAPTER I: WHAT IS INTERROGATION? 
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I.I: Why Intelligence is Crucial to the War on Terror 
To be able to make judgments concerning the policies that the Bush Administration 
made in regards to detainee treatment during detention and interrogation, it is vital to first 
understand what interrogation is and what is its purpose. It is not as obvious as it may 
sound. Furthermore, it is probably fair to say that the idea of interrogation in and of itself 
makes the average person uncomfortable, with the vague notion played up in the media of 
a dark room with tough-looking men grilling their subject. This perception acts as a bias 
against seeing not only interrogation’s usefulness, but also its necessity in certain contexts. 
This section will serve to clarify that necessity and the procedures related to interrogation.  
In war1, there are many strategies for spying on and attacking the enemy. 
However, the war on terror presents quite a dilemma to traditional war techniques 
because al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations by definition do not follow standard 
military procedures. Concretely, that means that terrorists, “unlike previous enemies…do 
not have mass armies or flotillas of warships that can be observed by spies or tracked by 
satellites” (Thiessen 15). The paucity of visible traces places a heavy burden on gathering 
intelligence concerning the enemy’s operations and plans. 
Thiessen explains that there are essentially three avenues that intelligence officials 
can use to complete this mission. Those include penetration of the enemy (i.e. spies and 
double agents), “‘signals intelligence’ – using advanced technology to intercept and 
monitor the enemy’s electronic communications,” and interrogation (Thiessen 77). All 
three of these methods are being used, but this paper will focus solely on the use of 
interrogation as a means of gathering intelligence. 
                                                
1 This thesis will operate under the assumption that the war on terrorism is in fact a war and will thus be 
referred to as such. This thesis will not debate the merit of the war metaphor, but will touch briefly on the 
corresponding responsibilities that come with war in chapter IV.II. 
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The value placed on intelligence in the war on terror cannot be underestimated; the 
Bush Administration fervently believed that only by interrogating those within al-Qaeda’s 
ranks could it possibly begin to 1) define such an amorphous enemy and 2) prevent 
further attacks. As President Bush said to the nation in his September 6, 2006 address, 
“‘To win the war on terror, we must be able to detain, question, and, when appropriate, 
prosecute terrorists captured here in America, and on the battlefields around the world’” 
(qtd. in Thiessen 393). 
Proponents of the Bush Administration’s CIA interrogation plan (analyzed further 
in chapter III.II) emphasize that it has been an enormously important resource for not 
only learning about what particular plots the enemy has hatched, but also about al-Qaeda 
itself: its organization, its recruiting tactics, its financing, its methods of communication, 
etc. Thiessen goes so far as to assert that “[u]ntil the program was temporarily suspended 
in 2006…well over half of the information our government had about al Qaeda…came 
from interrogation of terrorists in CIA custody” (Thiessen 10). The more knowledge the 
US has about how al-Qaeda operates, the better US intelligence officials will be at 
knowing what to look for as they try to piece together scattered pieces of intelligence into 
a coherent lead that will allow the US to thwart terrorist actions.  
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I.II: CIA “Black Sites” 
Part of the reason that the US has been able to gather so much information is 
because of its use of the highly controversial overseas “black sites” to conduct 
interrogations. Controversy has sprung forth because of the secretiveness surrounding 
these sites and the fact that some of them are located in countries with poor human rights 
records, which lead to accusations that the Bush Administration purposely selected them 
in order to avoid the law, both domestic and international.  
In the eyes of the interrogator, however, “black sites” were crucial. CIA personnel 
had 24/7 access to detainees and took advantage of that by constantly comparing the 
stories of one detainee to another, playing them off of each other to discover the truth. 
After questioning one detainee, for example, a CIA official could immediately go over to 
the cell of another detainee and search for either confirmation or denial of the previous 
detainee’s statements.  
The secure location also allowed the sharing of limited secret information, such as 
“asking them to explain the meaning of materials captured in terrorist raids, and to 
identity phone numbers, email addresses, and voices in recordings of intercepted 
communications” (Thiessen 48). This is a modern enemy without tanks and forts; the 
ability to trace the enemy through the cyber world is of the utmost importance. Being able 
to elicit confirmation of information like phone numbers and email addresses is a way in 
which US officials can use intelligence and security databases to look for patterns which 
might lead them to the capture of another al Qaeda member or to the placing of someone 
on the no-fly list so as to prevent his entrance into the United States. The sharing of 
certain information related to al Qaeda’s operations simply could not happen in less secure 
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locations, where the risk of leaks would be far greater. Anywhere that was in the battle 
zone, such as Afghanistan or Iraq, posed too much risk when determining where to house 
the most dangerous of those whom the US captured.2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
2 For an even more elaborate defense of the use of interrogation as an intelligence-gathering tool, see 
Thiessen 77-78.  
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I.III: Defining Interrogation 
The 1992 US Army Field Manual on Interrogation3 defines interrogation as: 
…the process of questioning a source to obtain the maximum amount of usable information. The 
goal of any interrogation is to obtain reliable information in a lawful manner, in a minimal amount 
of time, and to satisfy intelligence requirements of any echelon of command. (1-6&7) 
 
 The manual goes on further to explain that while there are different forms of 
interrogation (namely interviews, debriefings, and elicitations), all of them share three 
principles: “objective, the prohibition against use of force, and security” (1-7). As to the 
first principle, the interrogator must always have his objective in mind and only 
interrogate with the intention of fulfilling his objective.  
 While having a clear objective seems very straightforward, it is crucial in relation 
to the question of torture. As will be elaborated upon later, intention matters when 
determining if an act of abuse constitutes torture or not. If the interrogator’s objective is to 
cause severe suffering on the part of the detainee, then there are grounds for designating 
that treatment as torture. However, if the interrogator was acting solely on the intention of 
fulfilling his objective and had no alternative sadistic motive, even if the result of the 
interrogation is severe suffering, the treatment cannot constitute torture and the 
interrogator cannot, therefore, be prosecuted for torture. The objective defines the motive 
and it is that legally-defined motive that protects the interrogator, as well as making clear 
to him the specific duties of his job and that he may not stray from them under any 
circumstances, or he runs the risk of prosecution. 
                                                
3 Since 1992, there has been an update to the manual, completed in 2006. The reason that the older version is 
used for this section is due to the fact that it was the version used during the first several years of the war on 
terror and thus the version available when many of the policies were made regarding detainee interrogation 
and treatment.  
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Contrary to popular belief, the process of gathering information from detainees is 
actually separate from the interrogation process, as reports Marc Thiessen.  
Interrogation was not how we [intelligence officials] got information from the terrorists; it was the 
process by which we overcame the terrorists’ resistance and secured their cooperation – sometimes 
with the help of enhanced interrogation techniques [explained in detail in chapter III.II]. Once the 
terrorists agreed to cooperate, interrogation stopped and ‘de-briefing’ began, as the terrorists were 
questioned by CIA analysts, using non-aggressive techniques, for information that could help 
disrupt attacks. (Thiessen 45) 
 
This may seem a bit as if Thiessen were splitting hairs, since interrogation’s 
ultimate objective is the extraction of information, but it is helpful in counteracting, to a 
certain extent, the common criticism levied against the Bush Administration that 
information confessed under torture or abuse is unreliable. As enhanced interrogation 
techniques were being employed, detainees were not being questioned for information the 
US needed; it was not the 24 scenario in which the interrogation continues until the 
detainee reveals the location of the ticking bomb. It is not a confession that will end 
interrogation; it is rather a judgment call on the part of the interrogators in determining 
when they feel that the detainee is now in a cooperative state and will be willing to share 
sensitive information.  
Furthermore, using methods for the purpose of extracting information can run up 
against legal definitions of torture (see chapter II.V). An interrogator may not cause 
severe suffering on the part of the detainee for the purpose of extracting a confession; 
according to US and international law, this is not a legitimate objective. Securing 
cooperation and extracting information are seen as two different processes.  
Thus the purpose of enhanced interrogation techniques is to give detainees an 
incentive to talk. Again, this may sound as if the detainee is motivated to talk only in order 
to stop the interrogation, but the argument set forth by Thiessen is that the interrogation 
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and de-briefing process tends to be a one-way street. First interrogation occurs, then de-
briefing, with rare episodes of going back to interrogation. What is more, interrogators 
have means by which to verify and check the validity of detainee statements, thus helping 
them sort between false and true confessions. Keep in mind, however, that this is the 
argument put forth in defense of the CIA detention and interrogation program and does 
not, therefore, cover similar programs under military command.  
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CHAPTER II: WHAT IS TORTURE? 
I want to be absolutely clear with our people, and the world: The United States does not torture. It’s against our 
laws, and it’s against our values. I have not authorized it – and I will not authorize it.  
– President Bush, Sept. 6, 2006 speech, qtd. in Thiessen 400 
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II.I: The US Constitution 
There are two matters addressed by the US Constitution that are relevant to this 
discussion. First is its role in clarifying the rights of the individual. The Fifth, Eighth, and 
Fourteenth Amendments are the most pertinent to interrogation and detention. The Fifth 
Amendment refers to the inability of a person to be denied their liberty “without due 
process of law.” In short, this means that a person must be found guilty of a crime before 
they can be punished. The Fifth Amendment is thus the basis for the American legal 
tradition of “innocent until proven guilty.”4  
The meaning of liberty in the amendment, however, goes beyond its role as a 
symbol of the right to know with what crime one is charged and the opportunity to defend 
one’s case in court before being thrown in jail. Examining a certain understanding of 
torture (the one that this paper will defend) can also elucidate what defines liberty. 
Torture is a means of denying a person his5 liberty because it deprives him of free will, or 
in other words, a person’s ability to act and speak for himself, independent of the influence 
of others. When torture occurs, there is a gross asymmetry of power between the torturer 
and the tortured. The torturer has such overwhelming control over the tortured that the 
relationship is akin to that of master and slave, wherein the slave must always obey the 
will of the master and the master can compel the slave to do anything he so desires. The 
                                                
4 Based on the war approach taken by the Bush Administration to address terrorism, the legal motto became 
“guilty until proven innocent.” The guilt of those in US custody was assumed and they would not be given 
legal recourse to challenge their detention. This changed beginning in 2004, when the Supreme Court 
compelled the administration to grant habeas corpus to non-US citizens held at Guantanamo (consolidated 
cases of Rasul vs. Bush and al Odah vs. United States on June 28, 2004) and habeas corpus to US citizens 
detained during the war on terror (Hamdi vs. Rumsfeld on June 28, 2004). 
 
5 Throughout the paper, in the event that a singular subject should be needed, “he” will be employed to 
reflect the fact that the majority of detainees have been male, though there have also been female detainees 
whose stories have largely been ignored by the media. 
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one considered inferior becomes a tool for the gain of the superior and is no longer 
considered nor treated like a person.  
Torture objectifies people, stripping them of their humanity and turning them into 
a pawn for the powerful. It is this dehumanizing element intrinsic to torture that makes it 
so offensive to the human conscience. What distinguishes humans from the rest of the 
animal world is agency: the capacity to control one’s own life without being programmed 
to do so by nature or forced to do so by another person. Liberty is, among other things, 
mental and physical autonomy.  
With torture, the objective is to break the victim into total submission. That 
external and internal breaking process destroys a person to the point that they are no 
longer able to act on their own will, but rather on the will of the torturer. What makes 
torture so repulsive is that by stripping the tortured of his natural right to liberty, he 
becomes subhuman. The denial of one’s innate humanity is what makes torture wrong and 
so uncomfortable to discuss (Himes).  
The application of the Fifth Amendment to the connection between liberty and 
humane treatment has legal precedence. In 1952, in the case of Rochin vs. California, the 
Supreme Court was asked to judge the methods used by three Los Angeles sheriff 
deputies in apprehending a suspect. The Court ruled that the deputies’ behavior 
“‘shock[ed] the conscience’” and was so “‘offensive to human dignity’” that it indeed 
violated the suspect’s Fifth Amendment right to due process of law.6 Before a person can 
be deprived of his liberty, there must be a guarantee of due process of law.  
                                                
6 For more information on the case, see Honigsberg 23. 
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The Eighth Amendment refers to the ban on cruel and unusual punishment. As 
Professor Peter Jan Honigsberg of the University of California points out, this 
amendment refers not only to the illegality of certain punishments for any crime (i.e. 
beheading or burning at the stake) but also that “the punishment should fit the crime” 
(Honigsberg 23). The more serious the crime, the more severe the punishment should be. 
Some critics of the Bush Administration believe that this point holds enormous relevance 
for the treatment of those captured during the war on terror, for those that fell within US 
custody ranged from top Al-Qaeda operatives to innocent civilians who were mistakenly 
rounded up. The type of treatment each group deserved should have been contingent upon 
both their legal status according to US and international law, but also according to their 
crime. At first, policy regarding detainee treatment delineated between different types of 
detainees, but those distinctions gradually blurred, in part because of the US’ inability and 
unwillingness to employ the legal measures that would have helped determine who was 
guilty and who was not.7 
This criticism, however, does not adequately address the central reason for having 
detainees in the first place: intelligence gathering, not criminal conviction, was the main 
purpose of detention and interrogation. The correct standard against which detainees 
should be judged in order to determine their legal status (with corresponding rights and 
privileges) is how critical the information they could plausibly impart is. Yet, even in 
                                                
7 One aspect of the controversy related to the 8th Amendment is the debate over whether detainees deserve 
trials or not. For many years, this legal protection was denied, in deference to their being held within a war 
context and also because the Bush Administration felt that it needed to wait more time (and get all of the 
information that it could possibly get from the detainees) before bringing them to trial, either by military 
commission or through civilian courts. The Obama Administration has chosen to try five of the 9/11 
terrorists in civilian courts and another five through military commissions. For more information, see 
Savage, Charlie. “Accused 9/11 Mastermind to Face Civilian Trial in N.Y.” The New York Times. 13 Nov. 
2009. Web. 10 Jan. 2010 <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/14/us/14terror.html>. 
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recognizing the importance of the intelligence standard in determining legal status, it must 
also be recognized that a detainee’s intelligence is probably closely tied to the “punishment 
should fit the crime” model because a high-level al-Qaeda operative will not only have 
extremely valuable intelligence, but will also be more likely to be guilty of involvement in 
anti-US actions. An Afghan goat herder, on the other hand, will likely have little useful 
information beyond village hearsay and will also probably not be guilty of any anti-US 
behaviors. Thus it is important to recognize that the criminal motto of “the punishment 
should fit the crime” cannot be perfectly implemented in an intelligence setting, but there 
is a very important association between intelligence capacity and guilt.  
While the Fourteenth Amendment’s original purpose was to redress racial 
inequality, its application since then has expanded sufficiently to be relevant to today’s 
war on terror. The Fourteenth Amendment reiterates the Fifth Amendment’s protection of 
due process, stating, “…nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law.” Furthermore, it grants “equal protection of the laws” for all 
people “within its [the state’s] jurisdiction.”8 Though the wording is of course directed 
towards states and their authority over those within their respective territories, the themes 
and values presented by the amendment are those of due process and equality before the 
law.  
The relevance of these three Constitutional amendments finds support in legislative 
efforts post-Abu Ghraib to refine and clarify the steps the Bush Administration was taking 
to address the terrorist threat. One of those was the Military Commissions Act of 2006. 
The amendments played a central role in defining legal detainee treatment in the bill:  
                                                
8 The National Archives and Records Administration. “Constitution of the United States: Amendment XIV.” 
Archives.gov. Web. 6 Jan. 2009 <http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/constitution_amendments_11-
27.html>. 
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No individual in the custody or under the physical control of the United States Government, 
regardless of nationality or physical location, shall be subject to cruel, inhuman, or degrading 
treatment or punishment…the term ‘‘cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment’’ 
means cruel, unusual, and inhumane treatment or punishment prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth, and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, as defined in the United States 
Reservations, Declarations and Understandings to the United Nations Convention Against 
Torture and Other Forms of Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment [CAT, see 
section II.V]  
 
In deference to the Constitution, the Military Commissions Act of 2006 banned both 
torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment. As will be further 
addressed in chapter II.V, this uniform ban is a turning point in the course of the war on 
terror because for the first several years of the war, the Bush Administration did not apply 
the same principle to its policy decisions, which illegalized torture, but did not criminalize 
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment. 
The second issue that the US Constitution addresses as pertains to the topic of 
torture is that of Congress’ role in foreign policy. The Constitution enumerates several 
powers that the legislative branch has when conducting foreign affairs, among them the 
power to declare war and to raise an army. During the Bush Administration, however, 
Congress’ constitutional rights were repeatedly cast aside in its handling of the war on 
terror. Elimination of this check on the executive branch had many consequences, among 
them detainee detention and interrogation policy.  
A court case often cited by constitutional scholars on the topic of separation of 
powers, and now utilized by critics of Bush Administration policies, is that of another war 
and war president: President Harry Truman during the Korean War. The 1952 Supreme 
Court case of Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. vs. Sawyer placed limitations on executive power 
during times of war. The Court ruled that President Truman did not have the authority to 
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seize a steel mill in order to prevent an imminent strike that would have closed down steel 
production needed for the war effort.  
In his concurring opinion, Justice Robert H. Jackson talked about the direct 
relationship between congressional involvement in executive decisions and executive 
power. The president acts with the greatest amount of authority when he has the explicit 
or implicit approval of Congress. His power weakens when he ignores or acts deliberately 
in defiance of congressional wishes. Youngstown was a reminder to the chief executive that 
there are few instances in which he can act alone and that the American traditions of 
separation of powers and checks and balances cannot be discarded, even during a crisis. 
As will be developed in more detail later on, the Bush Administration handicapped these 
traditions in its execution of the war on terror,9 although it must also be said that there 
was a degree of reluctance on the part of Congress to be implicated in certain policy 
decisions and legislation such as the Military Commissions Act of 2006 demonstrates that 
Congress was on board with many of President Bush’s strategies. 
While the Constitution does not explicitly define the word “torture” and its 
protections do not extend beyond US borders, it is a fundamental text in illuminating 
American values and morals, such as a concern for human rights embodied in such 
traditions as due process of law and checks and balances. In addition, as the “supreme law 
of the land,”10 it must always serve as the most important source of standards for the 
federal government. 
 
                                                
9 Further elaboration on the exclusion of the legislative branch (among other federal government entities) 
can be found in chapter III.II, “The Unitary Executive.” 
 
10 Marbery vs. Madison. No. 137. Supreme Ct. of the US. 24 February 1803. 
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II.II: The US Army Field Manual 
The US Army Field Manual is the golden standard for Army operations. The 1992 
US Army Field Manual on Interrogation (often referred to by its military shorthand, FM 
34-52) defines torture as “the infliction of intense pain to body or mind to extract a 
confession or information, or for sadistic pleasure” (1-8). In accordance with the definition 
of torture provided in the previous section, FM 34-52 explains that “[p]hysical or mental 
torture and coercion revolve around eliminating the source’s free will [emphasis added]” (1-8). 
When a person’s capacity to act on his own accord is removed because his physical and/or 
mental faculties have been sufficiently broken, torture has taken place.  
The Manual goes further to list specific examples of what it constitutes as physical 
torture: 
• Electric shock 
• Infliction of pain through chemicals or bondage (other than legitimate use of restraints to 
prevent escape) 
• Forcing an individual to stand, sit, or kneel in abnormal positions for prolonged periods of 
time 
• Food deprivation 
• Any form of beating 
 
Some examples of “mental torture” are: 
• Mock executions 
• Abnormal sleep deprivation 
• Chemically induced psychosis 
 
These techniques are listed in addition to more obvious prohibitions, such as murder, 
maiming, and assault.  
The Field Manual also provides an interesting test of whether something 
constitutes torture or not, in recognition of the fact that the line between what is and is not 
torture is often gray.  
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In attempting to determine if a contemplated approach or technique would be considered 
unlawful, consider these two tests: 
• Given all the surrounding facts and circumstances, would a reasonable person in the place 
of the person being interrogated believe that his rights, as guaranteed under both 
international and US law, are being violated or withheld if he fails to cooperate. 
• If your contemplated actions were perpetrated against US PWs [prisoners of war], you 
would believe such actions violate international or US law. (1-9) 
 
This test provides for a rather strict interpretation of torture (take, for example, the fact 
that the standard is set in accordance with the treatment of POWs, which, as will be 
debated in greater detail further on, is a point of serious contention in the war on terror as 
POW status was not afforded to detainees), for it implies that any hesitancy one may feel 
should be regarded as a sign to desist from or never use the approach in question.  
Nevertheless, the Field Manual states: 
Authority for conducting interrogations of personnel detained by military forces rests primarily 
upon the traditional concept that the commander may use all available resources and lawful means 
to accomplish his mission and to protect and secure his unit. (1-9) 
 
This statement seems to compensate for the narrowness of the “torture test” detailed above 
by emphasizing that ultimate authority rests with the commander and what he feels is 
necessary to get the job done. It is recognition of the realities of war, whose intrinsically 
chaotic and dangerous nature means that the law cannot, unfortunately, predict and 
prepare for all potential scenarios.  
The US Army Field Manual on Interrogation provides significant guidance as to 
the issue of torture and despite its ambiguities, its long-term use and history of 
effectiveness entitled it to play a vital part in developing detainee treatment policy. 
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II.III: The United States Military Code of Justice 
Another relevant military document (and federal law) is the United States Military 
Code of Justice (UCMJ). It is the “bedrock of military law,” applying to all US military 
personnel (Powers). Articles 77 through 134 are known as the “punitive articles,” because 
they list “specific offenses, which, if violated, can result in punishment by court martial” 
(Powers). Thus UCMJ acts a rulebook for proper military conduct.  
The crimes listed in Articles 77-134 constitute crimes whether they are carried out 
against another member of the military or those in US military custody, although many of 
the crimes would be, on the whole, irrelevant to detainee treatment, such as being drunk 
on duty or deserting. As for those articles that have the potential to impact detainee 
treatment, one is Article 93, which states: 
‘Any person subject to this chapter who is guilty of cruelty toward, or oppression or maltreatment 
of, any person subject to his orders shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.’ (Powers) 
 
Thus a detainee, who is by his circumstances “subject to the orders” of his captor, would 
be protected from cruelty, oppression, and maltreatment. The incentive for compliance 
with this provision is high, as the punishment includes a dishonorable discharge from the 
military, forfeit of pay and allowances, and confinement (military prison) for one year. 
Military personnel and detainees are also protected from such abuses as murder (Article 
118), rape and sexual assault (Article 120), maiming (Article 124), and assault (Article 
134-3&4).11 The UCMJ does not have a section on torture or provide a definition of 
                                                
11 The UCMJ also includes a protection (Article 97) against “unlawful detention,” in which military 
personnel are prohibited from, “except as provided by law, apprehend[ing], arrest[ing], or confin[ing] any 
person.” While this paper will not address the issue of whether or not the US lawfully detained persons, this 
provision certainly provides fodder for Bush Administration critics who use this article as the legal grounds 
for prosecution of US military personnel for what critics feel have been “unlawful detentions” of many 
people during the course of the war on terror.  
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torture, but its detailed list of offenses provides significant guidance as to what is proper 
military conduct. 
 Furthermore, the UCMJ reinforces the military tradition of utmost respect for and 
compliance with superiors’ orders. Soldiers are to obey and to stay within delineated 
guidelines. Failure to do so is a crime, as detailed by Article 89 (disrespect towards a 
superior commissioned officer), Article 90 (assaulting or willfully disobeying superior 
commissioned officer), Article 91 (insubordinate conduct toward warrant officer, 
noncommissioned officer, or petty officer), and Article 92 (failure to obey order or 
regulation). The corresponding punishments are not light; Article 92, for example, carries 
the cost of being discharged, having to forfeit all pay, and confinement between six months 
and two years. 
 The relevancy of this last group of articles to the larger discussion of detainee 
treatment during the war on terror revolves around the common accusation levied by 
Bush Administration critics that military personnel who committed such abuses as those at 
Abu Ghraib – contrary to the official position of the administration that they were just a 
“few bad apples” – were actually following out their superiors’ orders, or at the very least, 
they believed that their actions were condoned by their superiors. Critics believe that the 
widespread nature of the abuse, combined with this very important aspect of military 
culture, means that higher officials are equally blameworthy for detainee abuse and 
torture. The UCMJ makes clear that soldiers must follow orders, so if enough soldiers 
were committing such acts, it does seem to raise questions as to how far up the chain of 
command such actions were approved and encouraged. 
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II.IV: The Geneva Conventions 
The most relevant feature of the Geneva Conventions in regards to the war on 
terror is not its definition of torture, but rather its definition of legal identities during times 
of war and the corresponding legal rights and privileges associated with those identities. 
The Geneva Conventions, written in the aftermath of World War II, establish rules of 
warfare so as to prevent repetition of the types of atrocities witnessed in the 1930s and 
1940s. They were “created to protect innocent civilians by deterring violations of the laws 
of war. They do this by offering certain protections to those who follow these laws – and 
denying such protections to those who do not” (Thiessen 29).  
To delineate who receives which protections, the Geneva Conventions defines legal 
identities for everyone in the context of war, from soldiers to insurgents to civilians. There 
are two identities presented by the Geneva Conventions, prisoners of war and civilians, 
which over time have come to find legal synonyms in lawful (because they are permitted to 
be on the battlefield) and unlawful (those who are not) combatants. These labels designate 
the rights a person has if captured by the enemy.  
The Third Geneva Conventions refer to the treatment of lawful combatants, or 
prisoners of war. The Fourth Geneva Conventions refer to the protection of civilians, 
which is a broad term for everyone else. This includes all who are not soldiers: civilians, 
terrorists, insurgents, guerrillas, etc. The Geneva Conventions are intended to cover 
everyone and leave no one in legal limbo. The International Committee of the Red Cross, 
“the protective body and foremost interpreter of the GC [Geneva Conventions],” 
(Honigsberg 20) explains the categories as follows:  
Every person in enemy hands must have some status under international law: he is either a 
prisoner of war and, as such, covered by the Third Convention, a civilian covered by the Fourth 
Convention, or again, a member of the medical personnel of the armed forces who is covered by 
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the First Convention. ‘There is no’ intermediate status; nobody in enemy hands can be outside the 
law. [Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War] 
 
The Geneva Conventions do not provide a standard definition of torture. Common 
Article Three includes a prohibition on “violence to life and person, in particular murder 
of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture…outrages upon personal dignity, in 
particular humiliating and degrading treatment,” but such wording certainly leaves much 
to interpretation. 
 Vague definitions of torture can have both positive and negative consequences. On 
the one hand, vagueness allows for broad application so that many techniques could be 
considered torture. A soldier operating under such an interpretation may be inclined to err 
on the side of caution so as not to be punished later for reading it too narrowly. This could 
happen with a soldier operating under the 1992 US Army Field Manual on Interrogation, 
whose broad “test” on what defines torture certainly suggests prudence, while still 
including the caveat about the commander’s having of the final say. This take on 
vagueness falls in line with the values set forth by the US legal tradition of “innocent until 
proven guilty,” mentioned earlier, in which the suspect is given the benefit of the doubt. A 
vague definition can be beneficial in encouraging caution in those who find themselves 
confronted with the issue of torture. 
On the other hand, the definition could be interpreted as so vague as to be 
rendered meaningless and thus useless for determining detainee treatment policy. As 
President Bush remarked in a press conference, in regards to Common Article 3: 
It’s like…it’s very vague. What does that mean? ‘Outrages upon human dignity.’ That’s a 
statement that is wide open to interpretation and what I’m proposing is that there be clarity in the 
law so that our professionals will have no doubt that that which they’re doing is legal. (Torturing 
Democracy)  
 
41 
President Bush was concerned that, although the US is a signatory to the Geneva 
Conventions, it was not written in precise enough language to meet what he felt were the 
US’ current needs. Furthermore, there was serious concern about whether or not 
terrorists deserved any Geneva Convention protections at all, despite the fact that the 
Bush Administration had deliberately chosen to take a war approach to fighting terrorism, 
which necessitated an examination of domestic and international law regarding warfare. 
The Bush Administration, through the Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel 
(OLC), tried to remedy the vagueness of the various definitions of torture that it was 
subject to by defining it extremely narrowly – too narrowly, this paper will argue. The 
definition endorsed by the Bush Administration is presented and discussed in section 
II.VI.  
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II.V: The United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) 
 and 18 U.S.C. § 2340-2340A 
The attention that the Geneva Conventions have received on the subject of the war 
on terror, while understandable given their intimate connection with war policy, has 
overshadowed another crucial international treaty on torture. CAT, to which the US is a 
party, is considered to be the international standard as to what constitutes torture as well 
as the standard off of which the US based its definition of torture, as embodied in the US 
federal criminal code. Unsurprisingly therefore, CAT was the principle source from which 
the Bush Administration derived its definition of torture. CAT (Article 1) defines torture 
as: 
…any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted 
on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, 
punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, 
or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any 
kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or 
acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. It does not include 
pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions. (Office of the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights) 
 
18 United States Code Section 2340-2340A incorporates CAT into federal law. 
While the Constitution protects citizens of the US from “cruel and unusual” treatment and 
torture within the geographical limitations of the US, §2340-2340A covers torture 
conducted by US personnel outside of US territory against US citizens and non-citizens 
alike. Thus it is particularly relevant for international conflict of any kind, including the 
wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.  
The process of signing onto the treaty began during President Reagan’s second 
term, but was not confirmed by the Senate until the George H.W. Bush Administration. 
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Both presidents wrote in caveats so as to explain the US’ interpretation of what they were 
signing up for. President Reagan added: 
‘The United States understands that, in order to constitute torture, an act must be a deliberate and 
calculated act of an extremely cruel and inhuman nature, specifically intended to inflict 
excruciating and agonizing physical or mental pain or suffering…The United States [also] 
understands the term ‘cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment,’ as used in Article 16 
of the Convention, to mean the cruel, unusual, and inhumane treatment or punishment prohibited 
by the Fifth, Eighth, and/or Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States.’ 
(qtd. in Bybee to Alberto Gonzales, 1 Aug. 2002, as reprinted in Danner 128-129) 
 
During the H.W. Bush Administration, the following language was added to the US 
signing of CAT: 
‘The United States understands that, in order to constitute torture, an act must be specifically 
intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering and that mental pain or suffering 
refers to prolonged mental harm caused by or resulting from (1) the intentional infliction or 
threatened infliction of severe physical pain or suffering; (2) the administration or application, or 
threatened administration or application, of mind altering substances or other procedures 
calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or the personality; (3) the threat of imminent death; or 
(4) the threat that another person will imminently be subjected to death, severe physical pain or 
suffering, or the administration or application of mind altering substances or other procedures 
calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or personality.’ (qtd. in Levin)  
 
What became 18 U.S.C. § 2340-2340A, an almost verbatim copy of the George W. H. 
Bush Administration’s interpretation, was the following: 
(1) “torture” means an act committed by a person acting under the color of law specifically 
intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering (other than pain or suffering 
incidental to lawful sanctions) upon another person within his custody or physical control;  
(2) “severe mental pain or suffering” means the prolonged mental harm caused by or resulting 
from—  
(A) the intentional infliction or threatened infliction of severe physical pain or suffering;  
(B) the administration or application, or threatened administration or application, of mind-
altering substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or the 
personality;  
(C) the threat of imminent death; or  
(D) the threat that another person will imminently be subjected to death, severe physical 
pain or suffering, or the administration or application of mind-altering substances or other 
procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or personality; (Legal Information 
Institute) 
 
In accordance with the definition of torture supported by this paper, the CAT 
definition addresses how torture can “disrupt profoundly the senses or personality.” 
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Torture causes long-term or even permanent damage, resulting in a fundamental change of 
the identity of the tortured. Recognition of the impact that torture has on a person’s 
personality or ability to process his surroundings reinforces the serious nature of torture 
and emphasizes how it differs from lesser forms of abuse which, although they may cause 
humiliation, pain, and/or short-term suffering, do not rise to the level of torture. 
The additional language that the US added to its codification of the treaty defined 
torture more narrowly and suggested that the US would base what it saw as torture and 
cruel, inhuman, and unusual treatment on standing US law (i.e. the Constitution, 
specifically Amendments Five, Eight, and Fourteen). At the time, these caveats were 
included largely to protect the death penalty in the US, a practice most European 
countries had by then illegalized. Yet its implications for the war on terror are far graver. 
The George W. Bush Administration took advantage of the US’ version of CAT for 
its own purposes. Recall that the US federal laws that followed from the treaty only ban 
torture in regards to the treatment of persons outside of the US. Cruel, inhuman, and 
degrading treatment is not, creating a window of leverage that the Administration 
“pounced on” (Honigsberg 24). CAT requires that states “undertake to prevent in any 
territory under its jurisdiction other acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment which do not amount to torture” (Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner of Human Rights). However, neither CAT nor its incorporation into 
federal law makes “cruel, inhuman or degrading” treatment a crime. The message seems to 
be that lesser forms of abuse, although highly discouraged, are not illegal. Here was a legal 
distinction that the Administration could use to its advantage to more clearly define which 
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of its actions were legal and which were not; as long as something was not torture, it 
technically did not violate US federal law according to 18 U.S.C. §2340-2340A.12  
CAT also asserts that “[N]o exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state 
of war or a threat of war, internal political instability or any other public emergency, may 
be invoked as a justification of torture.” Nor can torture be justified if carried out on the 
order of a superior officer or official.13 While it can be argued that CAT’s definition of 
torture is not perfectly clear, the rule concerning its use is black-and-white. Torture is 
never justifiable and thus must be avoided at all costs. 
As discussed in chapter I.III, torture according to this definition occurs only in 
instances where the intent is to cause “severe physical or mental pain or suffering.” If those 
happened to be the byproducts, but not the desired result, then the techniques used do not 
qualify as torture. Thus a soldier, acting on his superiors orders and not for his own 
sadistic pleasure, cannot be found guilty of torture, even if the detainee suffers to the same 
degree as if he had been tortured and if the soldier did derive sadistic pleasure from it.  
In addition, Article 15 of the treaty states that information derived from torture is 
not permissible as evidence in court. Thus if the US wanted to be able to use detainee 
confessions as proof of the efficacy of their methods, the Bush Administration had to be 
                                                
12 This stands in contrast to the UCMJ, discussed in chapter II.III, which bans cruelty, oppression, and 
mistreatment, and not just torture. Thus one can already begin to see some divergence in terms of what is 
considered legal and what is considered illegal.  
 
13 This does not contradict the point made earlier about how a soldier would be protected from legal 
prosecution if, on a superior’s order, he were to commit an act that amounted to torture. The assumption is 
that the superior would never order torture or he would face prosecution himself. Torture can never be 
ordered and a soldier engaging in an act that he knows to be torture, even if his superior said to, would be in 
violation of the law. The point is that the superior’s and the soldier’s intentions matter; if neither of them aim 
to torture, but the impact is essentially equivalent to torture, neither of them would have to face criminal 
charges.  
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certain that those methods were not torture. Article 15 created additional pressure to be as 
specific as possible in defining torture.  
18 U.S.C. § 2340-2340A is the US standard as to what defines torture. However, 
its most important contribution to the Bush Administration as it formulated detainee 
policy was not its definition of torture, but rather the fact that it criminalizes torture alone, 
and not lesser forms of abuse. It is this distinction that many Bush Administration critics 
fear was used as a sort of legal loophole to authorize grave abuse and mistreatment of 
those in US custody. As Honigsberg argues,  
The administration thus asserts that since the statute only bars torture and says nothing about 
cruel, inhumane, and degrading treatment, American agents – such as the CIA – are not 
necessarily bound by any laws other than the requirement not to torture. Since the definition of 
torture is malleable, CIA agents have had lots of room to mistreat a detainee. The administration 
argued that although it conducted harsh, or ‘enhanced,’ interrogations, these interrogations did not 
constitute torture. (Honigsberg 24)14 
 
Despite the rather narrow definition of what was barred, the US was still in compliance 
with CAT, thus the administration was able to send a message to the world that it was 
adhering to international law. Making CAT (18 U.S.C. § 2340-2340A) one of the 
foundational documents for defining torture in the war on terror was a way for the Bush 
Administration to present itself as respectful of both domestic and international law, while 
utilizing the law’s limitations to its advantage to maximize flexibility in terms of detainee 
treatment. 
 
                                                
14 Honigsberg points to an important distinction between groups such as the CIA and the military in 
conducting overseas detentions and interrogations. The CIA is bound by many fewer layers of restrictions 
than is the military (the US Army Field Manual on Interrogation and the UMCJ are just two mentioned in 
this chapter), thus an official government position stating that torture alone is prohibited does seem to 
encourage a very flexible field in which the CIA can operate. This becomes an even more problematic 
situation when coupled with the fact that the CIA was often working alongside the military, and confusion 
about what rules and protocol governed whom was one factor that contributed to abuses. Chapter IV.V 
elaborates further on this point. 
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II.VI: The Bush Administration 
On August 1, 2002, OLC issued a memo, under Assistant Attorney General Jay 
Bybee’s name (but widely believed to have been written by Deputy Assistant General of 
the Department of Defense John Yoo) to White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales, 
providing the following definition of torture: 
‘We conclude that for an act to constitute torture as defined in Section 2340 [18 U.S.C. § 2340-
2340A, the same section of the federal code discussed in the previous section], it must inflict pain 
that is difficult to endure. Physical pain amounting to torture must be equivalent in intensity to the 
pain accompanying serious physical injury, such as organ failure, impairment of bodily function, or even 
death. For purely mental pain or suffering to amount to torture under Section 2340, it must result 
in significant psychological harm of significant duration, e.g., lasting for months or even years. We conclude 
that the mental harm also must result from one of the predicate acts listed in the statute, namely: 
threats of imminent death; threats of infliction of the kind of pain that would amount to physical 
torture; use of drugs or other procedures designed to deeply disrupt the senses, or fundamentally 
alter an individual’s personality; or threatening to do any of these things to a third party [emphasis 
added].’ (qtd. in Danner 115) 
 
There is some overlap between this definition of torture and that enshrined in US 
federal code. The three sources of psychological torture, for example, are the same. Yet in 
contrast to all of the previous definitions of torture, the one officially sanctioned by the 
Bush Administration is extremely narrow. Physical torture is nothing short of “organ 
failure, impairment of bodily function, or…death.” Such qualifications are not present in 
18 U.S.C. § 2340-2340A, which specifies only to the extent of saying “severe 
physical…pain or suffering.”  
The same narrow approach is taken with psychological torture, in which the 
suffering must cause long-term damage. As to how to determine whether a technique 
could have such a result, the definition provides no guidance. The definition of 
psychological torture is also linked to the physical, in that psychological torture constitutes 
being threatened with physical torture. Such linking tends to exclude other actions, such 
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as excessive sleep deprivation or waterboarding that, while not causing physical pain, can 
certainly add up to excessive abuse and even torture.  
It is clear from looking at these various definitions of torture that there is much 
debate as to its definition. In an effort to concretize some of this rather vague and 
conflicting language, the following section will look at exactly which techniques were 
authorized, as well as detainee testimony of what it was like to endure them.  
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CHAPTER III: WHAT TECHNIQUES 
WERE AUTHORIZED? 
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III.I: The US Army Field Manual on Interrogation 
The US Army Field Manual on Interrogation was a baseline for determining 
interrogation tactics to be used on those captured during the war on terror. Several of its 
techniques were approved without question, largely because of their long history of use 
and effectiveness. Those methods, (with brief descriptions) are listed below:15 
1. Direct questioning: As the name implies, this is straightforward questioning of the subject. It 
is often the first technique to be utilized. 
 
2. Incentive/Removal of Incentive: Either rewarding something positive or removing something 
negative to encourage cooperation on the detainee’s part. This technique specifically states 
that it cannot be used to deny a detainee of their rights under the Geneva Conventions (i.e. 
in the case of a prisoner of war, he cannot be denied or “rewarded” medical treatment as an 
incentive for cooperation). 
 
3. Emotional Love: Appealing to their love of their family, friends, country, etc., such as 
suggesting to them that they can see their family sooner should they cooperate. 
 
4. Emotional Hate: Playing on a detainee’s desire for revenge, an interrogator may suggest that 
cooperation can lead to punishment of the people that caused the subject to be detained. 
 
5. Emotional Fear up Harsh/Mild: The interrogator plays upon a fear held by the subject and 
links cooperation with elimination or reduction of the fear. The interrogator asserts that 
the person’s fear may be tested if he does not cooperate.  
 
6. Emotional Fear Down: The opposite technique, in which the interrogator tries to reduce a 
subject’s fear if it seems as if their fear is preventing them from cooperating.  
 
7. Emotional Pride and Ego-Up: Exploits a subject’s low self-esteem by suggesting that the 
subject must be someone highly important with valuable information that the interrogator 
would love to have. A boost to the subject’s ego may make them want to divulge 
information. 
 
8. Emotional Pride and Ego-Down: The interrogator attacks a subject’s pride or ego. “The source, 
in defending his ego, reveals information to justify or rationalize his actions.”  
 
9. Emotional Futility: Convince the subject that resistance is futile. 
 
10. We Know All: Insinuate to the subject that the interrogator already knows all of the answers 
and all of the subject’s history, which will allow him to tell when the subject is lying. 
Therefore, it is to the subject’s advantage to tell the truth. 
 
                                                
15 Department of the Army Headquarters. “Pt. 3, The HUMINT Collection Process, Chapter 8, Approach 
Techniques and Termination Strategies.” FM 2-22.3 (FM 34-52): Human Intelligence Collector Operations. 6 Sept. 
2006. Web. 18 Nov. 2009 <http://www.army.mil/institution/armypublicaffairs/pdf/fm2-22-3.pdf>.  
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11. File and Dossier: A variation of We Know All. A dossier is prepared containing real and false 
documents pertaining to a subject’s case to make it seem as if the interrogator knows a 
considerable amount about a subject to scare him into revealing information. 
 
12. Establish Your Identity: The interrogator argues that the subject is a notorious individual that 
is wanted by the highest authorities and that the subject’s claims that he is someone else 
must therefore be lies. In an effort to defend and disassociate himself from a high-profile 
criminal, he reveals other information about himself. 
 
13. Repetition: In one variation, an interrogator will repeat the question and the subject’s 
answer many times over, until the subject becomes so bored or agitated that they begin to 
disclose more candid and fuller answers to the questions.  
 
14. Rapid Fire: Questions are asked so quickly that the subject does not have time to fully 
respond to one question before another is asked. He is then frustrated and may begin to 
contradict himself. The interrogator confronts the subject on these contradictions and in an 
effort to clear himself, the subject may answer fully and honestly. 
 
15. Silence: The interrogator “says nothing to the source, but looks him squarely in the eye, 
preferably with a slight smile on his face.” The subject may grow uncomfortable and thus 
easier for the interrogator to manipulate. 
 
16. Change of Scenery: This requires a change in the subject and interrogator’s location to 
somewhere where the subject may feel more comfortable speaking. This may include 
remaining in the same room, but changing the conditions of the room so as to make it less 
intimidating.  
 
In contrast to the procedures for the CIA interrogation program outlined in 
Chapter I, these military techniques blur the line between interrogation and de-briefing, as 
they are meant to elicit both cooperation and information from the subject. This set-up is a 
reflection of their historical use, which has been largely confined to the questioning of 
POWs in traditional war contexts. It is also the result of the overall mild nature of these 
techniques; no physical contact with the detainee of any sort is involved nor is there 
excessive indulgence in psychological manipulation.  
 
 
 
 
52 
III.II: “Enhanced Interrogation Techniques” (EITs) 
“The universal rejection of torture and the President’s unequivocal directive that the United States not 
engage in torture warrant great care in analyzing whether particular interrogation techniques are consistent with 
the requirements of sections 2340-2340A, and we have attempted to employ such care throughout our analysis. 
We emphasize that these are issues about which reasonable persons may disagree.”  
- Steven Bradbury, May 10, 2005, 47 
 
Despite the long history of use and success related to FM 34-52, there were many 
within the administration who felt that FM 34-52, because it had been around for so long 
and was public information, would be insufficient in dealing with key al-Qaeda operatives 
who were trained to resist such techniques. One such operative who was trained in 
resisting FM 34-52 was Abu Zubaydah, “a top aide to Osama bin Laden and the first 
senior terrorist operative captured following” 9/11 (Thiessen 23). With such credentials, it 
was crucial that the US discover all he knew, and quickly.  
As a result, Assistant Attorney General Bybee issued a memo on August 1, 2002, 
detailing ten additional techniques that could be used by CIA personnel against high-
profile Al-Qaeda operatives such as Zubaydah. It is these techniques, among others, that 
the term “enhanced interrogation techniques” and the CIA interrogation program refer to. 
The memo provides detailed descriptions of how each technique is to be implemented, 
with what frequency, and what precautions need to be taken in order to ensure their 
effective use. For the sake of brevity, summary definitions are included below:16 
1. Attention grasp: The interrogator places his hands on the sides of the detainee’s face and 
pulls the detainee toward him. 
 
2. Walling: Detainees are pushed against a “flexible false wall” which creates a loud sound 
when hit, so as to make the detainee think that what he is experiencing is far more 
dangerous than what is actually happening (2). 
                                                
16 All definitions are paraphrased from the document itself, as reprinted on the ACLU website. Bybee, Jay 
S. “Memorandum for John Rizzo, Acting General Counsel for the Central Intelligence Agency: 
Interrogation of al Qaeda Operative.” 1 Aug. 2002. American Civil Liberties Union. Web. 30 Jan. 2010 
<http://luxmedia.vo.llnwd.net/o10/clients/aclu/olc_08012002_bybee.pdf>. 
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3. Facial hold: The interrogator cradles the detainee’s face in his hands with a firm grip so as to 
make the detainee’s face immobile.  
 
4. Facial slap (insult slap): This is a very specific, fingers-spread slap that is not meant to cause 
injury, but rather shock, surprise, and humiliation on the part of the detainee. 
 
5. Cramped confinement: This space is “usually dark” (2). The length of time that a detainee can 
remain in such quarters depends on the size of the room. For larger spaces, up to 18 hours 
is considered appropriate. For smaller spaces, a maximum of two hours is allowed. 
 
6. Wall standing: A detainee must stand with his arms raised, fingers touching a wall, with the 
objective of “induc[ing] muscle fatigue” (3). No time limit is given. 
 
7. Stress positions: The memo suggests two positions. The detainee sits on the floor with legs 
straight out in front with his arms raised above his head. The detainee may also “kneel on 
the floor while leaning back at a 45 degree angle” (3). No time limit is given. 
 
8. Sleep deprivation: The objective is to “reduce the individual’s ability to think on his feet and, 
through the discomfort associated with lack of sleep, to motivate him to cooperate” (3). A 
detainee may not be deprived of sleep for more than 11 days at a time. The memo does not 
specify as to how the detainee is to be kept awake. 
 
9. Insects placed in a confinement box: The detainee is told that a stinging insect will be placed in 
the box with him. A “harmless insect such as a caterpillar” is used instead (3). 
  
10. Waterboarding: “The individual is bound securely to an inclined bench…A cloth is placed 
over the forehead and eyes. Water is then applied to the cloth in a controlled manner. As 
this is done, the cloth is lowered until it covers both the nose and mouth” (3-4). Note that 
waterboarding is still a part of Navy training today, meaning that members of the Navy are 
waterboarded.17  
 
The techniques may be used for up to thirty days, with the hope that by the end of that 
thirty day period, the detainee will be willing to cooperate and thus there will be no 
further need for EITs. It is this creation of a second tier of techniques that produces a 
distinction between interrogation and de-briefing, a distinction that is not part of the 
military tradition of FM 34-52. The techniques utilized during the de-briefing process 
were largely limited to those of FM 34-52.  
These techniques were taken from a military program known as SERE (Survival, 
Evasion, Resistance and Escape). SERE is torture resistance training, designed by the 
                                                
17 For a defense of waterboarding’s usefulness, see Thiessen 102-03. 
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Pentagon for Navy SEALs at the end of the Korean War to prepare them for abuse they 
might endure in the event of their capture by the Koreans. In fact, all ten techniques 
except for the one involving the insect have been part of and continue to be part of SERE 
training. 
SERE tactics were authorized for Guantanamo and “black site” detainees because 
of their status as high-level al-Qaeda operatives. The link between SERE and EITs is 
reinforced by the requirement detailed in the memo that a “medical expert with SERE 
experience” be present for some of the techniques (Bybee to John Rizzo, 1 Aug. 2002, 4).  
SERE included a version of waterboarding called “drown-proofing,” in which 
Navy SEALS “are placed in deep water, and their hands and feet are tied while they must 
accomplish certain tasks” (Honigsberg 98). The use of SERE during the war on terror is 
further confirmed by the fact that soldiers at Guantanamo also used the term “drown-
proofing.” It is clear from the memo’s language, however, that the form of waterboarding 
approved for use by the CIA is different – and arguably milder – than the one used in 
SERE training.  
It is, however, the great variety within the umbrella category of “waterboarding” 
that has elicited so much debate about its use, and helped prompt the publication of the 
US’ version of it. Waterboarding has been used for centuries and by many dictatorships, 
from the time of the Spanish Inquisition to the Japanese during the 1940s. Their horrible 
versions of waterboarding, as well as those experienced by US service members such as 
Senator John McCain, have created an image of waterboarding as the ultimate torture. 
What the US has authorized is considerably less harsh, but the amount of historical 
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examples of the use of waterboarding has generated considerable misconception and 
concern on the part of the public and among government officials.18  
Furthermore, the fact that SERE was originally created as a torture resistance 
program unsurprisingly has evoked worry. What was once training against torture seemed 
to have morphed into training on how to torture. In the words of Malcolm Nance, a highly 
respected former US Navy security official who served as SERE chief of training, “We 
have recreated our enemies methodologies in Guantanamo.” For him, the use of SERE on 
the enemy jeopardizes the safety of US soldiers because by condoning and employing such 
tactics “we have authorized them for the world now” (Torturing Democracy).19 Such 
sentiment has been echoed by other officials, such as Senator John McCain, who fear that 
the US’ employing of such tactics – regardless of what version – is simply encouraging the 
enemy to do the same.  
This is a tricky conclusion, as the obvious rebuttal to such an argument is that 
terrorists will mistreat their detainees anyway, regardless of what the US does. The filmed 
beheading of journalist Daniel Pearl is merely one example of their lack of scruples. By 
definition, terrorists do not comply with standards regarding warfare or detainee 
treatment and thus it will not be the US’ actions that will push them over the edge, so to 
speak, into using unconventional tactics. However, by employing SERE, the US is still 
sending out a message to the world about how changing circumstances are allowing for a 
                                                
18 Even Thiessen supports the notion that some forms of waterboarding can be torture, but he vehemently 
defends the US’ version of it. He provides an analysis of various historical examples of waterboarding, 
particularly those that Bush Administration critics have used as parallels and comparisons to the US’ version 
of waterboarding. See Thiessen 127-52.   
 
19 Mr. Nance, furthermore, has publicly declared that he views waterboarding as torture, regardless of what 
version. For more, see Nance, Malcolm. “I Know Waterboarding is Torture – Because I did it Myself.” NY 
Daily News. 31 Oct. 2007. Web. 12 Feb. 2010 <http://www.nydailynews.com/opinions/2007/10/31/2007-10-
31_i_know_waterboarding_is_torture__because.html>. 
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changing of the rules, which undoubtedly provides fodder for others to make changes to 
their policies as well.  
It is certainly confusing as to why the US would employ what it once referred to as 
torture. There are many factors at play here. One is the difference between what may have 
been legally and colloquially defined as torture in the 1950s when SERE was created and 
what became the standard for torture under US law decades later, with the 1994 
ratification of CAT. Furthermore, it would be preposterous for the US to torture its own 
soldiers, so if it uses the techniques on its own people, then there must be a fundamental 
assumption that, while harsh and at times degrading and humiliating, the US version of 
these techniques do not constitute torture. This argument reinforces the notion that 
although the US is now employing techniques that were previously considered unlawful, 
the versions of those techniques that the US is using brings them within the legal fold.20 
The controversy surrounding rumors regarding exactly how the Bush Administration 
was tackling terrorism prompted President Bush to deliver a speech (September 6, 2006), 
which simultaneously acknowledged the CIA program for the first time and defended it, 
stating: 
We knew that Zubaydah had more information that could save innocent lives, but he stopped 
talking. As his questioning proceeded, it became clear that he had received training on how to 
resist interrogation. And so the CIA used an alternative set of procedures. These procedures were 
designed to be safe, to comply with our laws, our Constitution, and our treaty obligations. The 
Department of Justice reviewed the authorized methods extensively and determined them to be 
lawful. I cannot describe the specific methods used -- I think you understand why -- if I did, it 
would help the terrorists learn how to resist questioning, and to keep information from us that we 
need to prevent new attacks on our country. But I can say the procedures were tough, and they 
were safe, and lawful, and necessary. (qtd. in Thiessen 395-96) 
                                                
20 A more minor debate concerning these techniques is where waterboarding occurred. There is ample proof 
that the US did waterboard certain detainees, but there is disagreement about whether or not anyone at 
Guantanamo Bay was waterboarded, or if waterboarding was limited solely to “black sites.” Thiessen argues 
that no one was ever waterboarded at Guantanamo, period (see Thiessen 298). Others, like Honigsberg, 
provide soldier testimony to its occurrence there (see Honigsberg 99). 
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President Bush’s defense of the program evokes the sentiment held by many within his 
administration that going beyond FM 34-52 was vital to procuring the type of information 
the US needed to prevent future attacks. The necessity to go beyond those standard 
techniques, however, also increased the pressure to ensure that they stayed within legal 
limits (i.e. did not constitute torture and thus did not constitute federal crimes).  
Part of the process of creating legal versions of those techniques was ensuring, as the 
memo points out, that “no prolonged mental harm would result from the use of these 
proposed procedures,” and would thus make them compliant with both the Bush 
Administration’s definition of torture and 18 U.S.C. § 2340-2340A (Bybee to John Rizzo, 
1 Aug. 2002, 4). The document analyzes each of the technique’s impact on the detainee’s 
physical and mental well-being.  
A few months later, resistance from another important detainee, Mohammed al-
Kahtani, prompted further requests for a broader range of techniques. The resulting 
techniques were divided into three categories, after initial remarks concerning the use of 
incentives such as cookies and cigarettes to elicit cooperation, in order of increasing 
severity for use on those at Guantanamo.21 
• Category I  
o Yelling 
o Techniques of deception 
 Multiple interrogator techniques. One example is known as Mutt and Jeff. The 
objective is to make the subject identify with one of the interrogators so 
that he will trust him and cooperate. “This technique involves a 
psychological ploy that takes advantage of the natural uncertainty and 
guilt that a source [detainee] has as a result of being detained and 
questioned.” One interrogator acts kindly towards the detainee, while 
                                                
21 Paraphrased from the original document, Phifer, Lieutenant Colonel Jerald. “Memorandum for 
Commander, Joint Task Force 170, Subject: Request for Approval of Counter-Resistance Strategies.” 11 
Oct. 2002. George Washington University. Web. 21 Feb. 2010 
<http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB127/02.12.02.pdf>. 
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another is to act in a cold and harsh manner, though never in a way as to 
“threaten or coerce” the detainee. The detainee will tend to gravitate 
towards the interrogator who is kinder and may divulge information in the 
process. This technique is taken from the US Army Field Manual on 
Interrogation. 
 Interrogator Identity. This is the second of the two US Army Field Manual 
techniques that are considered appropriate under more restrictive 
circumstances. It is known as False Flag, which entails deceiving the 
detainee by having the interrogator present a false identity. 22 
 
•  Category II 
o Stress positions (such as standing) for a maximum of four hours 
o Falsified documents or reports 
o Isolation for up to thirty days (renewable with approval of military commanders) 
o Interrogation in an environment other than a standard interrogation booth 
o Deprivation of light and auditory stimuli (accomplished by the use of hoods, 
goggles, and noise-canceling headphones) 
o The use of a hood during transportation and questioning 
o Removal of all comfort items (including religious items) 
o 20-hour interrogations 
o Switching of detainee’s hot meal to “meals ready to eat” (MREs, or American 
military field rations) 
o Removal of clothing 
o Forced grooming (i.e. shaving of facial hair) 
o Exploitation of fear of phobias (such as dogs) to induce stress 
 
• Category III: These techniques are to be used only by request and are to be used on less 
than three percent of detainees, meaning those that are the most non-cooperative.  
o Use of scenarios designed to convince the detainee that death or severely painful 
consequences are imminent for him and/or his family 
o Exposure to cold weather or water (with appropriate medical monitoring) 
o Waterboarding 
o “Mild, non-injurious physical contact such as grabbing, poking in the chest with 
the finger, and light pushing” 
 
On December 2, 2002, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld approved all 
Category I and II techniques. He approved only one Category III technique, that of “mild, 
non-injurious physical contact.” It was in reference to this memo that Rumsfeld hand-
wrote his now infamous statement: “However, I stand for 8-10 hours a day. Why is 
standing limited to 4 hours?” (Haynes, 27 Nov. 2002, 1). Despite Rumsfeld’s rejection of 
certain Category III techniques, this statement has been used by Bush Administration 
                                                
22 Department of the Army Headquarters. “Pt. 3, The HUMINT Collection Process, Chapter 8, Approach 
Techniques and Termination Strategies.” FM 2-22.3 (FM 34-52): Human Intelligence Collector Operations. 6 Sept. 
2006. Web. 18 Nov. 2009 <http://www.army.mil/institution/armypublicaffairs/pdf/fm2-22-3.pdf>. 
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critics as proof of the callous nature of the administration in evaluating what is humane 
treatment and what is not. Of course politicians like Rumsfeld (and many people in other 
professions) are working on their feet for far longer than 4 hours at a time. Yet this is 
certainly very different from the circumstances of a detainee who, for one, is not doing so 
by choice and two, is not allowed to move around. His comment suggests that standing is 
viewed as a light technique and serves as an unofficial endorsement to make detainees 
stand longer than four hours, thus encouraging interpretation and bending of the rules. 
This techniques tier was short-lived because of controversy that arose concerning 
al-Kahtani’s treatment. January 15, 2003, Rumsfeld rescinded his approval of Category II 
techniques and the one Category III technique on mild physical contact. A new list was 
presented to him on April 4, 2003. Ultimately, 24 of the 35 recommended techniques were 
approved for use solely on those held at Guantanamo Bay. Those techniques were 
(Rumsfeld, 16 April 2003, 2-3): 
o FM 34-52 [including Mutt and Jeff, False Flag, and allowing the change of scenery 
technique to include a location that is less comfortable, but nevertheless does not 
“constitute a substantial change in environmental quality” (2)] 
o Dietary manipulation: “changing the diet of the detainee; no intended deprivation of 
food or water; no adverse medical or cultural effect and without intent to deprive 
subject of food or water, e.g. hot rations to MREs” (2) 
o Environmental manipulation: suggested methods are altering the temperature or 
introducing an “unpleasant smell” (3).  
o Sleep adjustment: It is specifically distinguished from sleep deprivation, to mean that 
the detainee will not be deprived of sleep but will rather sleep at abnormal times, 
such as having to sleep during the day and remain awake at night. 
o Isolation: No more than 30 days. 
 
On October 12, 2003, specific guidelines were issued for Combined Joint Task 
Force Seven, which was in charge of all military forces in Iraq. The memo begins by 
stating that the detainees in question are protected by “Articles 5 and 78 of the Geneva 
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons [Fourth Geneva]” (Sanchez, 12 
Oct. 2003, 1). FM 34-52 were the only techniques approved, to include Mutt and Jeff but 
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not including False Flag. The contrast between what was approved for Guantanamo and 
the CIA program and what was approved for Iraq differed in many ways, while sharing 
the same baseline. As discussed previously, the reason for this divide was 1) the threat 
level of the detainees at each location and 2) Geneva Convention protections applied in 
Iraq.  
On May 10, 2005, another memorandum issued by the head of OLC, Steven 
Bradbury, detailed how EITs could be used in combination for terrorists and gave more 
specifics as to those techniques. It was issued in order to clarify that the CIA program was 
in compliance with 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A. As an initial safeguard, the memo requires 
that 
[P]rior to interrogation, each detainee is evaluated by medical and psychological professionals 
from the CIA’s Office of Medical Services (“OMS”) to ensure that he is not likely to suffer any 
severe physical or mental pain or suffering as a result on interrogation. (4) 
 
The idea is, if the detainee will not suffer in said ways, then he will not have been tortured 
and US personnel will have stayed within the law. The approved techniques are listed 
below. Several of them are consistent with techniques already described above, thus they 
will not be elaborated upon here. 
1. Dietary Manipulation: It is thought that, when used in combination with other techniques, it is 
rendered more effective in securing the detainee’s cooperation. Safeguards include weekly 
weigh-ins and cessation of the use of the technique if the detainee loses more than ten percent 
of his body weight. 
 
2. Nudity: It is meant to cause “psychological discomfort…clothes can be provided as an instant 
reward for cooperation…During and between interrogation sessions, a detainee may be kept 
nude…No sexual abuse or threats of sexual abuse are permitted…the detainee is not 
intentionally exposed to other detainees or unduly exposed to the detention facility 
staff…interrogators can exploit the detainee’s fear of being seen naked…female officers 
involved in the interrogation process may see the detainees naked” (9-10). 
 
3. Attention grasp 
 
4. Walling: It is suggested that this be used up to 30 times in one interrogation session. The 
objective is not to cause injury, but rather to “wear down the detainee and to shock and 
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surprise the detainee and alter his expectations about the treatment he will receive…[i.e.] to 
dispel a detainee’s expectations that interrogators will not use increasing levels of force, and to 
wear down his resistance” (10). 
 
5. Facial hold 
 
6. Facial slap or insult slap 
 
7. Abdominal slap: The interrogator slaps the detainee in the stomach with the back of his open 
hand. It is “used to condition a detainee to pay attention to the interrogator’s questions and to 
dislodge expectations that the detainee will not be touched” (11). 
 
8. Cramped confinement 
 
9. Wall standing 
 
10. Stress positions: In addition to the two suggestions made in the August 1, 2002 Bybee memo, a 
third stress position is included here. The detainee may be forced to lean “against a wall 
generally about three feet away from the detainee’s feet, with only the detainee’s head touching 
the wall, while his wrists are handcuffed in front of him or behind his back, and while an 
interrogator stands next to him to prevent injury if he loses his balance” (11). 
 
11. Water dousing: “Cold water is poured on the detainee either from a container or from a hose 
without a nozzle” (11). Several safeguards concerning water temperature, ambient 
temperature, and how long the detainee is allowed to remain wet are in effect to prevent 
hypothermia. The memo discusses the version of water dousing used in SERE training, 
describing it as far more “extreme” than what is approved here. A lighter version of water 
dousing called “flicking” is also permitted. The interrogator wets his fingers and flicks water at 
the detainee. It is meant to “‘create a distracting effect, to awaken, to startle, to irritate, to 
instill humiliation, or to cause temporary insult’” (12). 
 
12. Sleep deprivation: Unlike the August 1, 2002 Bybee memo, this memo specifies the methods used 
to keep a detainee awake. The first method is shackling. “The detainee is standing and is 
handcuffed, and the handcuffs are attached by a length of chain to the ceiling. The detainee’s 
hands are shackled in front of his body…The detainee’s feet are shackled to a bolt in the floor” 
(13). The detainee’s hands may be raised above his head but for no more than two hours at a 
time. It is viewed as a “passive means” for keeping the detainee awake because the shackles do 
all of the work, in the sense that if a detainee starts to fall asleep, he will start to lose his 
balance and the shackles will bring him back to the same standing position. This “passive” 
method “avoids the need for using means that would require interaction with the detainee and 
might pose a danger of physical harm” (13). 
Another means of keeping a detainee awake is having him sit on and be shackled to a stool. 
“The stool supports the detainee’s weight, but is too small to permit the subject to balance 
himself sufficiently to be able to go to sleep” (13). 
To be used less frequently, and only in the case that the detainee must recover from edema 
(swelling) without interrupting the sleep deprivation technique, is shackling the detainee while 
he is in a horizontal position. He is placed on top of a thick towel or blanket. His hands are 
“manacled together and the arms placed in an outstretched position – either extended beyond 
the head or extended to either side of the body – and anchored to a far point on the floor in 
such a manner that the arms cannot be bent or used for balance or comfort. At the same time, 
the ankles are shackled together and the legs extended in a straight line with the body and also 
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anchored to a far point on the floor in such a manner that the legs cannot be bent or used for 
balance or comfort” (14). The objective is to return the detainee to the standing shackled 
position as soon as signs of edema have disappeared. 
In discussing the simultaneous use of nudity and sleep deprivation, the memo says that the 
detainee will wear an adult diaper, which is “not used for the purpose of humiliating the 
detainee, and it is not considered to be an interrogation technique” (14).  
The memo is also stricter in regards to how many hours sleep deprivation may be employed. 
Recall that the August 1, 2002 memo authorized up to 11 consecutive days, constituting a total 
of 264 hours. The May 10, 2005 memo limits sleep deprivation to 180 hours (7.5 days), which 
must be followed with a minimum of eight hours of uninterrupted sleep. 
 
13. Waterboarding: The distance from which the water is poured changes. In the August 1, 2002 
memo, the height was 12 to 24 inches. For this memo, the height is 6 to 18 inches. This memo 
is also extremely detailed as to how often and to whom it can be applied. A detainee may be 
waterboarded only if “(1) the CIA has credible intelligence that a terrorist attack is imminent; 
(2) there are ‘substantial and credible indicators the subject has actionable intelligence that can 
prevent, disrupt or delay this attack’; and (3) other interrogation methods have failed or are 
unlikely to yield actionable intelligence in time to prevent the attack” (15). Waterboarding can 
only be used during one 30-day period and only on five of those days. In any 24-hour period, a 
detainee may not undergo a waterboarding “session” (being strapped to the table) more than 
twice and no session may exceed two hours. Within one session, “the number of individual 
applications of water lasting 10 seconds or longer may not exceed six…the total cumulative 
time of all applications of whatever length in a 24-hour period may not exceed 12 minutes” 
(15). 
 
In a footnote, the memorandum explains that the previously approved method of placing a 
detainee in a “confinement box” with a harmless insect was never used but, nevertheless, 
has been removed from the official list of interrogation techniques (11). This list of 
techniques was issued after news of Abu Ghraib was made public and its influence can be 
seen in the restrictions placed on nudity, for example, but techniques such as shackling 
and stress positions were still allowed in certain circumstances.  
Of extreme importance is the fact that the definition of torture against which the 
memorandum judges these techniques is not that issued by the Bush Administration, but 
rather that of CAT as incorporated into 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A. Perhaps it is a 
recognition of the flawed nature of the Bush Administration’s overly narrow outlook on 
torture, yet it still maintains a great deal of flexibility in terms of interrogation techniques. 
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After establishing the progression of EITs, it is worth keeping in mind that the CIA 
only has detained about one hundred persons and it is from those numbers that EITs 
could be implemented. Furthermore, 
Two thirds of those brought into the CIA program did not require the use of any enhanced 
interrogation techniques whatsoever. Just the experience of being brought into CIA custody – the 
‘capture shock,’ arrival at a sterile location, the isolation, the fact that they did not know where 
they were, and that no one else knew they were there – was enough to convince most of them to 
cooperate. (Thiessen 45)  
 
Thiessen argues that EITs were used on a very small number of individuals and that EITs, 
regardless of on whom they were used, were legal. There are three potential problems with 
his analysis that the next section will seek to address. First, the CIA program 
encompasses, as Thiessen acknowledges, only a very small sampling of those taken into 
US custody. Thus discussion of the CIA program is not representative of detainee 
treatment as a whole during the Bush Administration years. Furthermore, evidence shows 
that it was more than just this small group that was subjected to EITs. Third, EITs work 
under a philosophy of fear-and-domination, whereby the interrogator makes clear to the 
detainee who is in charge and by inducing a sense of fear and helplessness, elicits his 
cooperation. This philosophy is problematic for the question of torture. 
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III.III: Reports and Testimony – A Case Study Comparison 
23 
As pertains the categories for Guantanamo detainees mentioned above, on June 
22, 2004, the Bush Administration released a one-page summary detailing which of the 
techniques had actually been put into effect and with what variations, between December 
2002 and January 15, 2003 (reprinted in The Torture Papers 1239): 
• Category I 
o Yelling (not directly into ear) 
o Deception (introducing of confederate detainee) 
o Role-playing interrogator in next cell 
 
• Category II 
o Removal from social support at Camp Delta 
o Segregation in Navy Brig 
o Isolation in Camp X-Ray 
o Interrogating the detainee in an environment other than standard interrogation 
room at Camp Delta (i.e., Camp X-Ray) 
o Deprivation of light (use of red light) 
o Inducing stress (use of female interrogator) 
o Up to 20-hour interrogations 
o Removal of all comfort items, including religious items 
o Serving MRE instead of hot rations 
o Forced grooming (to include shaving facial hair and head – also served 
hygienic purposes) 
o Use of false documents or reports 
 
One of the prisoners at Guantanamo who was there during the time period in 
which the above techniques were employed was Mohammed al-Kahtani. To elaborate 
                                                
23 <http://www.spencersundell.com/blog/wp-
content/uploads/2009/01/guantanamo_bound_prisoners_for_torture.jpg>. 
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some on exactly what the above techniques entailed, this section will present a case study 
comparison between the treatment al-Kahtani received and the abuses at Abu Ghraib.  
Al-Kahtani is known as the “20th hijacker,” or the terrorist who attempted to 
participate in the 9/11 attacks but was denied entry into the US. Thiessen details the 
interrogation methods used on him:  
He was forced to stand naked for five minutes with females present. He was forced to wear a 
woman’s bra, a thong was placed on his head, and he was shown pictures of women in bikinis. 
Once, a female interrogator straddled him without putting any weight on him and rubbed his 
shoulders. He was also forced to dance with a male interrogator, told that he had homosexual 
tendencies, and that his mother and sister were whores. In addition, an interrogator put a leash on 
him, showed him pictures of al Qaeda terrorists, and ordered Kahtani to growl at the terrorists. 
(Thiessen 303) 
 
Thiessen justifies the use of these techniques by arguing that they are actually derived 
from FM 34-52 – the baseline for all interrogations – and not from any additional, more 
controversial EITs. Al-Kahtani was an “extreme misogynist” and in order to exploit such a 
disposition to elicit his cooperation, interrogators used the “Emotional Pride and Ego 
Down” and “Emotional Futility” techniques (techniques eight and nine as listed in chapter 
III.I). He quotes the 1992 US Army Field Manual on Interrogation, which describes 
“Emotional Pride and Ego Down” as involving “‘attacking the source’s sense of personal 
worth.’” As for “Emotional Futility,” the interrogator “‘convinces the source that resistance 
to questioning is futile’ by exploiting ‘the source’s psychological and moral weaknesses, as 
well as weaknesses inherent in his society’” (303). Thus the sexual humiliation was a 
legitimate means of breaking down al-Kahtani’s resistance by hurting his pride and 
making clear to him that the best avenue would be cooperation. 
 Kahtani was also subjected to the following: 
…Kahtani was isolated from the general population, and underwent 20-hour interrogations (with 
regular ten minute exercise and restroom breaks) and four hours’ sleep in between sessions. He 
was subjected to yelling and loud music. On one occasion, a military working dog was brought in 
to growl at him. When he refused to drink water to stay hydrated, the water was poured over his 
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head in a policy of ‘drink it or wear it’ (this is the closest Kahtani ever came to being 
waterboarded). He was forced to look at videos of the destruction of 9/11, and pictures of the 
victims were plastered on the walls of his interrogation room. He was made to look at photos of 
children who died in the attacks, and at one point the picture of one 3-year old victim was taped 
over his heart. He was forced to stand during the American national anthem and write letters of 
remorse to the families of 9/11 victims (the letters were never mailed). (Thiessen 303-04) 
 
Thiessen cites an FBI report issued by Lieutenant General Randall Schmidt and Brigadier 
General John Furlow24 stating that all of these techniques were legally sound. Thiessen 
chalks up the techniques as to nothing more than fraternity-style hazing which, although 
humiliating and even degrading, are certainly not torture. Bush Administration supporters 
such as Thiessen vehemently support the argument that “What happened in those photos 
[of Abu Ghraib] had nothing to do with CIA interrogations, military interrogations, or 
interrogations of any sort” (Thiessen 39). What happened was a case of “Military Police 
gone wild.”  
 Next is a listing of techniques employed at Abu Ghraib (many of which are 
depicted in the photographs), using the exact wording of the Taguba Report (as reprinted 
in Danner 292-93):  
• Punching, slapping, and kicking detainees; jumping on their naked feet 
• Videotaping and photographing naked male and female detainees 
• Forcibly arranging detainees in various sexual positions for photographing 
• Forcing detainees to remove their clothing and keeping them naked for several days at a 
time 
• Forcing naked male detainees to wear women’s underwear 
• Forcing groups of male detainees to masturbate themselves while being photographed and 
videotaped 
• Arranging naked male detainees in a pile and then jumping on them 
• Positioning a naked detainee on a MRE Box, with a sandbag on his head, and attaching 
wires to his fingers, toes, and penis to simulate electric torture 
• Writing “I am a Rapest” on the leg of a detainee alleged to have forcibly raped a 15-year 
old fellow detainee, and then photographing him naked; 
• Placing a dog chain or strap around a naked detainee’s neck and having a female Soldier 
[Private First Class Lynndie England] pose for a picture [while holding onto the dog 
chain] 
                                                
24 This report, entitled “Investigation into FBI Allegations of Detainee Abuse at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba 
Detention Facility,” can be accessed at <http://humanrights.ucdavis.edu/resources/library/documents-and-
reports/schmidt_furlow_report.pdf>. 
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• A male MP guard having sex with a female detainee 
• Using military working dogs (without muzzles) to intimidate and frighten detainees, and in 
at least one case biting and severely injuring a detainee 
• Taking photographs of dead Iraqi detainees 
• Breaking chemical lights and pouring the phosphoric liquid on detainees 
• Threatening detainees with a charged 9mm pistol 
• Pouring cold water on naked detainees 
• Beating detainees with a broom handle and a chair 
• Threatening male detainees with rape 
• Allowing a military police guard to stitch the wound of detainee who was injured after 
being slammed against the wall in his cell 
• Sodomizing a detainee with a chemical light and perhaps a broom stick 
• Using military working dogs to frighten and intimate detainees with threats of attack, and 
in one instance actually biting a detainee  
 
It is blatant hyperbole to say that the only difference between what happened to al-
Kahtani at Guantanamo and to those at Abu Ghraib is that the latter were photographed. 
However, it is equally erroneous to deny that there is no connection whatsoever between 
the techniques, particularly those surrounding sexual humiliation, used at Guantanamo 
and those that were used at Abu Ghraib. Recall that it was concerns about al-Kahtani’s 
treatment that prompted a revision of EITs for Guantanamo; there was enough consensus 
of concern to elicit an investigation into the approved techniques.  
Furthermore, both sets of techniques share an underlying philosophy of what 
Matthew Alexander terms “fear-and-control”(5). Manipulation of the detainee’s 
environment, sexual humiliation, and physical contact all work to induce a sense of fear 
and helplessness in the detainee. These techniques make clear to the detainee that the 
interrogator is in charge and by exploiting the detainee’s anxieties and weaknesses, the 
detainee will realize that it is best to comply and not challenge his superior.  
Even without making any moral judgments about the techniques themselves and 
without addressing the question of whether or not these techniques were torture, it is 
undeniable that there exists some overlap between these sets of techniques. Although there 
were certainly many instances of blatant violations of policy (such as the writing on 
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detainees’ bodies or pouring chemical lights onto detainees), many other techniques were 
exaggerated or extreme versions of what was approved for Guantanamo detainees.  
Take the technique of allowing the use of military dogs to exploit phobias. Under 
formal policy guidelines, the dogs were to be muzzled at all times and never to make 
contact with the prisoners. In a memorandum to Combined Joint Task Force Seven 
(stationed in Baghdad, Iraq), for example, Lieutenant General Ricardo S. Sanchez, 
Commander of all US forces in Iraq, specifies that “Should military working dogs be 
present during interrogations, they will be muzzled and under control of a handler at all 
times to ensure safety” (Sanchez, 12 Oct. 2003, 5). Obviously the use of dogs at Abu 
Ghraib went beyond those limitations, but the idea to use dogs did not come from solely 
the imagination of the soldiers working there.  
The same applies to removal of clothing; it seems as if one of the original 
restrictions on this technique was preventing a naked detainee from being seen by any 
other detainees, although the interrogators could see him. Again, the soldiers at Abu 
Ghraib took the concept of nudity and ran with it.  
Consider also the Category III technique approved for mild physical contact, as 
well as the August 1, 2002 Bybee memo approving the facial hold and facial slap. These 
physical EITs are meant to be mild and to startle rather than to harm the detainee. Yet 
they signaled a profound change; they offered a breaking of the taboo against touching 
detainees. Recall that FM 34-52 involves zero physical contact with the detainee. Now 
interrogators were allowed to breach that barrier. The beatings conducted by Abu Ghraib 
soldiers went far beyond what was legally proscribed, but it is certainly plausible that they 
had their basis in the idea that interrogators were now allowed to have physical contact 
with detainees. 
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There is, of course, not a perfect time line at hand. The broadest range of 
techniques approved for use at Guantanamo was from December 2, 2002 through 
January 15, 2003. The Abu Ghraib abuses occurred between October and December of 
2003, when the shorter list of approved techniques was in effect. However, this paper still 
wishes to insist on a connection by analyzing the role of one particular individual, Major 
General Geoffrey Miller. 
Major General Geoffrey Miller was in charge of Guantanamo from November 
2002 through March 2004, thus he was present for part of the time that al-Kahtani was 
there.25 From August 31, 2003 through September 9, 2003, shortly before the documented 
abuses at Abu Ghraib, MG Miller was sent to Iraq in order to replicate what was 
considered to be his success at Guantanamo. The Taguba Report admits to MG Miller’s 
influence in the techniques used at Abu Ghraib: 
‘From 31 August to 9 September 2003, MG Miller led a team of personnel experienced in strategic 
interrogation to HQ [Headquarters], CJTF-7 [Combined Joint Task Force Seven] and the Iraqi 
Survey Group (ISG) to review current Iraqi Theater ability to rapidly exploit internees for actionable 
intelligence. MC Miller’s team focused on three areas: intelligence integration, synchronization, and 
fusion; interrogation operations; and detention operations. MG Miller’s team used JTF-GTMO 
procedures and interrogation authorities as baselines [emphasis added].’ (qtd. in Danner 283) 
 
It may seem unremarkable that MG Miller would use the strategies and 
interrogation techniques of Guantanamo Bay to help the war effort in Iraq. After all, he 
was seen as an expert in extracting information from detainees and the pressure for 
“actionable intelligence” was increasingly high, particularly because events in Iraq were 
not turning out quite as the Bush Administration had expected and the Iraqi insurgency 
was gaining in strength. To counteract the growing conflict and civil disorder in Iraq, the 
                                                
25 Al-Kahtani remains at Guantanamo Bay, thus MG Miller was not present for the entirety of al-Kahtani’s 
detention. 
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US needed better intelligence and thus it turned to military professionals like MG Miller 
for assistance.  
However, it was publicly voiced that the detainees at Guantanamo were “the worst 
of the worst.”26 In his September 2006 speech justifying the CIA program and military 
commissions, President Bush argued,  
It's important for Americans and others across the world to understand the kind of people held at 
Guantanamo. These aren't common criminals, or bystanders accidentally swept up on the 
battlefield – we have in place a rigorous process to ensure those held at Guantanamo Bay belong at 
Guantanamo. (qtd. in Thiessen 393-94)27 
 
EITs were approved for use at CIA “black sites” and Guantanamo Bay, which was run by 
both military and CIA personnel, because they held the most valuable and most dangerous 
detainees, such as al-Kahtani. A prison like Abu Ghraib would not have been an arena for 
EIT use for a variety of reasons, including its insecure location but above all because the 
                                                
26 Stating that the highest-profile terrorists would be placed at Guantanamo implies that there is some sort of 
vetting process that occurs to determine who is sent there. There is substantial evidence, however, that many 
who ended up there were not dangerous at all, but instead were given to the US in exchange for bounties 
paid to people who turned in Al-Qaeda or Taliban members. Of the first three hundred people to arrive at 
Guantanamo, for example, only five percent had been captured by US forces; the rest were turned over to 
the US by Pakistan or the Northern Alliance. The US’ ignorance of the people, culture, language, and 
religious sects allowed this system to be rampantly abused, whereby Afghanis and Pakistanis would turn in 
the neighbor they did not like, the person they owed money to, a member of an enemy clan, etc. in exchange 
for $5,000 to $20,000 or more US dollars, which could support their family and their community for many 
years, if not for a lifetime. (Honigsberg 77-8)   
The Fay-Jones Report, an inquiry into Abu Ghraib, confirms the insufficient vetting process that happened 
for many detainees in Iraq, particularly for those at Abu Ghraib: Soldiers “‘failed to perform the proper 
procedures at the point-of-capture and beyond with respect to handling captured enemy prisoners of war 
and detainees (screening, tactical interrogation, capture cards, sworn statements, transportation, etc.). 
Failure of capturing units to follow these procedures contributed to facility overcrowding, an increased drain 
on scarce interrogator and linguist resources to sort out the valuable detainees from innocents who should 
have been released soon after capture, and ultimately, to less actionable intelligence’” (qtd. in Danner 32). 
 
27 There is no surprise that Thiessen, author of the speech, would also defend this position in his book 
Courting Disaster. “[T]he vast majority held at the facility were not common criminals or bystanders who 
were accidentally arrested. They were dangerous terrorists who had made it their life’s mission to kill 
Americans or America’s allies – and, if set free, would immediately return to fulfilling that mission (as some 
did)” (Thiessen 51). The qualifications, so to speak, of those who ended up at Guantanamo is one of the 
highly contested matters circumscribing the debate about detainee treatment. 
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detainees placed there were not high-level. EITs were originally intentioned for high 
profile detainees alone.  
Furthermore, detainees at Guantanamo, in Afghanistan, and in CIA “black sites” 
were not granted Geneva Convention protections, as discussed earlier. In contrast, those 
in Iraq were. The only group in Iraq that was excluded from the Fourth Geneva 
Convention protections was “al Qaeda terrorists from foreign countries who entered Iraq 
after the [US] occupation began” (Goldsmith 40). The legal protections for these various 
groups were distinct.  
What seems to have happened over the course of time, however, was that 
techniques approved for use on high-level detainees alone who received no Geneva 
Convention protections became acceptable for use on any prisoner, regardless if they were 
violent or not and regardless if there was substantial evidence as to their affiliation with 
either al-Qaeda or the Taliban. Thus General Miller’s appearance in Iraq, with the 
instructions to follow Guantanamo “procedures and interrogation authorities,” meant that 
interrogation techniques initially outlined for use on solely a few, key detainees – who 
were not protected by international law – were transported and adopted for detainees who 
were protected. EITs became standard, if not for all detainees, certainly for more than for 
whom they were originally limited to. The Fay-Jones Report, issued in response to the 
Abu Ghraib scandal, concurs:  
‘Policies and practices developed and approved for use on Al Qaeda and Taliban detainees (in Afghanistan and 
Guantanamo) who were not afforded the protection of the Geneva Conventions, now applied to detainees who did 
fall under the Geneva Conventions’ protections…[these techniques included] removing clothing, 
isolating people for long periods of time, using stress positions, exploiting fear of dogs and 
implementing sleep and light deprivation [emphasis added].’ (qtd. in Danner 27-8) 
 
Recall the US Constitution’s Eighth Amendment and its principle concerning just 
punishment. The punishment should fit the crime; unfortunately, in many cases of the war 
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on terror, the punishment (in the form of interrogation techniques) was far more uniform 
than the types of detainees within US custody. Insufficient categorization of detainees led 
to the application of harsh techniques upon those that did not merit them. 
The reader should note, too, that there is a certain level of confusion present as well 
about what was allowed and what was not. MG Miller was present for the end of August 
and the beginning of September of 2003. The next month, in October, Lieutenant General 
Ricardo Sanchez issued guidelines on interrogation to be applied to all forces in Iraq. 
There are competing theories at play and quick changes between who is in charge.  
There is a link between the narrowly defined techniques for a very narrow 
category of detainees and their application and re-invention on a very large category of 
detainees. Some of the abuses committed on detainees clearly went beyond what was 
officially sanctioned, but many of the abuses were variations of approved techniques. 
Efforts were made, based on the success of EITs on certain detainees, to expand their 
application to others. This case study comparison is not meant to rest the blame of Abu 
Ghraib solely on the shoulders of Bush Administration officials nor does it seek to explain 
all of the myriad factors that contributed to producing the Abu Ghraib nightmare, but it is 
meant to encourage the reader to ponder more on the possibility of a connection between 
what was explicitly approved and what abuses did occur.  
Thiessen argues that the “photos did enormous damage” (39). His concern echoes that 
of President Bush’s sentiment following the release of his photo op with the “Mission 
Accomplished” banner in the background, proclaiming what hindsight shows to be a far 
too premature victory in Iraq. President Bush was concerned that the photo was sending 
the wrong message to the American people. However, both cases fail to address the more 
fundamental point. Yes, the photos did enormous damage. The reason they did enormous 
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damage, however, was not the photographs themselves but the fact that their contents 
provided undeniable proof of detainee mistreatment at the hands of US personnel. The 
question that needs to be addressed is why what was depicted in the photos happened at 
all, and not why the photos exist. The following chapter seeks to elaborate further on both 
the rationale for the Bush Administration to approve the interrogation techniques it did 
and why abuses did occur, keeping always in mind the possibility of a connection between 
the two.  
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CHAPTER IV: WHAT FACTORS WENT INTO 
DETERMINING TECHNIQUES AND WHAT INFLUENCE 
DID THEY HAVE ON ABUSES THAT OCCURRED? 
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IV.I: Fear of Legal Prosecution 
Although the sections to this chapter are meant to be presented in no particular 
order and thus do not constitute a ranking system of most to least important influencing 
factors, the decision to place “fear of prosecution” as the opening section was deliberate. 
Fear, unfortunately, is a large theme within the greater context of the war on terror. As 
will be explored in this section, fear of terrorists, fear of future attacks, fear of being 
blamed for attacks, fear of damage to one’s reputation, fear of going too far, fear of not 
going far enough, fear of prosecution, etc. all combined to create a very tense and scared 
administration that felt it had to stretch and blur the law as far as it could possibly go so as 
to accomplish its obligation to keep America safe. 
On the one hand, the Bush Administration was terrified of the possibility of 
another terrorist attack.28 The administration’s fear stemmed, of course, from a concern for 
the American people but also because it knew that it alone would be blamed should 
another attack occur. The conclusions of the 9/11 Commission made clear that the Bush 
Administration must do everything within its power to prevent another attack.29  
The consistent refrain from the Commission, Congress, and pundits of all stripes was that the 
government must be more forward-leaning against the terrorist threat: more imaginative, more 
aggressive, less risk-averse. (Goldsmith 74) 
 
                                                
28 Beyond the frightening nature of 9/11, the President and select other officials also receive a daily “threat 
matrix,” detailing all threats to the US. Being consistently bombarded with such information inevitably 
influences a person’s judgment by inducing a sense of terror, with the foregone conclusion that all measures 
must be taken to prevent any one of these threats from materializing, no matter how weak or tangential the 
evidence is. Jim Baker, former head of the Office of Intelligence Policy and Review, described the daily 
reading of the threat matrix as “‘like being stuck in a room listening to loud Led Zeppelin music’…After a 
while, you begin to ‘suffer from sensory overload’ and become ‘paranoid’ about the threat” (Goldsmith 72). 
The reader will certainly note the profound irony of Mr. Baker’s comment, for it describes perfectly one of 
the commonly used interrogation and detention techniques as discussed in chapter III.III.  
 
29 This conclusion had been made before in US history. President Roosevelt, for example, after Pearl 
Harbor, knew that the responsibility to prevent another Japanese attack rested on his shoulders. His 
determination to do so resulted in many controversial policies, above all the internment camps for Japanese-
Americans.  
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It became a popular refrain that the United States government had failed to prevent the 
attack and the 9/11 Commission brought to light many instances in which the government 
had insufficiently followed up on leads that taken together, created the circumstances that 
allowed 9/11 to occur. The seemingly apocalyptic nature of the event injected a sense of 
terror into daily discourse, which, with the US being a democracy, naturally morphed into 
disillusionment with and protest against the federal government and vehement calls for 
policy changes to make sure that there would never again be a Ground Zero. 
 At the same time that pressure was at its peak to make changes and make the US 
less permeable to the terrorist threat, the US knew very little about al Qaeda. Intelligence 
wise, the US was at a serious disadvantage. Furthermore, as discussed in Chapter I, this 
was a highly sophisticated and scattered enemy as well, which utilized all means of modern 
technology to avert detection and be able to target civilian populations (i.e. blowing up 
commercial planes versus ambushing a military fort). As Goldsmith argues,  
With the “chronic obscurity” that comes from facing a scattered enemy that employs all means of 
modern technology and does not engage in the normal rules of warfare, there developed a sense 
that the President would have to maintain a large degree of flexibility to effectively destroy the 
ever-changing target. (Goldsmith 73)  
 
At the same time, Bush Administration officials feared that a subsequent 
administration, perhaps harboring differing views on how to conduct the war on terror 
and benefitting from hindsight, might be tempted to interpret that vital flexibility as war 
crimes under the US War Crimes Act (1996), the Torture Victim Prevention Act (1991), 
and other post-Vietnam legislation that had been implemented by Congress in light of 
what it saw as executive abuses of power. The Administration did not feel that it would be 
able to foresee all of the tools that it would need to face the enemy, but it knew that 
whatever was decided upon, sooner or later it would be called upon to explain and justify 
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those policy decisions. In order to have a strong case, the Bush Administration felt 
compelled to wrap itself in broad legal protections to cover the unexpected. 
The result was the legalization of a whole host of new programs and entities – 
everything from the Department of Homeland Security to the techniques discussed in this 
paper. The legal rationale for these strategies were at times written in very broad language 
to prevent “retroactive discipline” for threats and situations that perhaps hindsight would 
not deem so noteworthy (Goldsmith 137).  
To understand the extent to which the fear of legal reprisal loomed over 
administration officials – and how justified that fear was given recent legislation and 
efforts by various domestic interest groups – President Bush’s September 6, 2006 speech, 
in which he acknowledges the existence of the CIA program, is quoted at length: 
Another reason the terrorists have not succeeded is because our government has changed its 
policies – and given our military, intelligence, and law enforcement personnel the tools they need 
to fight this enemy and protect our people and preserve our freedoms. 
 
…There are two reasons why I’m making these limited disclosures [about the CIA program] 
today. First, we have largely completed our questioning of the men – and to start the process for 
bringing them to trial, we must bring them into the open. Second, the Supreme Court’s recent 
decision [Hamdan vs. Rumsfeld, decided June 29, 2006] has impaired our ability to prosecute 
terrorists through military commissions, and has put in question the future of the CIA program. In 
its ruling on military commissions, the Court determined that a provision of the Geneva 
Conventions known as “Common Article Three” applies to our war with al Qaeda. This article 
includes provisions that prohibit “outrages upon personal dignity” and “humiliating and degrading 
treatment.” The problem is that these and other provisions of Common Article Three are vague 
and undefined, and each could be interpreted in different ways by American or foreign judges. 
And some believe our military and intelligence personnel involved in capturing and questioning 
terrorists could now be at risk of prosecution under the War Crimes Act – simply for doing their 
jobs in a thorough and professional way. 
This is unacceptable. Our military and intelligence personnel go face to face with the world’s most 
dangerous men every day. They have risked their lives to capture some of the most brutal 
terrorists on Earth. And they have worked day and night to find out what the terrorists know so 
we can stop new attacks. America owes our brave men and women some things in return. We owe 
them their thanks for saving lives and keeping America safe. And we owe them clear rules, so they 
can continue to do their jobs and protect our people. 
So today, I’m asking Congress to pass legislation [what became the Military Commissions Act] 
that will clarify the rules for our personnel fighting the war on terror. First, I’m asking Congress to 
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list the specific, recognizable offenses that would be considered crimes under the War Crimes Act 
– so our personnel can know clearly what is prohibited in the handling of terrorist enemies. 
Second, I’m asking that Congress make explicit that by following the standards of the Detainee 
Treatment Act [2005] our personnel are fulfilling America’s obligations under Common Article 
Three of the Geneva Conventions. Third, I’m asking that Congress make it clear that captured 
terrorists cannot use the Geneva Conventions as a basis to sue our personnel in courts – in US 
courts. The men and women who protect us should not have to fear lawsuits filed by terrorists 
because they’re doing their jobs. (qtd. in Thiessen 392, 403-05)  
 
The Bush Administration sincerely felt that what it had approved and was doing 
was vital to the safety of the nation. However, the war on terror, by its being a 21st century 
war, was perpetually in the public eye and much of what was happening, naturally 
enough, caused concern among the populace. Never before had the public had so much 
access to how war was being conducted; because the US is a democracy, it also meant that 
the public had never had so much influence over what was happening. It was public 
outcry, confusion, misunderstanding, and concern that prompted President Bush to give 
the speech.  
At the same time that the war was being conducted in an increasingly public 
fashion, the US was struggling with the fact that it was facing a very different type of 
enemy whose tactics were a far cry from standard warfare procedure. Much needed to be 
changed and very quickly, but simultaneously there was a demand for accountability and 
transparency greater than the US had ever before faced during wartime.  
In acknowledgement of these realities, the Bush Administration turned to the 
Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) within the Department of Justice as a way to protect 
administrators, CIA personnel, soldiers, and anyone else who might come into contact 
with detainees from the type of legal nightmares that President Bush discussed in his 
speech. OLC has a great deal of clout and anyone working under its memorandum would 
have a strong legal defense in case he or she was brought to court. “More than any agency 
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in the government, OLC could provide the legal cover needed to overcome law-induced 
bureaucratic risk-aversion” (Goldsmith 96). Furthermore,  
[M]ost legal issues of executive branch conduct related to war and intelligence never reach a 
court, or do so only years after the executive has acted. In these situations, the executive branch 
determines for itself what the law requires, and whether its actions are legal. (Goldsmith 32) 
 
Thus it was not unusual for the Bush Administration to turn to OLC for legal guidance; it 
was an established procedure. 
Reliance on OLC, however, is not a perfect solution. First, OLC is supposed to 
simultaneously support and be a check on the executive branch, creating an inevitable 
source of conflict of interest. “OLC lives inside the very political executive branch, is 
subject to few real rules to guide its actions, and has little or no oversight or public 
accountability” (Goldsmith 33). Furthermore, although “OLC’s ultimate responsibility is 
to provide information about legality, regardless of what morality may indicate, and even 
if harm may result,” OLC must of course consider the needs of its clients, the most 
important being the president, whose number one responsibility is to keep the American 
people safe (Goldsmith 147-48). Thus the lawyers at OLC, lawyers for the CIA, lawyers 
for the FBI, and anyone else tasked with analyzing the legal foundations for war on terror 
policy found himself constantly facing competing demands. Goldsmith sums up this 
tension as it relates to the CIA: 
The lawyers…in the CIA…[e]very day, they and their clients were exposed to a buzzsaw of 
contradictory commands: stay within the confines of the law, even when the law is maddeningly 
vague, or you will be investigated and severely punished; but be proactive and aggressive and 
imaginative, push the law to its limit, don’t be cautious, and prevent another attack at all costs, or 
you will also be investigated and punished. (162) 
 
Such a situation should provoke what Professor Marc Landy has termed 
“constitutional empathy” for policymakers from the reader and the public in general (4). 
The war on terror has provoked on a very large scale the ever-present conflict within 
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democracies between liberty and security. The president (and by extension the 
government) is supposed to keep the people safe and maintain public order. The 
foundation of a liberal democracy, however, is rooted in the rule of law and the liberties 
and rights of the individual. What takes precedence during wartime is up to considerable 
interpretation. The Bush Administration chose to prioritize security, but in recognition of 
the strong tradition to adherence to the rule of law within the US, it took steps to ensure 
that what it was doing fell within a legal framework, even if that meant first changing the 
law. Such changes, as this paper analyzes, include interrogation techniques, whereby the 
traditional techniques based on the US Army Field Manual on Interrogation were 
rendered inadequate for handling certain high-profile detainees and thus a second-tier of 
techniques, EITs, were created and implemented.  
One of those techniques, as discussed previously, was hooding during interrogation 
and transportation (depicted in the photograph in chapter III.III). This technique 
reinforces the urgency surrounding the Administration’s eagerness to create thorough 
legal protections against prosecution. Hooding is a form of sensory deprivation and is thus 
meant to cause disorientation but should not inhibit normal breathing, as specified by the 
Oct. 11, 2002 memo issued by Lieutenant Colonel Jerald Phifer authorizing hoods, 
although this did occur. The February 2004 International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC) Report, covering US operations in Iraq, gives detail as to how exactly hoods were 
used there. 
One or two bags, sometimes with an elastic blindfold over the eyes which, when slipped 
down,…impeded proper breathing. Hooding was sometimes used in conjunction with beatings 
thus increasing anxiety as to when blows would come. The practice of hooding also allowed the 
interrogators to remain anonymous and thus to act with impunity. Hooding could last for periods from a 
few hours to up to 2 to 4 consecutive days…[emphasis added]. (qtd. in Danner 261)  
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Beyond providing a means to render detainees passive and thus more cooperative, 
hooding also prevented detainees from recognizing or identifying their interrogators and 
guards. Hoods created a sense of anonymity and therefore served as an additional 
safeguard against responsibility should “retroactive discipline” occur. Fear of “lawfare”30 
was so rampant among Bush Administration officials, CIA personnel, and the military that 
even the techniques themselves helped build a legal shield. Hooding may not have been 
intentionally designed to have this benefit, but the result is the same.  
Furthermore, the increased freedom from prosecution such a technique provided to 
interrogators encouraged further abuse. As the ICRC report details, if the detainee does 
not know whose control he is under, the interrogator may feel at greater liberty to let out 
whatever frustration, prejudice, boredom, or anxiety he may be feeling by abusing the 
detainee, such as through beatings.  
As discussed in President Bush’s speech, the fear of prosecution also played into 
the purpose and final language of the Military Commissions Act of 2006. As President 
Bush said in his speech given at the signing ceremony, 
‘This bill provides legal protections to ensure our military and intelligence personnel will not have 
to fear lawsuits filed by terrorists simply for doing their jobs. This bill spells out specific, 
recognizable offenses that would be considered crimes in the handling of detainees so that our men 
and women who question captured terrorists can perform their duties to the fullest extent of the 
law. And this bill complies with both the spirit and the letter of our international obligations. As 
I’ve said before, the United States does not torture. It’s against our laws and it’s against our 
values.’ (qtd. in Thiessen 56) 
 
Some critics of the Military Commissions Act view it as a Congressional blessing of much 
of the Bush Administration’s counterterrorism policies and is thus a public acceptance of 
sincerely flawed strategies. However, the Military Commissions Act was in fact an attempt 
to correct some of the problems that both the press and the Bush Administration realized 
                                                
30 For further reading on the role of “lawfare,” see Goldsmith 58-63. 
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and acknowledged, such as unclear guidelines as to what was and what was not torture 
and what was and what was not legal to do, as well an attempt to put the entire counter-
terrorism program on a more solid legal footing by gaining Congress’ seal of approval. 
More straightforward rules would, ideally, satisfy all sides of the debate, for they would 
result in greater protections for both government personnel (by being more specific as to 
what and was not legal) and detainees (by being more specific as to what protections they 
had and what techniques could be used). 
The war on terror is a new kind of war that demands new strategies. There existed 
within the Bush Administration a palpable fear of another attack and pressure to prevent 
another one. Yet in developing the means to do so, there inevitably were repeated clashes 
with existing law and tradition. Since the Administration felt that it had to stretch or even 
change the law in order to accomplish its mission, it also felt that it had to protect itself 
from the possibility of legal reprisal. It is telling of the times facing Americans that much of 
what is driving decisions and backlash against those decisions is mutual fear, which 
spawns suspicion and mistrust, doubt and discontent. In an effort to simultaneously keep 
the country safe, keep government personnel safe, and satisfy naysayers, the Bush 
Administration made many changes, adjustments, modifications, and breaks to existing 
law. 
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IV.II: The “Unitary Executive” 
“‘Detention and interrogation policy are at the heart of the president’s commander-in-chief power to wage war, 
and long constitutional history supports the president’s leading role on such matters.’”  
-John Yoo, qtd. in McKelvey 241 
 
The sentiment professed by Congress, the 9/11 Commission and the public about 
the urgency of being flexible and imaginative in the face of this new threat boded well with 
the philosophical underpinnings of many officials within the Bush Administration 
concerning executive power. Several key players in formulating war on terror policy were 
strong proponents of executive power. Some believed that the executive had very broad 
powers; others had a more personal agenda to see to it that the executive’s authority was 
expanded. 
One group of executive power proponents, known as the “War Council,” was 
extremely influential in formulating antiterrorism policy. The “War Council” consisted of 
Legal Counsel to the President Alberto Gonzales, Gonzales’ first deputy Tim Flanigan, 
Legal Counsel to the Vice President David Addington, Department of Defense General 
Counsel William “Jim” Haynes, and Deputy Assistant General John Yoo. Along with 
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Vice President Dick Cheney, and President Bush, 
they believed that particularly in foreign affairs, the executive branch was “first among 
equals when it [came] to separation of powers” (Honigsberg 76-7).  
Part of this fervor was due, as alluded to in the previous section, to what they felt 
had been an overreaction on the part of Congress during the 1970s, 80s, and 90s to actions 
taken by certain presidents, such as President Nixon (Watergate), President Johnson 
(Vietnam), and President Reagan (Iran-Contra). Congress had responded by imposing 
many legal restraints on the executive and many within the Bush Administration felt that 
these restraints were not only unconstitutional breaches of executive authority but also 
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would gravely impede the war effort in Afghanistan and Iraq, particularly in regards to 
the president’s role as commander in chief.   
The role of OLC was again central, as it articulated this belief through its 
memorandum. The August 1, 2002 memo by Yoo and Bybee, in discussing the effect that 
federal law concerning torture (18 U.S.C. § 2340-2340A) would have on executive power 
in executing the war on terror, reveals the Administration’s adamancy concerning 
executive prerogative: 
‘Even if an interrogation method arguably were to violate Section 2340A, the statute would be 
unconstitutional if it impermissibly encroached on the President’s constitutional power to conduct 
a military campaign…Any effort to apply Section 2340A in a manner that interferes with the 
President’s direction of such core war matters as the detention and interrogation of enemy 
combatants thus would be unconstitutional…Section 2340 must be construed as not applying to 
interrogations undertaken pursuant to his Commander-in-Chief authority…Any effort by 
Congress to regulate the interrogation of battlefield detainees would violate the Constitution’s sole 
vesting of the Commander-in-Chief authority in the President…It may be the case that only 
successful interrogations can provide the information necessary to prevent the success of covert 
terrorist attacks against civilians…[it] would be unconstitutional to seek to prevent the President 
from gaining the intelligence he believes necessary to prevent attacks upon the United States.’ 
(qtd. in Danner 142, 145, 149) 
 
Goldsmith summarizes the conclusions of the memo as follows: 
[V]iolent acts aren’t necessarily torture; if you do torture, you probably have a defense; and even if 
you don’t have a defense, the torture law doesn’t apply if you act under color of presidential 
authority. (144) 
 
The wording of the memo seems to suggest that the president is allowed to break the law if 
he believes it would interfere with his ability to protect the nation.  
To suggest that the president is above the law is a dangerous breach of American 
law tradition. The memo’s conclusion 
…has no foundation in prior OLC opinions, or in judicial decisions, or in any other source of 
law…It [also] implies that many other federal laws that limit interrogation – anti-assault laws, the 
1996 War Crimes Act, and the Uniform Code of Military Justice – are also unconstitutional. 
(Goldsmith 149) 
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Unsurprisingly therefore, the memo raised concerns that the president could justify any 
action taken as within his commander-in-chief powers. That includes torture, because the 
memo argues that the president can violate the torture statute if he feels it is necessary for 
national security. It is no wonder that the label of “torture memo” has stuck so thoroughly. 
Furthermore, the memo holds that Congress was absolutely powerless to provide 
any guidance or suggestions whatsoever on matters of interrogation and detainee 
treatment, again seemingly discarding legal traditions of checks and balances and 
separation of powers. As Goldsmith warns, 
[W]hen one concludes that Congress is disabled from controlling the President, and especially 
when one concludes this in secret [these memos were originally internal, classified documents], 
respect for separation of powers demands a full consideration of competing congressional and 
judicial prerogatives, which was lacking in the interrogation opinions. (Goldsmith 149)  
 
The broad interpretation of executive power had the corollary of viewing congressional 
input as potentially binding the executive’s hands. In David Addington’s opinion, 
“…[P]residential power was coextensive with presidential responsibility. Since the 
President would be blamed for the next homeland attack, he must have the power under 
the Constitution to do what he deemed necessary to stop it, regardless of what Congress 
said” (Goldsmith 79). Although it is Congress’ responsibility and right to create law, there 
are times when the pressing nature of a threat or the necessity for secrecy can compel the 
executive to forego debate with Congress and make decisions on its own. For the Bush 
Administration, however, that notion was pushed even farther to the point where, in 
general, it believed that there was rarely a reason to consult Congress. In place of 
congressional affirmations, OLC opinions were treated as law. 
Goldsmith also argues that “their [Bybee and Yoo’s] legal arguments were wildly 
broader than was necessary to support what was actually being done,” specifically in 
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reference to the ten techniques outlined in the other August 1, 2002 Bybee memo 
(Goldsmith 150). However, this was likely Bybee and Yoo’s intention. Remember that the 
Bush Administration, in trying to protect Americans, tried to accomplish two tasks 
simultaneously: create broad, expanded powers and programs to eliminate the enemy and 
protect itself from legal prosecution, also by making the law broad. These ten techniques 
went through many phases and morphed, for example, into twenty-four techniques on 
May 10, 2005, based on what the Administration had learned in the mean time about what 
was effective and what was not, who the enemy was and what its level of resistance was, 
etc. The memo was broad as a protective measure for future, unforeseen needs.  
Although Thiessen argues that the “president never relied on this authority [the 
August 1, 2002 memo] for any interrogations,” that did not mean that someone else would 
not or did not. Its broad language provoked anxiety within the administration, to the 
extent that Bybee’s successor, Jack Goldsmith, withdrew the memo in 2004. His 
rationale? 
My main concern upon absorbing the opinions was that someone might rely on their green light to 
justify interrogations much more aggressive than ones specifically approved and then maintain, not 
without justification, that they were acting on the basis of OLC’s view of the law. (Goldsmith 151)  
 
Goldsmith’s fears reflect the same reasoning behind those who have labeled the memo as 
the “torture memo.” It is so broad that it could potentially provide legal cover for any 
technique because it could always be justified as being within the president’s constitutional 
authority to protect the nation. In this memorandum, the national security argument 
granted legal cover for seemingly anything.  
The Bush Administration deliberately decided to view the fight against terrorism as 
a war instead of a criminal matter. The president could invoke his commander in chief 
powers, affording himself greater leverage than that allowed during peacetime. However, 
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choosing war also implies that the US would act in accordance with the laws of war. The 
benefits of a war metaphor must be balanced with the responsibilities it also encompasses. 
To a certain extent, the Bush Administration utilized OLC to get around those 
responsibilities and create its own rules of warfare.  
The message of executive privilege was supported by public statements issued by 
the administration. Less than a week after 9/11, on September 16th, 2001, Vice President 
Dick Cheney did an interview on Meet the Press with Tim Russert in which he declared his 
now infamous “dark side” comment: 
‘We also have to work, though, sort of the dark side, if you will.  We’ve got to spend time in the 
shadows of the intelligence world. A lot of what needs to be done here will have to be done quietly, 
without any discussion, using sources and methods that are available to our intelligence agencies, if 
we’re going to be successful. That’s the world these folks operate in, and so it’s going to be vital for 
us to use any means at our disposal, basically, to achieve our objective [emphasis added].’ (qtd. in 
Honigsberg 247-48)31 
 
Cheney’s comment reflects the belief that the US government and its personnel were 
taking the necessary risks so that the American people could sleep peacefully at night. 
What was required was dark and nasty because the enemy was dark and nasty; all 
Americans should be grateful that someone else was doing the dirty work for them. 
Furthermore, only the executive branch had the capacity to adequately face the threat and 
thus any restraints on its power meant an increased likelihood of American deaths.  
Further proof of the administration’s go-it-alone attitude comes from the process of 
drafting the August 1, 2002 memo.  
OLC normally circulates its draft opinions to government agencies with relevant expertise. The 
State Department, for example, would normally be consulted on the questions of international law 
implicated by the interrogation opinions. But the August 2002 opinion, though it contained no 
                                                
31 Vice President Cheney’s role in all matters of the presidency, but particularly in foreign policy, was quite 
unusual. During “…no previous administration was the Vice President’s Counsel so integrated into the 
operations of the powerful [President’s] Counsel Office…The new arrangement reflected Vice President 
Cheney’s enormous influence on President Bush” (Goldsmith 76). Thus Cheney’s sentiments as regards war 
on terror policy are highly relevant to understanding the tone of the Bush Administration.  
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classified information, was treated as an unusually ‘close hold’ within the administration…under 
directions from the White House, OLC did not show the opinion to the State Department, which 
would have strenuously objected. (Goldsmith 166-67) 
 
Not only Congress, but also other government agencies were excluded from the decision-
making process surrounding detainee treatment policy. 
The rhetoric of the CIA supported and reinforced the anything-goes attitude as 
well. In testifying before the Senate Intelligence Committee on September 26, 2002, 
Joseph Cofer Black, Director of the CIA’s Counterterrorist Center from 1999 through 
May 2002, made clear that in the eyes of the CIA, there was a distinct difference between 
the pre-9/11 world and the post 9/11 world. “After 9/11 the gloves come off” (Unclassified: 
Testimony of Cofer Black). Gloves evoke polite manners, gentlemanliness, and respect. To 
suggest that the gloves are coming off is to suggest that refinement, manners, and culture 
are being discarded, too. It is to say that the values and principles of social civility no 
longer apply. This is an extremely powerful metaphor for the deeply held belief among 
Administration officials that all methods were needed to tackle this war and thus no limits 
could be imposed upon the executive’s command-in-chief authority, and by extension, 
upon the interrogation methods used. The rhetoric is consistently of zero limitations, for 
the war was viewed by the Bush Administration as indisputably zero-sum; any limitation 
on the US’ side allowed the enemy to advance.  
The concept of “gloves coming off” was also supported by members of Military 
Intelligence. In mid-August of 2003, as pressure was mounting to gather “actionable 
intelligence” from detainees, an MI captain in Iraq sent out an email to his colleagues 
asking for their input on creating an “‘[i]nterrogation techniques wish list’” [internal 
quotations removed] that would be used against “‘unlawful combatants’” or those not 
protected by the Geneva Conventions. He writes: 
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‘The gloves are coming off gentlemen regarding these detainees, Col Boltz [the Army's V Corps 
deputy chief of staff of intelligence] has made it clear that we want these individuals broken. 
[American] [c]asualties are mounting and we need to start gathering info to help protect our 
fellow soldiers from any further attacks [emphasis added].’ (qtd. in Danner 33) 
 
The MI captain’s objective is clear: destroy the enemy by “breaking” them emotionally and 
physically so that they are no longer able to attack US troops.  
Avid supporters of Bush Administration policies like Thiessen make the argument 
that the choices made by the Bush Administration were the morally superior choices and 
that the US has acted in accordance with its tradition of civility and respect for human 
rights. It is better to make the enemy suffer than to run the risk of more Americans dying 
in another terrorist attack; that is true respect for human rights. Yet it is inevitable that the 
public would express concern when top officials talk about “gloves coming off” and 
publicly acknowledging that the US will be breaking from past procedures and traditions. 
With the wording of the August 1, 2002 memorandum supported by the rhetoric of the 
administration, CIA officials, and military leadership, one can began to see how the 
“gloves off” mentality trickled down to individual soldiers who felt that they could do as 
they pleased because the high-ups said they could. 
When questioned about the CIA’s role in controversial interrogation techniques, 
CIA spokesman Paul Gimigliano, interviewed by CNN, said:  
‘The CIA in no way endorsed behavior – no matter how infrequent – that went beyond formal 
guidance. This has all been looked at; professionals in the Department of Justice decided if and 
when to pursue prosecution. That is how the system was supposed to work, and that's how it did 
work.’ (Benson) 
 
What he says may in fact be true. The Bush Administration made sure that OLC 
memoranda, as discussed earlier, would provide legal protection for all parties involved 
and included a wide range of tactics and procedures for CIA use. The point that the Bush 
Administration missed, however, was that they changed the law in order to protect 
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themselves. The Bush Administration seemed very comfortable with lowering itself down 
to the level of its enemy in order to get what it wanted. The US was willing to get dirty, 
dark, and uncivilized if that meant protecting national security. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
91 
IV.III: Resistance to the “Unitary Executive” 
There has been some backlash against President Bush’s claims of executive 
privilege. On December 30, 2004, Goldsmith’s successor Daniel Levin issued a 
replacement memo for the one Goldsmith had rescinded (the August 1, 2002 Bybee/Yoo 
memo). Levin writes: 
Because the discussion in that memorandum concerning the President's Commander-in-Chief 
power and the potential defenses to liability was – and remains – unnecessary, it has been 
eliminated from the analysis that follows. Consideration of the bounds of any such authority would 
be inconsistent with the President's unequivocal directive that United States personnel not engage 
in torture. 
 
The message of the replacement memo was clear: the President’s Commander-in-Chief 
power cannot override the law. The commander-in-chief’s powers do not extend to 
approving torture, even if he may feel it necessary given the context of the war.  
Beginning in 2004 with Hamdi vs. Rumsfeld, the Supreme Court began to rule 
against aspects of the Bush Administration’s counter-terror plan. According to Goldsmith, 
these rulings “gave the administration the perfect opportunity to go to a Congress 
controlled by Republicans to get the entire terrorism program on a stronger and more 
explicit legal footing” (135). The Bush Administration chose to ignore this option, 
however, and more and tougher rulings followed. 
In the 2006 case Hamdan vs. Rumsfeld, the Supreme Court ruled that the Bush 
Administration could not create and operate its own system of military commissions to try 
detainees without congressional authorization. Both the Uniform Code of Military Justice 
(see chapter II.III) and the Geneva Conventions, particularly Common Article 3, would 
be violated otherwise. Justice Breyer, in a concurring opinion, wrote: 
The dissenters say that today’s decision would ‘sorely hamper the President’s ability to confront 
and defeat a new and deadly enemy.’…They suggest that it undermines our Nation’s ability to 
‘preven[t] future attacks’ of the grievous sort that we have already suffered…The Court’s 
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conclusion ultimately rests upon a single ground: Congress has not issued the Executive a ‘blank 
check.’…Indeed, Congress has denied the President the legislative authority to create military 
commissions of the kind at issue here. Nothing prevents the President from returning to Congress 
to seek the authority he believes necessary. 
 
Where, as here, no emergency prevents consultation with Congress, judicial insistence upon that 
consultation does not weaken our Nation’s ability to deal with danger. To the contrary, that 
insistence strengthens the Nation’s ability to determine—through democratic means—how best to 
do so. The Constitution places its faith in those democratic means. Our Court today simply does 
the same.  
 
Goldsmith argues that this legal analysis is “erroneous,” for the US’ compliance with 
Common Article 3 would have been “a matter of customary international law” and not “a 
treaty obligation” as the Court ruled (136).  
Goldsmith’s comment points to the fact that there is enormous debate about 
Common Article 3. In the original interpretation of its application, Common Article 3 
solely covered civil wars. However, it is part of (“common” to) all Geneva Conventions 
and its use since its inception to encompass more than civil wars suggests a more 
expansive reading of its application. Thus there are many individuals and groups, like the 
Supreme Court, who believe it should apply to all conflict, whether intra or international.  
That debate aside, Goldsmith acknowledges that the Supreme Court’s ruling 
concerning Common Article 3 was enormously powerful, if legally problematic.  
It meant that a small portion of the Geneva Conventions did apply in the war on terrorism, and it 
provided detainees with more elaborate legal rights of humane treatment and legal process than 
the administration had ever acknowledged. And more ominously, the Court’s holding implied that 
the 1996 War Crimes Act, which the independent counsel-fearing executive branch had tried to 
neuter since 2002, was in play and applicable to many elements of the administration’s treatment of 
detainees. (136) 
 
Hamdan, therefore, had much broader implications than for solely the matter of 
military commissions. The ruling that Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions 
applied had the potential to impact detainee treatment during interrogation and detention 
as well. The Supreme Court was imposing a higher standard upon the Bush 
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Administration’s conduct of the war, in reaction to what it felt had been a sweeping 
usurpation of power on the part of the president to conduct the war on terror.  
The criticism reached such a level that the Bush Administration felt compelled to 
address the nation and reveal its CIA program and attempt to justify it. The speech was 
delivered on September 6, 2006 and sections of it have already been quoted. 
Unfortunately, a single speech was not sufficient to either properly educate the American 
people about what was at stake nor to restore credibility for the administration. Thiessen 
admits to the belatedness of this public plea for support. “[I]f there was a cardinal sin of 
the Bush administration, it was a failure to explain and defend our actions against the 
criticisms of a hostile press” (51). While some limitations on what is made public are of 
course necessary for national security, disclosure to a certain extent is absolutely vital 
because the US is a liberal democracy. It is both the beauty and tragedy of such a society; 
some security must be sacrificed in order to have freedom of information and to be 
informed, engaged citizens who are aware of the facts, instead of being spoon-fed state-
sponsored propaganda.  
Furthermore, the passage of the Military Commissions Act of 2006 on October 17, 
2006, which granted the Bush Administration much of what it wanted,32 proved that 
Congress was not a roadblock to be avoided at all costs. Congress was even willing to 
support enhanced interrogation techniques. Goldsmith argues, however, that “[m]easured 
against the baseline of what it could have gotten from a more cooperative Congress in 
2002-2003, the administration had lost a lot” (139). The Bush Administration lost on a 
                                                
32 These gains included “a broadened definition of ‘unlawful enemy combatant’; implicit approval for 
aggressive interrogations short of torture; immunity from prosecution for those who participated in past 
interrogations that crossed the prohibited line; narrowing interpretations of the Geneva Conventions and 
amendments to the War Crimes Act that minimized the impact of the Supreme Court’s decision; elimination 
of judicial habeas corpus review over Guantanamo; and a prohibition on the judicial use of the Geneva 
Conventions to measure the legality of the Guantanamo detentions” (Goldsmith 138).  
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large scale because it was not willing to compromise; it felt that it had no need to 
compromise because the president was entitled to do everything possible to prevent future 
terrorist attacks.  
The immense secrecy and go-it-alone attitude of the Bush Administration impeded 
deeper evaluation of interrogation techniques. It must be recognized, however, that there 
was resistance on the part of Congress as well concerning how much they wished to be 
informed about the techniques. Congress held the same fears of legal prosecution as White 
House officials did; Congress was aware that the more information it knew about what 
exactly was happening, the more it would be held accountable if anything went wrong. 
The debate recently circulating in the newspapers about how much or how little Speaker 
of the House Nancy Pelosi knew about techniques such as waterboarding gives credence 
to this point.  
Despite congressional hesitation, the Bush Administration’s unwavering 
commitment to the executive’s sole control over foreign policy matters produced a hubris 
that impeded a more thorough analysis and development process of interrogation and 
detention policy.  
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IV.IV: “Enemy Combatants” and the Geneva Conventions 
“Yes, Common Article 3 is vague in some sense, I suppose, but life, and particularly law, are replete with vague 
terms: obscenity, probable cause, torture. If we need to explain what we believe those terms mean,  
then we should do it. We're just using vagueness as an excuse to avoid  
Common Article 3 and the Geneva Conventions.”  
-Former Navy Judge Advocate General Hutson qtd. in Katel 678 
 
The role of fear in determining the outlook of Bush Administration officials has 
already been mentioned. Fear was also relevant to the decisions the Bush Administration 
made regarding the applicability of the Geneva Conventions to detainees. Post-9/11 policy 
was created out of tremendous fear of the capability that only a handful of radicals had to 
inflict utter terror and destruction upon Americans. The general sentiment was that the 
people who had caused 9/11 had not acted humanely and thus were not deserving of the 
fullest level of humane treatment as provided under domestic and international law. 
The manifestation of this conclusion within the Bush Administration came with its 
declaration that the Geneva Conventions would not apply in fighting the war against al-
Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan. In a January 25, 2002 memorandum to President 
Bush, Alberto Gonzales argued that the War on Terror was  
‘…a new kind of war. It is not the traditional clash between nations adhering to the laws of war 
that formed the backdrop for GPW [the Third Geneva Conventions on Prisoners of War]…the 
new paradigm renders obsolete Geneva’s strict limitations on questioning of enemy prisoners and 
renders quaint some of its provisions requiring that captured enemy be afforded such things as 
commissary privileges, scrip, athletic uniforms, and scientific instruments.’ (qtd. in Danner 84)  
 
The US, therefore, would not hold itself accountable to the Geneva Conventions in 
fighting al-Qaeda and the Taliban. 
That the US was disqualifying them was a shocking change; never before had the 
US declared the Geneva Conventions irrelevant to its conduct in foreign wars. Such a 
dramatic step required significant legal support. Again OLC was able to provide it. The 
Bush Administration concluded that Al Qaeda and Taliban members were not entitled to 
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the protections afforded under the Third Geneva Conventions (that concerning POWs or 
lawful combatants) because of their failure, among other reasons, to comply with Article 
Four, which defines what a POW is and presents two categories of qualification.  
 The Bush Administration harped on the fact that Taliban soldiers, insurgents, and 
terrorists did not comply with the second category, which includes such requirements as a 
uniform and openly carrying one’s arms. Yet failure to comply with these measures does 
not automatically exclude a combatant from lawful combatant status. Article 4 specifically 
states that a lawful combatant must fall into “‘one of the following categories [emphasis 
added]’” and not both. The first category, “‘Members of the armed forces of a Party to the 
conflict as well as members of militias or volunteer corps forming part of such armed 
forces’” would seem to apply to Taliban soldiers who were paid by the Afghan government 
(International Committee of the Red Cross). Yet the Bush Administration dismissed this 
logic on the grounds of such arguments as that Afghanistan was a “failed state” at the time 
of the invasion (Danner 84).  
It makes sense that “giving terrorists such [POW] protections would undermine 
the very purpose of the Geneva Conventions,” which is to create incentives for adherence 
to the laws of war (Thiessen 29). The decision to not grant terrorists POW status, 
furthermore, was not controversial and received support from all sides of the political 
spectrum.  
To elaborate briefly on this point, soldiers who are captured by the enemy are 
effectively divested of their ability to hurt the enemy because they have been removed 
from the battlefield. A terrorist, on the other hand, once in custody has not necessarily 
“laid down his arms.” There is no literal battlefield from which he has been removed and 
his ability to influence events outside of his prison cell is much greater than that of a foot 
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soldier. Furthermore, a POW “is bound to give only his surname, first names and rank, 
date of birth, and army, regimental, personal or serial number, or failing this, equivalent 
information” to his captors (International Committee of the Red Cross, Art. 17 of the 
Third Geneva Conventions). In a war where intelligence is the key variable, US personnel 
must be able to demand more of detainees than their name and date of birth. 
The necessity of using “enhanced interrogation techniques” against certain 
detainees and denying POW status to captured Taliban and al-Qaeda members was 
reinforced by episodes such as the following:  
In late November 2001, a group of recently captured Arab Taliban fighters at Qala Jangi 
[Northern Afghanistan] used concealed weapons to kill CIA agent Johnny Spann and others and 
took over the facility for a week until they were subdued in one of the most brutal battles in the 
Afghanistan campaign [to date]…It was becoming clear that the fanatical volunteer fighters in this 
war were not like World War II conscripts who were thrilled to be off the battlefield and in safe 
POW camps. The Islamist fighters would not stop fighting once captured, but would instead use 
any means at their disposal to kill their enemies. (Goldsmith 107) 
 
Denying POW status to such fighters seemed to be a logical conclusion based on the 
danger they posed.  
It is another matter, however, to say that no part of the Geneva Conventions 
applies. As discussed earlier, the Geneva Conventions were written in a way as to afford 
everyone some form of legal protection. If no one qualified as a POW, everyone qualified 
under the Fourth Geneva Conventions (all unlawful combatants). As the ICRC reports, 
“the GC apply to all the detainees ‘regardless of how such persons are called’” (qtd. in 
Honigsberg 20).  
Yet the Bush Administration felt that the Geneva Conventions, beyond not 
applying to terrorists, imposed dangerous limitations on their ability to effectively face the 
enemy. The result of the disqualification of this long-standing treaty was the creation of a 
new legal term, the “enemy combatant.” The fact that “enemy combatant” had no legal 
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precedent created the impression that the US’ intention in coining the term was to skirt 
international law and avoid prosecution. Some critics believe that such legal twisting 
“provide[d] cover to mistreat and torture detainees” (Honigsberg 8). 
Furthermore, the desire to protect one’s self from legal prosecution also impacted 
the decision to disqualify Geneva. In the words of Attorney General John Ashcroft, in a 
memorandum sent to President Bush on February 1, 2002, 
‘A Presidential determination against treaty [i.e. the Geneva Conventions] applicability would 
provide the highest assurance that no court would subsequently entertain charges that American 
military officers, intelligence officials, or law enforcement officials violated Geneva Convention 
rules relating to field conduct, detention conduct or interrogation of detainees.’ (qtd. in 
Honigsberg 21) 
 
Excluding the Geneva Conventions kept the fear of legal retribution at bay.  
The first time that the term “enemy combatant” appeared in official records was in 
the February 2002 federal district court decision in Coalition of Clergy vs. Bush, which 
addressed what type of legal rights were afforded to Guantanamo Bay detainees.33 As 
mentioned before, the State Department was largely excluded from deliberations on 
interrogation and detention policies. Not surprisingly, therefore, members of State 
Department became vocal once they were informed of those policies. Secretary of State 
(and General) Colin Powell and other members of the State Department urged the 
president to designate Taliban soldiers as lawful combatants, but he instead decided to 
first designate them as unlawful combatants and later as unlawful enemy combatants, with 
little attempt at explaining the change in terminology. 
By the spring of 2002, the term “enemy combatant” was applied to anyone within 
the “enemy” camp. That Congress did not legalize the term until 2006, under the Military 
                                                
33 For more on this case, see Honigsberg 22 
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Commissions Act, points to both its controversial nature and the persistent exclusion of 
Congress from foreign policy decisions.  
Some of the loudest critics of the “enemy combatant” identification came from 
those with deep connections to the military, such as General Colin Powell, who, in a 
January 26, 2002 memorandum to Alberto Gonzales, argued that adopting such a position 
would  
‘…reverse over a century of US policy and practice in supporting the Geneva conventions and 
undermine the protections of the law of war for our troops, both in the specific conflict and in 
general…It has a high cost in terms of negative international reaction, with immediate adverse 
consequences for our conduct of foreign policy…It will undermine public support among critical 
allies.’ (qtd. in Danner 89) 
 
It is telling that someone of Powell’s military rank would question such a pivotal decision 
in the post 9/11 era. General Powell recognized the importance of adhering to 
international standards because if the US failed to, it could not expect the rest of the world 
to treat American soldiers according to the standards the US had rejected.34 
Powell also recognized the damaging effect this policy could have on military 
culture. A fundamental part of basic military training is instruction on the Geneva 
Conventions and how they constitute the standard of conduct for all armed conflict. This 
is so that soldiers know not only how they are to treat those in US hands, but what their 
rights are as well, should they be captured by the enemy. According to Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff General Richard Myers, “the Geneva Conventions were ‘ingrained in 
U.S. military culture,’ that ‘an American soldier’s self-image is bound up with the 
Conventions,’ and that ‘as we want our troops, if captured, treated according to the 
                                                
34 In addition, what the latter part of Colin Powell’s argument points to is a crucial feature of the fight 
against terrorism: it is a global problem that the US will not be able to solve on its own. It will need the 
cooperation of many other governments, in terms of intelligence sharing and military action, among other 
matters of mutual support. The US must be careful not to alienate those that it will need to achieve its 
objectives. The question of Geneva is one among many that has divided the US from its European allies, 
although the US has managed to maintain close ties with Britain. 
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Conventions, we have to encourage respect for the law by our own example’” (qtd. in 
Goldsmith 113-14).  
To say that these nearly golden standards are not applicable may convince soldiers 
that the enemy is not their equal but is instead their inferior, since they do not “deserve” 
the same legal protections as US soldiers or any previous enemy that the US has fought 
since ratifying the Geneva Conventions. Disqualifying the Geneva Conventions 
dehumanized the enemy, opening the way for abuse and torture.35  
Frustration over this policy decision was voiced by other military personnel as well. 
Captain Ian Fishback (US Army), who served tours in both Afghanistan and Iraq and 
later reported incidents of abuse he had witnessed, testified on what he felt was unclear 
and insufficient guidance as to the application of the Geneva Conventions where he was 
stationed. When he saw abuse for the first time, “his commanders left the impression that 
the United States did not have to follow the Geneva Conventions when dealing with 
prisoners in Iraq, so he did not report the incidents” (Schmitt). Those abuses included  
…beatings of Iraqi prisoners, exposing them to extremes of hot and cold, stacking prisoners in 
human pyramids, and depriving them of sleep at Camp Mercury, a forward operating base near 
Falluja. The abuses reportedly took place between September 2003 and April 2004, before and 
during the abuses at the Abu Ghraib prison near Baghdad. 
 
Confusion over whether the Geneva Conventions applied, including which Conventions 
where and when and to whom, abounded and played a role in the case of Abu Ghraib as 
well. Captain Fishback argued that the Bush Administration was unfairly blaming low-
                                                
35 There is an interesting twist to the story concerning the exclusion of the Geneva Conventions. One of the 
supposed benefits of creating new rules was to give the US government full reign over where, how, and for 
how long it kept detainees. Yet the Geneva Conventions state that until hostilities cease, a nation may 
continue to have custody over those it has captured. With the indefinite nature of the war on terror, the US 
could have technically held its prisoners indefinitely (as it has done anyway with countless numbers of them) 
while still adhering to international law, putting the US tradition of rule of law and the US’ international 
reputation (not to mention its moral fiber) at much less risk. 
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ranking individuals for policy decisions made at the top. In the same New York Times article 
quoted above, Fishback reports, 
‘We [Fishback and two sergeants with whom he was stationed] came forward because of the 
larger issue that prisoner abuse is systemic in the Army. I'm concerned…they'll try to scapegoat 
some of the younger soldiers. This is a leadership problem.’  
 
Fishback’s concerns reflect the hierarchical nature of the military. Any actions taken by 
those at the bottom of the chain of command ultimately reflect upon those at the top. With 
those at the top changing the rules, it does not seem that surprising that confusion and 
mistakes would be prevalent at the bottom. 
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IV.V: Detention vs. Interrogation, Army vs. CIA 
The confusion expressed by Captain Fishback concerning protocol and his 
frustration over what he felt was scapegoating of low-ranking soldiers, can partly be 
explained by the presence of a variety of groups working side by side at these detention 
facilities. Civilian contractors – ranging from maintenance workers to interpreters – 
worked alongside the military and the CIA. The confluence of groups created confusion 
about protocol. 
In the case of Abu Ghraib, there was a minimum of four groups responsible for 
detainees. There were military police (MPs), military intelligence (MIs), the CIA, and 
civilian contractors. Military intelligence and the CIA were to be in charge of 
interrogation; military police had authority over detention, i.e. monitoring the prisoners 
when they were not being interrogated. Civilian contractors filled in and supplemented 
many roles. As analyzed earlier, the Army and CIA operated under separate guidelines, 
but oftentimes these two branches worked side by side.  
The CIA was granted greater flexibility because it was assumed that what was 
appropriate and necessary within the context of interrogation went beyond what was 
appropriate and necessary for detention alone. Furthermore, the types of detainees that 
came into contact with the CIA were supposed to be higher-profile characters with 
correspondingly more interrogation techniques at the CIA’s disposal to elicit their 
cooperation. This distinction highlights again the value that was placed on intelligence and 
thus the looser guidelines assigned to interrogation sessions.  
 At Abu Ghraib, however, there appeared to be an understanding that one of the 
tasks of the Army personnel (i.e. MPs) was to “soften up” the detainees for the 
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interrogations. This led to use of the imagination and bending and breaking of the rules. 
As Sabrina Harman, 372nd MP Company stationed at Abu Ghraib prison, testified for the 
Taguba Report regarding the incident, captured on photograph, in which a detainee was 
hooded, made to stand on a box, and had wires attached to his toes, penis, and fingers,  
‘that her job was to keep detainees awake…MI wanted to get them to talk. It is Graner and 
Frederick’s36 job to do things for MI and OGA [other government agencies, i.e. the CIA] to get 
these people to talk.’ (qtd. in Danner 294) 
 
Her statements are supported by the testimony of several of her peers, including the 
following testimony from another MP, discussing what MI told him and the other MPs in 
regards to how to treat detainees: 
‘Loosen this guy up for us.’ ‘Make sure he has a bad night.’ ‘Make sure he gets the treatment.’ (qtd. 
in Danner 295)  
 
The interpretation of what it meant to “soften up” a detainee was what the world saw in 
the photos. Sergeant Javal S. Davis testified to the explicit approval and collusion that 
MIs provided to MPs to carry out the abusive treatments: 
The MI staffs, to my understanding, have been giving Graner compliments on the way he has been 
handling the MI holds [prisoners being held by military intelligence]. Example being statements 
like ‘Good job, they’re breaking down real fast’; ‘They answer every question’; ‘They’re giving out 
good information, finally’; and ‘Keep up the good work’ – stuff like that.’ (qtd. in Danner 19)  
 
Sergeant Samuel Provance concurs with Sergeant Davis’ account, stating: 
‘Military intelligence was in control. Setting the conditions for interrogations was strictly dictated 
by military intelligence. They weren’t the ones carrying it out, but they were the ones telling the 
MPs to wake the detainees up every hour on the hour…’ (qtd. in Danner 20) 
 
 Recall from chapter I that, according to the CIA, interrogation was actually a two-
step process, consisting of interrogation followed by de-briefing. The former could involve 
the use of EITs and the latter was when questions were asked and intelligence collected. 
Both steps, however, are to be carried out by CIA personnel. The behavior of the soldiers 
                                                
36 Corporal Graner and Sergeant Frederick were two of the main perpetrators of the Abu Ghraib scandal. 
They appear in many of the photos that were released.  
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at Abu Ghraib, however, shows a dangerous misinterpretation of the interrogation/de-
briefing process. Here they are told to “soften up” detainees in order to increase their 
cooperativeness during the interrogations and de-briefings that followed. Yet these 
soldiers were not trained the way CIA personnel were and were not given the strict 
boundaries that CIA personnel were. “Softening up” became whatever they came up with. 
Interrogation became part of daily detention procedure, so that detainees were subjected 
to a three-step system: interrogation while in detention, interrogation during actual 
interrogation sessions, and finally de-briefing.  
The level of training and expertise that differentiated CIA personnel from MIs and 
MPs was vast. In describing the former, President Bush explained, 
‘All those involved in the questioning of the terrorists are carefully chosen and they're screened 
from a pool of experienced CIA officers. Those selected to conduct the most sensitive questioning 
had to complete more than 250 additional hours of specialized training before they are allowed to 
have contact with a captured terrorist.’ (qtd. in Thiessen 399) 
 
Furthermore, 
[I]nterrogations involved strict oversight. There was no freelancing allowed – every technique had 
to be approved in advance by headquarters, and any deviation from the meticulously developed 
interrogation plan would lead to the immediate removal of the interrogation. (Thiessen 46) 
  
The CIA had its own set of very strict protocol and had been thoroughly trained on what 
that meant. Unfortunately, it often found itself working alongside new, young, and poorly 
trained soldiers who were easily influenced. Guantanamo Bay had a similar problem, for 
although run by the Army, it housed many CIA detainees, with the result of two different 
groups working from two different backgrounds and two sets of protocol in charge of the 
same group of detainees. 
On the subject of torture and cruel, inhumane, and unusual punishment, who 
committed such abuses is of little relevance. Torture is torture, whether carried about by 
105 
MPs, MIs, the CIA, or anyone else. However, proof of the involvement of MI in what 
happened is crucial for making the case that the abuse at Abu Ghraib was not an isolated 
incident of aberrant behavior, but was instead linked to those much higher up on the chain 
of command. The expansion of responsibility beyond low-ranking MPs to include MIs 
suggests that the Abu Ghraib scandal was orchestrated by far more than just a handful of 
soldiers on the night shift.  
Furthermore, it is telling that the reports issued in the wake of Abu Ghraib avoid 
placing blame on MI, despite the evidence in those same reports that they were actively 
involved. Acknowledging that the abuses were the result of someone other than the lowest 
members of the chain of command insulates those further up. It is somewhat ironic that 
the Bush Administration, in justifying many of its controversial policies, argued that they 
were necessary in order to protect American soldiers from being prosecuted later on. The 
objective was to keep troops safe. Soldiers, after all, are to follow orders, not issue them, 
thus whatever they do ultimately goes back to the chain of command – all the way to the 
commander in chief himself. Recall from chapter II.III that it is a federal crime for a 
soldier to disobey an order or regulation, according to Article 92 of the UCMJ.  
In the wake of Abu Ghraib, however, it seems as if the administration was content 
with insulating those at the top by scapegoating those at the bottom. It is an example of 
officials “who quail at the notion of ‘getting their hands dirty’” and put as much distance as 
possible between themselves and those that must carry out their orders (Danner 22, 32).37 
Here one sees Captain Fishback’s fears once again. The debate concerning the Military 
                                                
37 Another way in which soldiers suffered at the hands of officials – which also contributed to the abuses at 
Abu Ghraib, among other Iraqi prisons – was the consistent underfunding of operations. The administration 
wished to conduct the war on the cheap, and the result was a lack of staff (at one point, the prisoner-to-
guard ratio at Abu Ghraib was 75 to 1), supplies, and leadership. The inadequate funding created a chaotic 
and stressful environment at the expense of both soldiers and detainees.  
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Commissions Act of 2006, for example, focused heavily on ensuring legal protection for 
the men and women in uniform. Yet when things went awry, only they were held 
responsible.  
The anything-goes rhetoric of the Administration, coupled with the close working 
conditions between the Army and the CIA led to the belief among some soldiers that they 
were free to do as they pleased to the detainees, for they were defending their country and 
the enemy was undeserving of the types of protections that had been granted in previous 
conflicts anyway. As explains John D. Hutson, the Navy’s top lawyer from 1997 to 2000, 
“‘I know that from the military that if you tell someone they can do a little of this for the 
country’s good, some people will do a lot of it for the country’s better’” (Shane 5). 
Members of the military are trained to follow orders. Questioning their superiors is not 
part of the job description. Soldiers would not have “taken the gloves off” on such a scale 
had they not believed that what they were doing would not only be condoned, but would 
also be encouraged.  
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IV.V: Physical vs. Psychological Torture 
 
As discussed previously, the Navy’s SERE program was once source of inspiration 
for the creation of EITs. The CIA also contributed through its manual KUBARK 
Counterintelligence Interrogation, which was written in 1963 and was also developed as a 
Cold War strategy, particularly against the Soviet threat. KUBARK provides much of the 
logic as to why EITs are so effective in securing detainee cooperation and thus is useful to 
be quoted as length: 
‘…[A]ll coercive techniques are designed to induce regression…The result of external pressures of 
sufficient intensity is the loss of those defenses most recently acquired by civilized man… ‘Relatively small 
degrees of homeostatic derangement, fatigue, pain, sleep loss, or anxiety may impair these 
functions’…The circumstances of detention are arranged to enhance within the subject his feelings 
of being cut off from the known and the reassuring, and of being plunged into the strange…Control of the 
source’s environment permits the interrogator to determine his diet, sleep pattern, and other 
fundamentals. Manipulating these into irregularities, so that the subject becomes disoriented, is 
very likely to create feelings of fear and helplessness…[the interrogator] is able to manipulate the 
subject’s environment, to create unpleasant or intolerable situations, to disrupt patterns of time, 
space, and sensory perception…Once this disruption is achieved, the subject’s resistance is 
seriously impaired. He experiences a kind of psychological shock, which may only last briefly, but 
during which he is far…likelier to comply…Frequently the subject will experience a feeling of 
guilt. If the ‘questioner’ can intensify these guilt feelings, it will increase the subject’s anxiety and 
his urge to cooperate as a means of escape [emphasis added].’  (qtd. in Danner 17) 
 
KUBARK follows the philosophy, mentioned in chapter III.III, of fear-and-control. Make 
a detainee feel helpless and he will cooperate. Make clear to him that he is the inferior in 
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the situation and that his only hope of returning to the “known” is cooperation with his 
superior. 
To be more specific, KUBARK techniques generally fall within the broad categories of 
sensory deprivation and environmental manipulation. The main purpose of these 
techniques is to cause disorientation, as the person is thrown out of sink with his natural 
rhythms and is “plunged into the strange,” losing the ability to exert control over his 
surroundings. KUBARK clearly states that one of its purposes is to do away with 
detainees’ civility, depriving them of their fundamental human functions so as to become 
wholly dependent upon the interrogator for mercy and sanity. They are to be deprived of 
their will so as to be rendered fully docile and compliant. It is for this reason – the 
intentional denial of a person’s will – that sensory deprivation and environmental 
manipulation become problematic in terms of a discussion on torture.  
Sensory deprivation has been known to go so far as to prohibit detainees from using 
their sense of touch, in the form of gloves or mittens, for prolonged periods of time. 
According to Shayana Kadidal, senior managing attorney for Guantanamo Global Justice 
Initiative at the Center for Constitutional Rights, one of his clients was forced to wear 
gloves on his hands for the several years that he was there. As a result, he never felt 
human contact. Such extreme circumstances can lead to Stockholm syndrome, in which 
the detainee becomes so deranged as to begin identifying with his interrogator. The 
development of said syndrome is a clear instance in which a person’s free will has been 
shattered; his identity has become so entwined with that of his interrogator that he defends 
the person who has abused him. Prolonged deprivation of one’s senses can produce 
psychological damage.  
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Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez38, the overall commander in Iraq from June 
2003 to June 2004, was in favor of utilizing KUBARK. On October 12, 2003, shortly after 
Major General Miller’s visit to Iraq, Lt. Gen. Sanchez signed a classified memorandum 
“calling for interrogators at Abu Ghraib to work with military police guards to ‘manipulate 
an internee’s emotions and weaknesses’ and to assume control over the ‘lighting, 
heating…food, clothing, and shelter’ of those they were questioning” (qtd. in Danner 12). 
Yet it seems as if, although the power of such psychological tricks was recognized and 
taken advantage of, a premium was still placed on physical techniques; psychological 
techniques were perceived as lighter and less harmful. This bias created leeway for abuse 
to occur.  
To elaborate on this point, a case study will be used. Camp Nama, a US military 
base at Baghdad International Airport in Iraq, was one such place that routinely utilized 
psychological interrogation methods.39 Camp Nama was established for the purpose of 
collecting information on the US’ then number one target in Iraq, Abu Musab al-
Zarqawi.40 The pressure for procuring “actionable intelligence” from detainees that would 
lead to al-Zarqawi’s capture was enormous. “By the spring of 2004, the demand on 
interrogators for intelligence was growing to help combat the increasingly numerous and 
                                                
38 Lt. Gen. Sanchez retired in November of 2006, “calling his career a casualty of the Abu Ghraib prison 
scandal.” Sanchez was never directly charged with any crimes, but he claims that he was essentially refused 
further work because of his association with the incidents at Abu Ghraib. For more see Serrano, Alfonso. 
“November Off to Bloody Start in Iraq.” CBSNews. 2 Nov. 2006: n. pg. Web. 26 Feb. 2010 
<http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/11/02/iraq/main2143888.shtml>. 
 
39 Camp Nama is actually only a few miles away from Abu Ghraib. Many detainees were first sent to Camp 
Nama and then transferred to Abu Ghraib. 
 
40 Al-Zarqawi was killed on June 7, 2006 by a US air strike. For more information on the circumstances of 
his death, see Finer, Jonathan and Ellen Knickmeyer. “Insurgent Leader Al-Zarqawi Killed in Iraq.” The 
Washington Post. 8 June 2006: n. pg. Web. 8 Jan. 2010 <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/06/08/AR2006060800114.html>. 
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deadly insurgent attacks” on US personnel (Marshall). The high stakes of Nama’s 
objective encouraged the use of more and harsher tactics in an effort to follow any lead – 
however tangential – that could help the US to locate al-Zarqawi. 
As to what those tactics were, the message “NO BLOOD, NO FOUL,” posted on 
placards located throughout the facility (the image at the opening of this section is a copy 
of the placard), provides much insight. This seemingly strange slogan summarizes a policy 
adopted by the US Army unit in charge of the base, Task Force 6-26: “‘If you don't make 
them bleed, they can't prosecute for it’” (Marshall).  
As the slogan points out, there was considerable fear that in the process of 
interrogating detainees, military personnel might engage in or be witness to behaviors and 
actions that they could later be prosecuted for as war crimes. To be court marshaled could 
spell the end of a person’s military career, not to mention the emotional and financial 
devastation that accompanies preparing for and participating in a trial. The fear of 
prosecution at the top, as discussed in chapter IV.I, was pervasive throughout all levels of 
authority, from the White House to the Army privates at the bottom of the military 
hierarchy. 
Assurances were thus made to protect the soldiers in the form of changed laws and 
policies. For Task Force 6-26, as long as soldiers did not cause detainees to physically 
show distress through bleeding, any technique they employed to extract information was 
valid and legally sound. The slogan of “no blood, no foul” was taken so literally that 
detainees were even used as paintball targets (hence the placard’s reference to the “High 
Five Paintball Club,” the name adopted by a group of the soldiers); potentially bruises, but 
no blood, would be the only physical evidence of this cruel entertainment. 
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Furthermore, when someone was first brought to Camp Nama, they arrived 
shackled and “[d]ressed in blue jumpsuits with taped goggles covering their eyes.” The 
importance of depriving detainees of their vision was integral to the full Camp Nama 
experience. Prisoners were also required to wear hoods whenever they left their cells. 
After the abuses at Abu Ghraib became public, in an attempt to concede to public petitions 
for better detainee treatment, detainees at Camp Nama were able to trade in their hoods 
for “cloth blindfolds with drop veils that allowed detainees to breathe more freely but 
prevented them from peeking out” (Marshall). 
This slight concession had the same effect however; detainees became disoriented 
and were dependent upon their captors in order to see and to move about their 
surroundings. The use of blindfolds instead of hoods still provides the interrogator with 
anonymity as well. As mentioned in chapter IV.I, both are visual shields against being 
identified later by a detainee reporting on the conditions of his captivity. Hoods are 
certainly an effective psychological interrogation technique, but the built-in autonomy 
they provide to the interrogator also makes it unavoidable to wonder if soldiers knew that 
what they would be doing could potentially be construed as abuse or torture, and thus 
eliminating witnesses to their behavior was vital. 
Hoods were used not only as an interrogation technique, but also as a symbolic 
parting gift for high-performing personnel within Task Force 6-26. The “the task force 
leaders established a ritual for departing personnel who did a good job…The commanders 
presented them with two…mementos: a detainee hood and a souvenir piece of tile from the 
medical screening room that once held Mr. [Saddam] Hussein” (Marshall).41 The hood 
served as a symbol of the interrogator’s power over the detainee; it suggests a smug 
                                                
41 After his capture, Saddam Hussein was brought to Camp Nama for medical review. 
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satisfaction with rendering detainees incapacitated, docile, and compliant. That it was a 
standard feature of the parting ceremony demonstrates a sense of pride that pervaded 
Task Force 6-26 about its work. Yet this pride also suggests a slight sadism, which is very 
problematic for the question of torture, because abuse committed for sadistic pleasure fits 
the proper intention for an action to constitute torture. The centrality of hoods at Camp 
Nama raises serious concerns about the type of attitude towards detainees that American 
personnel brought into their work as interrogators and what influence this had on the type 
of treatment detainees received. 
Camp Nama also had what was referred to as the “Black Room,” a window-less 
detention facility in which all of the walls and the ceiling were painted black. At first 
glance, a room painted black may seem no more serious than a teenager experimenting 
with a gothic lifestyle. Yet the “Black Room” became a playground for a variety of 
psychological techniques. The use of strobe lights, sleep deprivation, stress positions, 
blasting of loud music, and extreme temperatures, in combination with the perpetual 
absence of natural light, were among the non-physical techniques used on those who were 
kept in the room (McKelvey 158).  
Such techniques of sensory deprivation and environmental manipulation often went 
hand in hand with stress positions. A few documented cases from Guantanamo, recorded 
on July 29, 2004 and later collected during an FBI investigation, provide clear examples: 
‘On a couple of occasions, I entered interview rooms to find a detainee chained hand and foot in a 
fetal position to the floor, with no chair, food, or water. Most times they had urinated or defecated 
on themselves, and had been left there for 18-24 hours or more. On one occasion, the air 
conditioning had been turned down so far and the temperature was so cold in the room, that the 
barefooted detainee was shaking with cold. When I asked the MPs what was going on, I was told 
that interrogators from the day prior had ordered this treatment, and the detainee was not to be 
moved. On another occasion, the A/C had been turned off, making the temperature in the 
unventilated room probably well over 100 degrees. The detainee was almost unconscious on the 
floor, with a pile of hair next to him. He had apparently been literally pulling his own hair out 
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throughout the night. On another occasion, not only was the temperature unbearably hot, but 
extremely loud rap music was being played in the room, and had been since the day before, with 
the detainee chained hand and foot in the fetal position on the tile floor.’ (qtd. in Honigsberg 98-9) 
 
This case shows the use of solitary confinement, shackles, stress positions, dietary 
manipulation/deprivation, temperature manipulation, and the blasting of loud music to 
render the detainee docile and compliant.  
To analyze the first technique, recall that it was a category II technique approved 
for a maximum of 30 days. The detainees referred to above were not kept isolated for more 
than a day or so (according to one witness), but there were cases of isolation that far 
exceeded the 30-day limitation. Steve Oleskey, a WilmerHale lawyer, asserts that one of 
his clients was held in solitary confinement for 16 months. In addition, the light was 
always on in his room, depriving him of the ability to distinguish between night and day, 
interfering with his ability to sleep and thus causing disorientation, fatigue, and 
depression. The conditions of his cell were such that his legs began to atrophy. This one 
anecdote is not meant to suggest that exceeding the isolation time limit was a widespread 
phenomenon, but it is a potentially dangerous technique because if done long enough, the 
detainee can become mentally unhinged and suffer severe physical problems.  
The power of prolonged isolation to drive a person to insanity is quite strong, but 
placed next to a slogan of “No blood, no foul,” isolation seems unremarkable, even 
childish, as if you are sending the “bad” detainee to his time-out. The Camp Nama motto 
represented the belief that only physical abuse could ever amount to torture and that only 
severe physical abuse was serious enough to be worth prosecuting. In fact, those at Camp 
Nama who were charged with crimes were overwhelmingly condemned for physical 
abuses: electric shocks with stun guns, beatings, etc. Task Force 6-26’s slogan fell in line 
with the Administration’s official position of torture constituting only “serious physical 
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injury, such as organ failure, impairment of bodily function, or even death.” The potential 
damage that psychological abuse could cause was grossly underestimated.  
Recall the three-tier interrogation system approved by Secretary of Defense 
Donald Rumsfeld detailed in chapter III.II. Category III included “mild, non-injurious 
physical contact, e.g., grabbing, poking or light pushing,” yet hooding and isolation for up 
to thirty days fell under Category II and thus were considered less harmful and less 
subject to restrictions as to their use. Physical contact and pain of any sort is the most 
controversial; psychological pain is useful, but not nearly as problematic.  
Psychological abuse and torture do have visible side effects, even if they are not as 
clear as physical ones. Several examples of the former are detailed in the February 2004 
ICRC report. When the ICRC did inspections at Abu Ghraib in mid-October 2003, they 
encountered prisoners  
‘…presenting signs of concentration difficulties, memory problems, verbal expression difficulties, 
incoherent speech, acute anxiety reactions, abnormal behavior and suicidal tendencies. These 
symptoms appeared to have been caused by methods and duration of interrogation.’ (qtd. in 
Danner 7) 
 
The observations of the Red Cross emphasize that torture is sometimes not just a 
technique within itself, but that the way it is used and how often and for how long are 
compounding factors that can make something that on the surface seems merely 
uncomfortable become torture.  
Several of the memoranda did take into account the impact of using multiple 
techniques simultaneously and with what frequency. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, for 
example, recognized the need for strict guidelines as to isolation as he approved 
techniques for Guantanamo. He qualifies his approval by saying,  
Caution: The use of isolation as an interrogation technique requires detailed implementation 
instructions, including specific guidelines regarding the length of isolation, medical and 
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psychological review, and approval for extensions of the length of isolation by the appropriate 
level in the chain of command. (Rumsfeld, 16 April 2003, 3) 
 
He goes on further to note that other countries might find isolation for more than 30 days 
in violation of the Geneva Conventions and even though the Geneva Conventions did not 
apply in this case, this international perspective – held by US allies, among others – was 
worth bearing in mind.  
Furthermore, the ten techniques outlined in the August 1, 2002 memo were also to 
be used for a maximum of 30 days. The memo admits to the limitations of the effectiveness 
of their repeated use as well: “…although some of the techniques may be used more than 
once, that repetition will not be substantial because the techniques generally lose their 
effectiveness after several repetitions” (Bybee to John Rizzo, 1 Aug. 2002, 2).  
Yet these nuances clearly did not reach those on the ground in all cases and it is far 
harder to make judgment calls concerning psychological techniques than it is for physical 
techniques. Department of Defense specialists who worked with Task Force 6-26 
conceded that “[c]ases of detainee abuse attributed to Task Force 6-26 demonstrate both 
confusion over and, in some cases, disregard for approved interrogation practices and 
standards for detainee treatment...” (Marshall). Beating a detainee has clear limits; the 
evidence is visible to the naked eye and an interrogator can, on the whole, see where 
further beating might fall within the Bush Administration’s definition of torture. Yet 
psychological torture is simply much more difficult to measure and the standard imposed 
by the Bush Administration, “significant psychological harm of significant duration, e.g., 
lasting for months or even years,” is essentially impossible to evaluate without being an 
expert in mental health. Such professionals were present at some locations, but certainly 
not to the extent required.  
116 
Recall from the discussion on torture about how vague definitions can potentially 
render them useless. The Bush Administration’s definition of psychological torture was not 
vague, but rather so strict that it effectively produced the same result; little or no limitation 
was placed on psychological techniques because of the difficulty associated with 
evaluating how it was affecting the detainee’s mental health. An interrogator likely would 
have observed the same problems that the ICRC did, but remember that the definition 
requires damage lasting months or years. Interrogators would potentially have to wait that 
long in order to be able to make such calls, if they did at all.  
Take for example the EIT concerning confined space. At Guantanamo, when the 
first detainees began to arrive in January of 2002, the facility was not adequately outfitted 
yet. Detainees were placed in eight-by-eight metal cages reminiscent of “dog kennels” 
(Honigsberg 76-7). Confining someone to a small space does not constitute torture, but it 
is arguably degrading. Furthermore, the analogy to dog housing also brings up a common 
theme among interrogation techniques, that of equating detainees with dogs.  
In McKelvey’s book Monstering, she quotes Brigadier General Janis L. Karpinski 
(commander of the 8ooth Military Police Brigade, which worked at Abu Ghraib) who in 
turn quotes MG Miller as saying,  
‘[A] detainee never leaves the cell if he’s not escorted by two MPs in leg irons, and hand irons, and 
a belly chain. And there was no mistake about who was in charge. And you have to treat these 
detainees like dogs.’ (qtd. in McKelvey 12)  
 
There are three assumptions evident in MG Miller’s concluding statement. Military 
personnel should have no doubt in their minds that the detainees are not their equals; they 
are not fully human. Subhuman status requires subhuman treatment. Second, detainees 
must be made to understand that they are subhuman through their treatment. Third, this 
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type of treatment is necessary in order to elicit cooperation and thus intelligence from 
detainees. 
MG Miller’s sentiment about the dog status of detainees did not fall on deaf ears. 
Though this was never the wording used by top officials such as Rumsfeld or Cheney, the 
behavior of the soldiers at Abu Ghraib points to an adoption of Miller’s attitude. What 
follows are several excerpts from sworn statements made by Abu Ghraib detainees, made 
public by The Washington Post: 
‘…[T]hey treated us like animals not humans…they left us for the next two days naked with no 
clothes, with no mattresses, as if we were dogs.’ 
‘[T]hey forced us to walk like dogs on our hands and knees. And we had to bark like a dog and if 
we didn’t do that, they started hitting us hard on our face and chest with no mercy.’ 
‘Some of the things they did was make me sit down like a dog, and they would hold the string from 
the bag [placed over his head] and they made me bark like a dog and they were laughing at me.’ 
‘Q: Did the guards force you to crawl on your hands and knees on the ground? A: Yes…Q: What 
were the guards doing while you were crawling on your hands and knees? A: They were sitting on 
our backs like riding animals.’ 
 
Recall that al-Kahtani (Guantanamo), too, was asked to growl and a leash was placed 
around his neck (chapter III.III). One of the most infamous Abu Ghraib photos is that of 
Private First Class Lynndie England holding a leash that had been placed around the neck 
of a detainee, who is lying naked on the floor. Unmuzzled dogs were used at Abu Ghraib. 
The motive surrounding the dog techniques seems to go beyond the securing of 
cooperation so as to extract vital information; it is as if there was an a priori assumption 
that the detainees were inferior creatures. Such an attitude, combined with the more 
relaxed attitude towards psychological tools over physical ones, made abuse more likely at 
Abu Ghraib.  
Also worth further examination is the popularity of sexual techniques, which were 
derived from the original EIT of nudity. The way in which this technique was applied – in 
the presence of multiple US personnel who were not trained interrogators, involving 
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multiple detainees, the imitation of sexual acts, and recorded through photographs and 
video – goes far beyond the necessities that interrogation requires and are unquestionably 
sadistic. They were a form of sick entertainment for those in charge and served to 
humiliate and degrade the detainees. They induced a sense of shame and guilt in the 
detainees. Yet these are psychological side effects and are thus more difficult to quantify 
and therefore put strict limitations on them. In addition, guides such as KUBARK support 
the inducing of psychological harm; the objective is to remove all levels of comfort and of 
the known and make the detainee feel helpless.  
Danner discusses how KUBARK’s logic explains what was seen in the Abu Ghraib 
photographs. 
Viewed in this light, the garish scenes of humiliation pouring out in the photographs and 
depositions from Abu Ghraib…begin to be comprehensible; they are in fact staged operas of 
fabricated shame, intended to ‘intensify’ the prisoner’s ‘guilt feelings, increase his anxiety and his 
urge to cooperate…(Danner 18)  
 
KUBARK’s contribution parallels Thiessen’s justification of the techniques used against 
al-Kahtani (chapter III.III), in an “ends justify the means” kind of attitude. The sexual 
humiliation that al-Kahtani experienced, Thiessen argued, was a creative application of 
some of the psychological interrogation techniques outlined in FM 34-52. Psychological 
manipulation is okay because it quickly breaks the detainee down and as for permanent or 
lasting mental scarring, that is difficult to measure and unlikely anyway. As Lt. Gen. 
Sanchez said, it is about taking advantage of a detainee’s weaknesses and emotions and 
exploiting them to gain his cooperation.  
As the techniques demonstrate, one such weakness was the Arab culture’s 
sensitivity to sexuality. “[S]ome of the techniques seem clearly designed to exploit the 
particular sensitivities of Arab culture to public embarrassment, particularly in sexual 
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matters” (Danner 18). The refrain from the administration goes, these methods are no 
worse than those used in American college fraternity hazing – and they are so useful for 
gaining detainee compliance – that any concerns about abuse or torture seem misplaced. 
Such a stance reflects well the tone of the August 1, 2002 “torture memo,” reflecting 
everything from the assertion that no limitations could be placed on interrogation 
techniques if the president thought it was necessary for national security to making the 
definition of torture so narrow.  
There were, of course, differing opinions on the topic of sexual and public 
humiliation among US personnel. In the fall of 2003, the Marine Corps, in an attempt to 
help them better understand the population they would be working with and thus to help 
foster cooperation with them, was given the following guidelines, among others, for its 
operations in Iraq: 
‘Do not shame or humiliate a man in public. Shaming a man will cause him and his family to be  
anti-[US] Coalition. 
The most important qualifier for all shame is for a third party to witness the act. If you must do 
something likely to cause shame, remove the person from view other others. 
Shame is given by placing hoods over a detainee’s head. Avoid this practice. 
Placing a detainee on the ground or putting a foot on him implies you are God. This is one of the 
worst things we can do. 
Arabs consider the following things unclean: 
Feet or soles of feet. 
Using the bathroom around others. Unlike Marines, who are used to open-air toilets, Arab men 
will not shower/use the bathroom together. 
Bodily fluids…’ (qtd. in Danner 18) 
 
These recommendations reflect an entirely different philosophy as to how to make 
detainees compliant than that espoused by KUBARK. As opposed to the fear-and-control 
strategy, the Marine Corps guidelines intentionally eschew humiliating and shameful 
situations. The objective is to foster cooperation and rapport through trust and not 
through domination.  
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These guidelines were released either slightly prior to or simultaneously with the 
occurrence of the Abu Ghraib abuses. They were not released years later as retroactive 
finger-wagging and knowledge based on lessons learned. The US knew enough about 
Arab culture to exploit it; interrogators and other personnel took advantage of Arab 
cultural sensitivities, particularly to sexual and public humiliation, to create an 
interrogation plan particular to the Arab world. A detainee will often say whatever he 
believes his interrogator wants to hear in order to stop the pain. It is also to stop the 
shame. Particularly in the case of photographs and videos, that meant that the suffering 
occurring within the prison could easily extend beyond the prison walls and serve as a 
permanent reminder of such a traumatizing experience. The photographs broadcasted the 
detainees’ shame to the world.  
Some might be tempted to say that the comparison with Marine Corps policy 
demonstrates that abuses were by and large a product of military rank. As states The 
Taguba Report in regards to Army personnel at Abu Ghraib: 
‘…[P]rior to its deployment to Iraq for Operation Iraqi Freedom, the 320th MP Battalion and the 
372nd MP Company had received no training in detention/internee operations. I also find that very 
little instruction or training was provided to MP personnel on the applicable rules of the Geneva 
Conventions Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War…’ (qtd. in Danner 295) 
 
Many of those serving at Abu Ghraib had never before left the US and were in their late 
teens or early twenties. Low-ranking Army personnel, poorly trained, perhaps not very 
intelligent, and as yet not well integrated into Army culture, let their prejudiced 
imaginations run loose under the combined stress, fear and boredom of their jobs.  
Yet there are holes to this argument. Task Force 6-26 at Camp Nama, for example, 
was in fact an elite Special Operations forces unit, considered to be one of the military’s 
“most highly trained counterterrorism units” (Marshall). Furthermore, “Twice daily at 
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noon and midnight military interrogators and their supervisors met with officials from the 
CIA, FBI and allied military units to review operations and new intelligence.” Many 
highly trained and disparate groups worked together at Camp Nama. The truth is that 
many of the repulsive tactics used at Abu Ghraib were implemented at many different 
locations and by high-ranking as well as low-ranking military personnel. Furthermore, 
objections were raised about Camp Nama procedures on multiple occasions. At separate 
times, both the CIA and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) stopped operating at the 
camp over objections to detainee treatment.42 Camp Nama, Abu Ghraib, and Guantanamo 
were run by very different personnel, but there are many parallels in the ways in which 
they handled detainees.  
To return to the issue of shame, EIT-induced shame can be so strong as to produce 
many of the same consequences that torture does. False confessions are one example. 
Three British men held at Guantanamo Bay confessed to appearing in a 2000 video with 
Osama bin Laden after undergoing beatings, hooding, stripping, being photographed 
naked, sleep deprivation, drug injection, being shown pornography, shaving, and shackled 
into stress positions. It is certainly possible that their stories could have involved some 
hyperbole; it is well-known that one of al-Qaeda’s training techniques is to teach its men to 
claim abuse because it will inevitably evoke the sympathy of the international community 
and make the US look like the bad guy. However, their stories seem to pass muster 
because when authorities realized that the confessions were false, all three were flown 
back to London and released without charge, with no explanation given. Had they truly 
                                                
42 These concerns potentially contributed to the relocation of Camp Nama. “In the summer of 2004, Camp 
Nama closed and the unit moved to a new headquarters in Balad, 45 miles north of Baghdad. The unit's 
operations are now shrouded in even tighter secrecy” (Marshall). 
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been important detainees, they probably would not have been released and been free to 
talk with the media.43 
Torture induces false confessions for two reasons. On the one hand, the pain and 
shame is so profound that the subject will want to do anything simply to make it stop. On 
the other, torture has a fundamentally dehumanizing effect, whereby the subject is broken 
emotionally, mentally, and physically. Thus anything he says is highly questionable as he is 
not in full control of his senses.  
Thiessen argues that this common critique spouted by Bush Administration 
opponents is false because interrogation techniques are utilized separately from the 
questioning period (de-briefing). The techniques approved and implemented by the CIA 
would not result in the total destruction of the person. Yet it is clear that this division of 
stages was not a uniform practice and the way in which EITs were implemented in many 
other instances – and particularly on the many detainees who did not fall under the 
category of those who qualified for EITs – demonstrates the breaking of detainees and 
thus their fecklessness in providing information to stop the next terrorist attack.  
There are those, furthermore, who argue that none of the EITs were necessary. 
Among them is Matthew Alexander, a former military interrogator who performed 300 
interrogations himself and supervised 1000. His philosophy is that to be an effective 
interrogator, what you need is a “chair, brain, and a heart” (Amnesty International USA 
Annual General Meeting). Most importantly, the interrogator must gain the trust of the 
detainee. The interrogator must not come in with a spirit of dominance, which contrasts 
sharply with the attitude of Camp Nama and Abu Ghraib personnel. The interrogator 
                                                
43 For more details, see Ward, Jonathan. “British Men Report Abuse from Guantanamo.” CNN.com. 4 Aug. 
2004: n.pg. Web. 12 Jan. 2010 <http://www.cnn.com/2004/LAW/08/04/guantanamo.abuse.accusations/>. 
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must sympathize with the detainee in order to get him to cooperate. Sympathy acts as a 
restraint on interrogators; it reminds them of the purpose of their job and reminds them of 
the essential humanity of their subject.  
It seems as if, in the cases where abuse occurred, there was a whole-scale absence 
of such sympathy. Personnel who abused came in with an attitude that detainees were 
inferior beings, aided by public statements of government officials regarding the 
dangerous and nasty nature of the enemy and the language of such manuals as SERE and 
KUBARK, as well as the confusion regarding which techniques when, on whom, with 
what frequency, etc. The casual attitude towards psychological manipulation also played 
an important role; it is a side effect of not seeing the enemy as one’s equal. The lack of an 
appreciation for what mental manipulation can do to a person – evident from the White 
House down to the Army privates – greatly contributed to the occurrence of abuse. 
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Chapter IV.VII: Other Personnel (interpreters) 
As mentioned before, several groups operated together at the various US detention 
facilities located in Afghanistan, Iraq, Guantanamo Bay, and CIA “black sites.” One group 
consisted of civilian contractors, including interpreters. Lacking sufficient bilingual 
(English and Arabic) speakers within its ranks, the US military searched desperately both 
within the US and throughout parts of the Middle East for interpreters, who were vital to 
facilitating interrogations. Desperation resulted in a lowering of standards. Those lower 
standards meant that many of the interpreters had personal biases against the prisoners, 
biases that military personnel, unfamiliar with the culture, customs, language, religion, or 
history of the Middle East, would not be able to detect.44 These biases translated into 
intentional and unintentional mistranslation of detainee’s statements and at times 
encouragement of harsher treatment. 
Several of the interrogators at Abu Ghraib, for example, were Iraqi Chaldeans, 
many of whom, because of their position as a religious minority that was persecuted under 
Saddam, had a “personal stake in overthrowing” Saddam’s regime (McKelvey 50). Should 
they come across a prisoner who they knew or learned was sympathetic to the regime, 
they could use that to misconstrue what the prisoner said, resulting in prolonged 
interrogation sessions, more beatings, etc.  
Ex-patriots now living in the US who were hired had their own scores to settle. 
“[S]ome US Arabic speakers, acting as interpreters, were responsible for assisting 
individuals who once had been their oppressors and were now detainees in US custody” 
                                                
44 This situation is very similar to that of the US’ use of bounties to round up Al-Qaeda and Taliban 
members, analyzed in footnote 26. 
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(McKelvey 52). Many of the interpreters from the US had fled Iraq to escape Saddam’s 
regime. Facilitating the abuse of a regime sympathizer was a way to exact revenge.  
Marwan Mawiri, who worked for a private military contractor as an interpreter 
from 2003 to 2004, has testified to how personal prejudice played a role in the abuses.  
‘When they [the interpreters] got there, the Kurdish linguists became lobbyists for the Kurdish 
cause. The Shia linguists became linguists for the Shia cause. Kurds were turning in Arabs…Shia 
were turning in Sunnis…And who got burned? American soldiers…’ (qtd. in McKelvey 52) 
 
The US’ unfamiliarity with the enemy contributed not only to inhumane treatment, but 
also produced many unintentional consequences, too, like that of interpreters who 
manipulated both prisoners and guards for their own personal gain.  
Mawiri’s comment also illuminates the often non-discussed flipside to torture: it 
affects the interrogator, too. In depriving another of his will, there is an inevitable 
psychological weight that falls on the shoulders of the interrogator. Shame and guilt can 
be felt by both detainee and interrogator.  
Shannon P. Meehan, formerly an Army lieutenant stationed in Iraq, wrote for the 
New York Times about the impact that killing has had on her. 
Killing enemy combatants comes with its own emotional costs. On the surface, we feel as soldiers 
that killing the enemy should not affect us – it is our job, after all. But it is still killing, and on a 
subconscious level, it changes you. You’ve killed. You’ve taken life…The feelings of disbelief that 
initially filled me quickly transformed into feelings of rage and self-loathing…What I found, 
though is that you feel the shock and weight of it only when you kill an enemy for the first time, 
when you move from zero to one. Once you’ve crossed that line, there is little difference in killing 
10 or 20 or 30 more after that. 
 
War erodes one’s regard for human life. Soldiers cause or witness so many deaths and 
disappearances that it becomes routine. It becomes an excepted part of existence. After a while, 
you can begin to lose regard for your own life as well. (Meehan, A23)  
 
Although killing can be the outcome of certain tortures, the purpose of the above quote is 
not to equate death and torture. Nor is it to suggest that Ms. Meehan is the ultimate 
authority on what it is like to fight in a war. The quote was chosen because it explains 
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quite well the problems associated with torture. It is the job of the interrogator to 
interrogate; it is his job to make the detainee cooperate. Yet once he has tortured, he can 
never quite be the same person again. In robbing another of his will and humanity, the 
interrogator has lost some of his right to his own will and humanity. This realization 
produces a sense of “self-loathing,” in which the interrogator asks himself: What gave him 
the right to deprive another of his humanity? It begs the question of whether or not 
humans are fundamentally equal and are deserving of a bare minimum of treatment. 
Torture happens when the subject is not considered one’s equal; it is this flawed logic that 
can haunt the interrogator afterwards, as it did Ms. Meehan. 
Furthermore, she points out that this regret is strongest only after the first death. 
Again, there are parallels with torture. Recall the discussion about how the EITs provoked 
a fundamental change by breaking the physical barrier; interrogators were allowed to 
make physical contact with detainees. That was the seed that sparked all of the other 
physical abuses that followed; once the gate was opened, some took it upon themselves to 
run with it, for they were defending their country, after all. Once physical contact was 
allowed and encouraged – whether by White House memos or the wink and nod of a 
superior or from peer pressure from fellow soldiers – the sense of taboo associated with it 
had been removed, allowing it to become a more routine practice. Abuse can quickly 
escalate and a person’s sensitivity to what constitutes abuse decreases the more they are 
engaged in it. As was the case with Abu Ghraib, once one soldier began to abuse a 
detainee and no reprimand was issued by a superior, peer pressure and a sense of 
camaraderie would kick in and soon all would partake in the abuse.  
It is these realities that contributed to the war on terror abuses. Detainees did get 
“burned,” but so did American soldiers, and not just those who faced criminal charges. 
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Anyone involved will have been changed and his sense of respect for human life will have 
undoubtedly been challenged because of the lack of respect for human life extended to 
those within his custody. 
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IV.VIII: The Problem of Torture – A Summary of Key Findings 
 In the First Amendment Supreme Court case Jacobellis vs. Ohio (1964), Justice 
Potter Stewart, in defining what he believed to be “hard-core pornography” (and thus not 
protected by the First Amendment right to freedom of speech), he argued, “I shall not 
today attempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be embraced within 
[said category]…But I know it when I see it.” Some would argue that the same sentiment 
could be applied to the discussion of torture and once and for all clarify its definition.  
Yet this view is overly simplistic, for if simply seeing a technique employed is 
enough to determine its classification, then how could soldiers believe that stripping 
detainees, chaining them hand and foot to the floor, and beating them was okay to do? 
Some of the personnel at Abu Ghraib felt that their behavior was so in accord with 
military policy that they used the photos as the background image (wallpaper) on their 
laptops.45 Such a casual attitude towards the abuses cannot be blamed solely on the work 
of the soldier. This concluding section seeks to reiterate some of the major pieces of 
evidence that led to the abuse and torture of war-on-terror detainees, with a special 
emphasis on making the connection between policy decisions and rhetoric from the top 
and what happened on the ground. 
Certainly many at Abu Ghraib were untrained and very young. Former Air Force 
officer Matthew Alexander argues that in fact most military interrogators (at least in Iraq, 
where he was stationed) were outside of the US for the first time in their lives. Many had 
never before seen a Muslim. Once they arrived, they encountered a “wink and a nudge” 
attitude about doing whatever it took to accomplish the mission – and such an attitude was 
                                                
45 McKelvey 25 
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particularly potent for such a young crowd. It does not seem to be very enlightening that 
low-ranking military personnel, placed in a permissive and dangerous environment with 
an unclear chain of command and guidelines, are at considerably increased risk of 
engaging in such immoral behavior. Vague rules are an invitation for the worst tendencies 
within the human being to come out. But as this paper has also sought to highlight, it is 
not just Army privates that are to blame; abuse was more pervasive and thus the analysis 
of many more contributing factors. 
First, the Bush Administration changed the definition of torture as enshrined in 
international (CAT) and federal law (18 U.S.C. § 2340-2340A) for a variety of reasons, 
among them fear of legal reprisal and a sincere belief that this was a new war that 
demanded new standards. The result was a very narrow interpretation of torture that, 
furthermore, only illegalized torture and not cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment or 
punishment. This was a departure from the standards of the Constitution, the US Army 
Field Manual on Interrogation, and the US Military Code of Justice.  
In addition, the August 1, 2002 Bybee/Yoo memo stated that the president was 
allowed to break the torture statute if it interfered with his commander-in-chief 
responsibilities. The memo also effectively silenced Congress, the State Department, the 
Supreme Court, and any other government body that wanted to have its two cents in 
forming detainee policy by placing all power over detainee treatment policy into the hands 
of the executive and keeping a tight hold on information regarding exactly what the 
administration was doing. 
Geneva Convention protections were also rendered invalid in Afghanistan, 
Guantanamo Bay, and CIA “black sites,” but remained for Iraq, causing confusion for 
soldiers trained to view GC as the standard for all international wars. New terminology 
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such as “unlawful enemy combatant” provoked further changes in the rules of warfare and 
thus complicated the situation even more. 
In developing the actual list of interrogation techniques, the Bush Administration 
implemented a second tier of interrogation techniques (EITs) on top of those provided by 
FM 34-52, creating a break with past military protocol that caused great confusion in the 
many instances in which the CIA and the military were working alongside of each other. 
EITs were originally designed for use against the most high-profile detainees, but over the 
course of the war, they became standard procedure for a majority of detainees, some of 
whom were protected by the Geneva Conventions. Furthermore, EITs broke the taboo 
against physical contact with detainees by authorizing such techniques as slapping, which 
opened up the way for the use of even harsher physical methods. 
SERE and KUBARK also provided considerable guidance in developing EITs, and 
their focus on psychological manipulation (i.e. through nudity and sensory deprivation) 
contributed to the abuses. Their philosophy of fear-and-control also pervaded the 
atmosphere of interrogations, and encouraged soldiers to view detainees in an inferior and 
alien light. Abuse was thus more easily justified, since the enemy was not perceived as 
fully human. Such a perception was reinforced by the “gloves coming off” rhetoric of top 
officials in the White House, CIA, and military. Interpreters with their own personal 
biases added fuel to the flame. 
Perhaps many of the techniques, by themselves and done infrequently, would not 
constitute torture. However, they were not employed in such a manner. Many were done 
simultaneously and repeatedly. Determining what constituted torture during the Bush 
Administration years was complicated by many factors, as this thesis has tried to prove, 
not least of them being the extensive use of psychological torture which, to the naked eye, 
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may not seem like torture or even particularly damaging, but merely uncomfortable (i.e. 
prolonged solitary confinement or sleep deprivation).  
There is no simply right way to torture; the ends, for however compelling they may be, 
never justify the means (torture) because it deprives the tortured of the most fundamental 
aspect of his identity, his humanity. 
[T]he problem of torture is…a particular case of what is sometimes called the problem of dirty 
hands: that is, a species of moral dilemma, where, in doing what appears to be the right or the best 
thing in the circumstances, we cannot avoid doing wrong. (Lukes 2) 
 
Soldiers, CIA personnel, and civilian contractors are all told that what they do is in 
defense of the motherland; thus it can be easy to fall into “the ends justify the means” way 
of thinking. However, condoning torture introduces a profoundly dangerous moral 
relativity about what is an acceptable way to treat others and what the value of one 
human’s life versus another is.    
At the 2000 Republican National Convention, President Bush talked about the 
need for both parties to end “politics of fear.” Yet this is exactly the means by which 
President Bush led his administration, constantly impressing the message that stakes were 
so high that everything and anything had to be allowed. This was a new war with a new 
enemy and the US had to be permitted to do whatever it believed necessary – even if it 
broke the law – to win the war. That meant, for example, discarding the US Army Field 
Manual on Interrogation’s labeling of such techniques as prolonged stress positions and 
abnormal sleep deprivation as torture. It meant using fear as the main weapon against the 
enemy; creating a sense of fear and helplessness in detainees was considered the most 
effective way of rendering them compliant. What was authorized by the Bush 
Administration raises questions about the necessity of changing standards and whether 
what constitutes torture is a relative term based on the perception of the threat level. 
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Admittedly, the Bush Administration had much to fear as it tried to balance 
adherence to the law, an amorphous enemy, and saving American lives. Yet the extent of 
the terror felt by the highest officials rapidly dissipated among the populace and allies as 
the passing of time brought no more attacks and no clear military victories. What was seen 
within parts of the administration as a “better safe than sorry” strategy was perceived as 
fear mongering in order to scare the American public into surrendering civil liberties and 
military traditions in the name of a new enemy.  
…[M]uch of the country and most of our allies didn’t think we were (or should be) at war with 
Islamist terrorists…they simply did not trust the administration’s claim that the threat of terrorism 
warranted a wholesale military response. Public judgments about the legality of presidential 
actions are colored by public perceptions of the stakes. When a nation is unambiguously at war 
and believes its future is at risk, practices that would have seemed wrong in peacetime are viewed 
as necessary and thus legitimate. (Goldsmith 115)  
 
Had the Bush Administration been more sensitive to public criticism, it would have had 
many opportunities to correct itself, particularly if it had included Congress more in its 
policy making. For the first several years of the war however, the Bush Administration 
never toned down its rhetoric and was never willing to admit to mistakes. It was not 
willing to throw itself at the mercy of Congress and/or the public as it navigated the war 
on terror.  
The Bush Administration did not conduct itself in a manner that inspired trust. It 
emphasized secretiveness and an almost authoritarian control over information and its 
policy decisions. Again, the attitude at the top reflected what occurred on the ground; the 
government was not trying to gain the American people’s trust in the same way that 
interrogators were not trained to gain the trust of detainees. The objective was to keep the 
opposition in the dark and make very clear who was in charge. To the American public, 
that meant public declarations of executive prerogative and national security arguments. 
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To the detainees, that meant employing interrogation tactics that blatantly suggested that 
the detainee was inferior and subhuman in comparison to his captors.  
There are certainly those who will not be persuaded by the argument that the 
abuse and torture that detainees suffered was the result of policy decisions made at the top 
and that, therefore, the President and other high officials were aware of and equally guilty 
of what happened. The argument concerning systemic abuse has many critics. However, 
this thesis hopes to demonstrate that US engagement in inhumane and degrading practices 
is possible given the way that the administration approached its antiterrorism policy and if 
changes are not made now, what were (some argue) isolated incidences of abuse could 
become a part of a much larger problem. That torture and abuse have not been more 
rampant is more of an accident rather than a matter of policy, for the policy was written in 
such a way as to dehumanize the enemy and thus make inhumane treatment more 
justifiable. Changes need to happen if Americans wish to prevent more Abu Ghraibs.  
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CHAPTER V: CHANGES AND IMPLICATIONS 
“‘[T]orture should remain anathema to a liberal democracy and should never be regulated, 
countenanced, or covertly accepted in a war on terror. For torture, when committed by a state, expresses the state’s 
ultimate view that human beings are expendable. This view is antithetical to the spirit of any constitutional 
society whose raison d’être is the control of violence and coercion in the name of human dignity and freedom.’” 
-Michael Ignatieff, qtd. in Lukes 4 
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V.I: Torture and Democracy 
Terrorism, particularly suicide bombing, relies on the notion that human life is 
expendable in the name of a greater goal. Terrorists rely on targeting civilian populations 
to produce the greatest human loss for the least amount of money. The more deaths, the 
more news coverage there will be. The more news coverage, the farther their message can 
spread. The farther the message spreads, the more members they can have and the greater 
likelihood of achieving their aims. Humans are necessary collateral damage.  
Torture is another way to view human life as a means to an end. Human life is 
considered secondary to the greater purpose; in the case of the US, it would be to collect 
information to prevent future deaths in another terrorist attack. It is as if the US has 
adopted a version of the terrorist’s own view towards life. Torture goes beyond the 
battlefield reality of enemy soldiers shooting each other. Torture is a denial of the other 
person’s essence.  
It seemed that what the Bush Administration endorsed was the sacrifice of 
democratic rules for the preservation of them. As Michael Ignatieff suggests, there should 
be a “‘lesser evil morality’ according to which ‘necessity may require us to take actions in 
defence of democracy which will stray from democracy’s own foundational commitments 
to dignity’” (qtd. in Lukes 4). If the US temporarily sacrifices its principles now, they will 
be preserved in the long run. Furthermore, there is an understanding of greater and lesser 
evils, where some things are permissible in certain circumstances.  
This logic has been dismissed by certain pieces of legislation and policy changes 
that have happened since the Abu Ghraib scandal became public. Beginning in 2005, the 
administration began to compromise on many aspects of its counter-terror program in an 
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effort to address the concerns of the public. Some of those compromises are addressed in 
this section, namely the replacement of the August 1, 2002 Bybee/Yoo memo, the Detainee 
Treatment Act of 2005, the 2006 update to the US Army Field Manual on Interrogation, 
and finally, President Obama’s efforts.  
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V.II: 18 U.S.C. § 2340-2340A  
As discussed previously, the qualifications made by OLC to the section of the 
United States criminal law code that prohibits torture were so controversial that OLC 
(specifically former Assistant Attorney General Jack Goldsmith) rescinded the August 1, 
2002 memo interpreting the law. The replacement memo states:  
Questions have…been raised, both by this Office and by others, about the appropriateness and 
relevance of the non-statutory discussion in the August 2002 Memorandum, and also about 
various aspects of the statutory analysis, in particular the statement that ‘severe’ pain under the 
statute was limited to pain ‘equivalent in intensity to the pain accompanying serious physical 
injury, such as organ failure, impairment of bodily function, or even death.’ (Levin, 30 Dec. 2004) 
 
In essence, the memo concludes that the US must adhere to Section 18 U.S.C. § 2340-
2340A as it stood before the August 1, 2002 memo.  
However, it bestows its approval upon all of the techniques previously authorized, 
judging none of them to be illegal. In a footnote, Levin writes: 
While we have identified various disagreements with the August 2002 Memorandum, we have 
reviewed this Office's prior opinions addressing issues involving treatment of detainees and do not 
believe that any of their conclusions would be different under the standards set forth in this 
memorandum.  
 
This fact points to a very important reality of circumstances that greatly influenced 
the narrative on the Left as to the true story of the war on terror. The legal rhetoric was 
very broad, much broader than that needed for many of the specific techniques approved. 
It is thus easy to make the leap to believing that the US was trying to create a window of 
flexibility for itself so that it would be legally protected to go far beyond those specific 
techniques and in that gray area of unspecified creativity operated those soldiers and 
personnel who did abuse detainees. 
 
 
138 
V.III: The Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 
The Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 helped to counteract the power of the terms 
“enemy combatant” or “unlawful enemy combatant” because it proscribed uniform 
interrogation techniques for all detainees, “regardless of status or characterization” [FM 2-
22.3 (FM 34-52): Human Intelligence Collector Operations vi]. As discussed in chapter 
III.III, there was serious confusion as to which were valuable detainees and which were 
not and what treatment each should receive. The Detainee Treatment Act sought to 
eliminate that ambiguity by creating one standard for all detainees. However, some 
exceptions were still made for the CIA, allowing it to continue with certain techniques 
such as waterboarding (Eggen).  
The potential impact of this bill was also tempered by the importance of the 
philosophy of executive privilege amongst members of the Bush team. In signing the act 
into law, President Bush included a signing statement “banning cruel, inhumane, and 
degrading treatment of detainees but reserved the right to ignore the ban under his power 
as commander in chief” (Honigsberg 33). The Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 attempted 
to erase the previous distinction the Bush Administration had made between cruel, 
inhumane, and degrading treatment (legal) and torture (illegal) by banning both. Bush’s 
signing statement, however, effectively maintained the legal distinction implemented by 
the Bush Administration in which torture alone was illegal.  
The signing statement reveals two important themes of the Bush Administration 
years. One is the belief that the president’s commander in chief authority is so broad and 
so vital to national security that anything that could potentially interfere with it is illegal. 
Secondly, the Bush Administration seemed concerned only with banning torture. There 
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did not seem to be any qualms about cruel, inhumane, and degrading techniques. Taken 
together, these points strongly suggest that the Bush Administration wanted legal 
protection to engage in cruel, inhumane, and degrading techniques, believing that not only 
was it within the commander in chief’s authority to authorize such techniques but also that 
these techniques were necessary for winning the war on terror. 
Goldsmith analyzes this signing statement in legal terms:  
…[A] signing statement serves no formal legal purpose. If President Bush later felt he needed to 
act in a way contrary to the McCain law [the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, sponsored by 
Senator John McCain], he could have made and acted upon and published the decision at that 
time without any prior signing statement. The only thing achieved by the statement at the time the 
President signed the bill was to spoil the tentative consensus and goodwill that had been reached 
with Capitol Hill on the issue, and further enflame mistrust of the President. (Goldsmith 211) 
 
Once again, the circumstances of the war and of the Bush Administration compelled 
President Bush to include exceptions which did not provide sufficient reassurance to the 
American public about what exactly the US was doing and why.  
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V.IV: The US Army Field Manual on Interrogation (2006 Revision) 
In direct response to what had been done by Army personnel post 9/11 
(particularly in regards to Abu Ghraib), an overhaul of the Field Manual on Interrogation 
was undertaken. The update explicitly addressed the issues concerning the role of the 
Army versus the CIA between detention and interrogation.  
The MPs will not take any actions to set conditions for interrogations (for example, ‘softening up’ 
a detainee). Additionally, in accordance with DOD [Department of Defense] Directive 3115.09, 
military working dogs, contracted dogs, or any other dog in use by a government agency shall not 
be used as a part of an interrogation approach nor to harass, intimate, threaten, or coerce a 
detainee for interrogation purposes…The only authorized interrogation approaches and 
techniques are those authorized by and listed in this manual, in accordance with the Detainee 
Treatment Act of 2005. Two approaches, Mutt and Jeff and False Flag, require approval by the 
first O-6 in the interrogator’s chain of command. The restricted interrogation technique 
‘Separation’ [solitary confinement or isolation] requires COCOM [or UCC, Unified Combat 
Command, a US joint military command] commander approval for use, and approval of each 
interrogation plan using ‘Separation’ by the First General Officer/Flag Officer (GO/FO) in the 
chain of command…use of all techniques at all locations must carefully comply with this manual 
and additional instructions contained in the latest DOD and COCOM policies. [FM 2-22.3 (FM 
34-52): Human Intelligence Collector Operations  3-8-1] 
 
In bold it states:  
All captured or detained personnel, regardless of status, shall be treated humanely, and in 
accordance with the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 and DOD Directive 2310.1E, “Department 
of Defense Detainee Program,” and no person in the custody or under the control of DOD, 
regardless of nationality or physical location, shall be subject to torture or cruel, inhuman, or 
degrading treatment or punishment, in accordance with and as defined in US law. [FM 2-22.3 
(FM 34-52): Human Intelligence Collector Operations  2-5-20] 
 
 The revised Field Manual applies to all branches of the military. This effort at 
uniformity is an important step in making clear what is legal and what is not – and much 
of what had been approved over the course of the first years of the Bush Administration 
was banned. The first sixteen techniques outlined in chapter III.I (FM 34-52) remained. 
Three additional techniques were added, justified given what has been learned since 
beginning the war on terror. The first two are techniques 17 and 18 from chapter III.II 
(Mutt and Jeff and False Flag). The third technique is isolation. However, all three of 
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these techniques require additional approval before being used, reinforcing the importance 
of the military chain of command (which also places responsibility for detainee treatment 
on other military personnel above MPs, perhaps in belated recognition of the fact that Abu 
Ghraib abuses were not just the product of MP behavior).  
However, as was the case with the Detainee Treatment Act, the Field Manual on 
Interrogation is not applicable to the CIA. Remember that besides the different 
requirements and needs of the military versus the CIA, the military is bound up in a 
completely different tradition than is the latter. The military lives and breathe by its code 
and by its chain of command. The United States Military Code of Justice, the US Army 
Field Manual on Interrogation, and the Geneva Conventions have long overseen military 
policy and operations.  
With the birth of the war on terror, the Bush Administration was asking the 
military to make significant changes to the way it had previously conducted itself and 
naturally, it had difficulty adjusting. It is in part due to its tradition and history of high 
standards why the wording of the 2006 revision to the Army Field Manual is so precise 
and detailed – and why both torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading punishment are 
prohibited, in contrast with the original Bush Administration declaration on detainee 
treatment, the August 1, 2002 memo which banned torture alone.  
Lt. Gen. John Kimmons, Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, when 
interviewed by CBS, qualified the additional three techniques added to FM 34-52 by 
stating that they were to be used “only on unlawful combatants, not POWS, only as an 
exception and only with permission of a high-level commander” (Alfano). A clear and 
orderly chain of command and clear legal distinctions among detainees are the key 
objectives of the new standards. 
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The 2006 revision also mentions such techniques as nudity and hooding for the first 
time, an acknowledgement of both their novelty and their recent use in military 
operations. It bans “forcing the detainee to be naked, perform sexual acts, or pose in a 
sexual manner [and] placing hoods or sacks over the head of a detainee; [nor can military 
personnel use]…duct tape over they eyes” [FM 2-22.3 (FM 34-52): Human Intelligence 
Collector Operations  2-5-21]. These are unquestionably judgment calls based on lessons 
learned from the abuses.  
Despite these reassurances, however, it must be remembered that similar 
restrictions were originally placed on these techniques, yet they still were abused and 
ended up becoming standard procedure for all detainees. This is important, concrete 
policy change but allowances and exceptions were made before; what will stop them from 
happening again? The next, and final, section serves to argue that one vital way of 
preventing further abuses lies in presidential leadership. 
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V.V: Final Thoughts – The Obama Administration 
“[O]ur constitutional democracy will not be preserved by better laws and institutional structures, but 
rather…by leaders with a commitment to the consent of the governed who have checks and balances stitched into 
their breasts. In the permanent emergency we face, the best hope for preserving both our security and our liberty is 
to select leaders who will be beholden to constitutional values even when they are forced to depart from 
 constitutional traditions.” -Goldsmith 216 
 
Torture is never publicly defensible in a constitutional, liberal democracy, 
regardless of who is in US custody or what their crime may be. This is an argument of 
principle; there are no circumstances in which torture is permissible in such a society, for 
it opens up the dangerous possibility of a quiet, slippery slope whereby the US moves 
more and more in the direction of the tyrannies it so reviles, leaving behind the values and 
morals that define the American tradition. As Professor Steven Lukes argues, torture  
…cannot be rendered liberal-democratically accountable, in the sense that it will sometimes be 
legitimate and, when not, punished, because its practice cannot be publicly recognized without 
undermining both the democratic and liberal components of liberal democracy. (1)  
 
The options seem to be to either continue to torture and ignore it or stop torturing 
completely and permanently out of recognition of its fundamental incompatibility with the 
values, beliefs, and morals of a liberal democratic society.  
One such belief is intricately tied to the topic of torture, namely, equality among 
men. Torture involves an assumption of the inferiority of the subject to an extreme; one 
cannot believe in a shared human essence – an absolute bare minimum of standards that 
all humans are deserving of – if one condones and engages in torture.  
It was this message that the Bush Administration tried to put forth in its Middle 
East policy. The rhetoric of bringing free societies to the Afghani and Iraqi people seemed 
to present a message of viewing them as equals to the Americans, as equally deserving of 
what Americans view as the best form of government – their government: a peaceful, 
liberal democratic society where legitimate, elected governments regularly hand over 
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power to subsequent administrations and individual rights and liberties are protected and 
preserved. Yet abuse and torture are the products of viewing the other in an unequal light, 
as one’s inferior, as subhuman. Instances of abuse on the ground were not in accord with 
the political message being sent from the top.  
Part of what happened is that the rhetoric made a point of distinguishing between 
civilians (those whose “hearts and minds” the US tried to win and saw as its equal) and 
terrorists (not equal and thus not deserving of democracy). But the way policy was 
designed and the way it was implemented in the field erased most distinctions between 
those categories, and in the end, anyone who came into US custody faced the risk of being 
abused and tortured in the gruesome ways detailed throughout this paper. The US is 
supposed to be a liberator, spreading its values of freedom and equality. Yet the US has 
played a role in spreading terror as well.  
The US must be careful to do everything within its power to maintain a pristine 
reputation, because otherwise it is likely that some of those “hearts and minds” will turn 
“anti-coalition,” and instead fall into the arms of the insurgents and terrorists. 
In fighting a guerrilla war, the essential weapon is not tanks or helicopters but intelligence, and the 
single essential tool to obtain it is reliable political support among the population. [The US’ 
strategy] means not only that the occupier lacks the political support necessary to find and destroy 
the insurgents but that it has been forced by the insurgents to adopt tactics that will further lessen 
that support and create still more insurgents. It is, in short, a strategy of desperation and, in the 
end, a strategy of weakness. (Danner 33) 
 
The Bush Administration failed to establish an adequate level of trust with the American 
people about what it was doing, and it fueled much of the anger and backlash that 
occurred once evidence did start leaking to the press. The Bush Administration has also 
failed to earn the trust of the countries that it has occupied, which is a threat to US 
national security that Bush supporters such as Thiessen do not adequately address.  
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At the same time, this thesis has sought to show that the question concerning 
whether the US has engaged in systematic torture is far more nuanced than either the Left 
or the Right paints the situation. No officials explicitly tried to approve torture, but 
disagreements about how far one could go was highly contentious, hence the ever-
changing guidelines regarding interrogation techniques. That constant debate produced 
mass confusion on the ground, which increased the likelihood of abuse and torture.  
The debates stemmed, in part, out of the question that any democracy must ask 
itself in wartime: security or freedom, one or both, and to what extent? Francis Biddle, 
FDR’s Fourth Attorney General, spoke to this question in response to the attack on Pearl 
Harbor: 
‘The war would test whether our freedoms could endure…[a]nd although we had fought wars 
before, and our personal freedoms had survived, there had been periods of gross abuse, when 
hysteria and fear and hate ran high, and minorities were unlawfully and cruelly abused. Every man 
who cares about freedom must fight for it for the other man with whom he disagrees [emphasis added].’ (qtd. 
in Goldsmith 44) 
 
Biddle warned against the possible loss of civil liberties that might accompany the 
impending war, favoring freedom over security, while making it evident that it is human 
freedom that makes life worth living. Human equality is the fundamental mantra of any 
democracy and departing from this must always necessitate a serious public debate, if not 
always right away, at the very least soon after the fact. This paper is meant to contribute to 
that much needed debate. 
President Obama has certainly asked himself the same question of security vs. 
freedom and his actions are quite telling of where he stands. On his second day in office, 
he signed an executive order ordering the closing of Guantanamo Bay within a year. He 
also signed an order stating that interrogations performed on anyone in US custody must 
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conform to the US Army Field Manual (the 2006 version).46 That meant elimination of the 
CIA’s “enhanced interrogation techniques” program.  
First, by emphasizing that all personnel must adhere to the Field Manual, 
President Obama is erasing the previous distinction between the CIA and the military, a 
distinction that the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, the Military Commissions Act of 
2006, and the 2006 update to the Army Field Manual on Interrogation left in place. 
Furthermore, limiting techniques to those delineated in the Field Manual eliminates many 
of the most controversial techniques, such as waterboarding, nudity, physical contact, and 
the use of military dogs. The argument could certainly be made that erasing the distinction 
between the CIA and the military could actually be counter-productive. It will limit the 
CIA’s flexibility and thus potentially result in less and poorer quality intelligence used to 
prevent future terrorist attacks.  
Furthermore, the release of relevant documents shortly after this executive order 
had the potential to damage US efforts, while satisfying critics who had denounced the 
secrecy surrounding Bush Administration operations. Thiessen warns that “al-Qaeda will 
now use the information…to train its operatives to resist interrogation, and thus withhold 
information about planned attacks. Americans could die as a result” (13). Knowing that 
the enemy is becoming better trained in US interrogation techniques might encourage the 
CIA and the military to continue to push the envelope anyway, which could potentially 
lead to interrogation techniques even more questionable and dangerous than the ones 
already prohibited, as the US tries to keep pace with the enemy. If the US were to 
reinstate some plan of interrogation that went beyond the Army Field Manual, then it 
                                                
46 For more information, see Pickert, Kate. “The Army Field Manual.” Time.com. 26 Jan. 2009: n. pg. Web. 
18 Nov. 2009 <http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1873897,00.html>. 
147 
might have to implement even harsher techniques than those used before in order to 
maintain an element of surprise over the enemy – which would seem to produce the 
entirely opposite effect of the intention of eliminating the techniques in the first place. 
That the techniques were made public makes it difficult to simply reinstate the program 
and it is naïve to believe that it would still exert the same effectiveness. 
Although making public certain previously classified documents can be a 
potentially dangerous move, the American government must be fully aware that all future 
military campaigns will be done publicly. The role of mass media has transformed warfare; 
leaders must assume that what happens in an obscure prison like Abu Ghraib could 
become tomorrow’s headlines. Technology, from photographs to Twitter, cell phones to 
instant messaging, can broadcast the smallest incident to the world in the span of a few 
seconds.  
After the news of Abu Ghraib was made public, even the Bush Administration 
underwent a change in tone in regards to how much it would reveal about its methods. 
There suddenly developed an urgency to set the record straight. As National Security 
Advisor Steve Hadley put it, 
‘We all knew when we were doing this program in 2002 to 2003, even though it was classified and 
was not public, that at some point it would become public and we would have to explain our 
actions…The president, after 2004, basically says: Look, we need to take all these tools we’re 
using, and we need to bring them out of the shadows. We need to make them public. We need to 
frame them, we need to explain them, and then work with Congress to get a legislative basis for 
them, as a way of getting acceptance from the public, so that programs will endure and be 
available to me and my successor. We need to institutionalize the tools for fighting the war on 
terror.’ (qtd. in Thiessen 39)  
 
Yet why was this not done from the very beginning? Why not preempt the supposedly 
predictable process of leaking by taking the sense of unity that developed immediately 
following 9/11 and throw one’s self at the mercy of the American people and be honest 
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with them about the kinds of methods and tactics the US would need to employ to face 
such a formidable enemy? As Thiessen admits, “disclosing the [CIA] program” in 2006 
was done “in order to save it” (44). Those reasons ranged from fear of lawfare to 
dedication to a broad understanding of executive privilege to concern that divulging 
information would harm national security.  
While the Bush Administration did have some legitimate reasons for wanting to 
keep certain information under wrap, it failed to acknowledge that  
[t]he Terror Presidency’s most fundamental challenge is to establish adequate trust with the 
American people that enables the President to take the steps needed to fight an enemy that the 
public does not see and in some respects cannot comprehend. (Goldsmith 192)  
 
Goldsmith is true to point out that the distance the average American feels from the 
conflict makes it easier to view the stakes as not so high and criticism more likely. The war 
on terror  
…ha[s] brought no draft, little mobilization, relatively few casualties, and no shortages, rationing, 
or economic controls. Nor have we seen alarming army divisions, or decisive public victories. 
(Goldsmith 187) 
 
It is easy and tempting to paint the administration’s behavior as paranoiac exaggeration, 
which has the unavoidable corollary of provoking additional suspicion about the 
government’s intentions. The fact that this was a modern war that kept the public very 
distant from what was happening on the ground – which can easily feed misperception – 
did not bode well with the tight-lipped attitude of the administration. 
The Bush Administration, furthermore, for all of its efforts to aggrandize executive 
privilege,  
…borrowed against the power of future presidencies – presidencies that…will be viewed by 
Congress and the courts, whose assistance they need, with a harmful suspicion and mistrust 
because of the unnecessary unilateralism of the Bush years…a president’s authority is not 
measured primarily by his hard power found in the Constitution, statutes, and precedents, but 
rather by his softer powers to convince the other institutions of our society to come around to his 
point of view. (Goldsmith 140, 205) 
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Presidents will face the threat of terrorism for many, many years, if not for the rest of the 
US’ existence. Interrogations are simply one tool for facing that threat and any tool used 
must be placed on a foundation of trust and legality, which, while it certainly may take 
time and can be quite chaotic in a democracy, is necessary to remain a democracy. 
As to critics of Obama’s executive orders, it is necessary to understand why he felt 
compelled to do so. As this thesis has sought to demonstrate, President Obama’s decisions 
were a reflection of much of the public’s concern about the entire torture debate. The 
move was in response to what was perceived as mistakes made during the Bush years. 
One of his objectives was to regain the trust of the public, to wield that soft power that 
Goldsmith praises and which was often cast aside by the Bush Administration. Obama 
was trying to counter the secretive nature in which the Bush Administration conducted 
itself by issuing orders and releasing classified documents. Guantanamo Bay, for example, 
had become so synonymous in the public and international mind with torture and abuse 
that it would be good for public relations to close it.  
The fact is that allowing anyone to practice EITs provoked anxiety because of 
scandals like Abu Ghraib. No one was keen on allowing this to happen again and certainly 
not President Obama, since everything that happened from now on would be on his 
watch. President Obama took the opposite “better safe than sorry” approach of the Bush 
Administration. The Bush Administration approved almost everything to prevent further 
attacks; the Obama Administration has approved very little in order to prevent further 
abuse. Which is the morally superior choice?  
Thiessen criticizes Obama for making a move towards using more drones, whereby 
the US is killing terrorists, rather than capturing and interrogating them. He does not 
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believe that this is the morally superior choice because it deprives the US of critical 
intelligence that is forever lost with the death of the al-Qaeda operative. It is as if the US 
has gone as a nation from one extreme to the other: from permitting anything short of 
death (i.e. torture is limited to “organ failure, impairment of bodily function, or even 
death”) to now permitting only death so as to avoid torture. Yet the point is that 
interrogation makes the average human uncomfortable; it brings with it the possibility of 
bringing out the worst in humans and opens up the possibility of depriving someone of 
their humanity. It is a slippery slope that some would rather avoid all together rather than 
make gradual steps with a clear cut off line. Death in wartime is accepted; it is certainly 
easier for the public to digest the deaths of terrorists, rather than having to face the reality 
of the messy and harsh business that detention and interrogation can be.  
Hopefully, it will not have to be a choice for very long and a middle ground can be 
found between the two strategies, as is already evident by President Obama’s continuation 
of much of President Bush’s policies. An extreme reaction on either end will inevitably 
cause the US to sacrifice some of its good policies with its bad ones, which will simply 
produce more mistakes, albeit different ones.  
The president’s number one priority is to keep the American people safe. Yet 
making conscious efforts to prevent abuse is a testament to the strength of the values and 
principles that make the US an exceptional country and are the bedrock of American 
liberty. What the US needs right now is serious reflection, acknowledgment of failures and 
successes, and implementation of a strategy that does a better job of balancing liberty and 
security than either the Bush Administration did or the Obama Administration has up to 
now. As Danner puts it,  
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Like other scandals that have erupted during the Iraq war and the war on terror, it is not about 
revelation or disclosure but about the failure, once wrongdoing is disclosed, of politicians, officials, 
the press, and ultimately, citizens to act. The scandal is not about uncovering what is hidden, it is 
about seeing what is already there – and acting on it. (Danner xiv)  
 
The failure of the Bush and Obama Administrations to flesh out the faults of both of their 
poor policy decisions may doom the US to repeat them.  
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